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In this thesis, I study whether stock returns are predictable. Specifically, I study 
whether the focal firm’s1 linked partners or linked peers can forecast its future 
returns. The literature of return predictability has found that a lot of forecasting 
variables, which are mainly constructed by the focal firm’s own characteristics, 
can predict its future returns, but the predictive power from explicitly or 
implicitly linked firms is not fully explored and understood. The study of inter-
firm return predictability has become an interesting and important research 
field, since it challenges current asset pricing theory and models. 
 
In this thesis, my research questions are whether inter-firm return predictability 
exists in the ownership network (namely one new “explicit” network) and 
whether it exists in the similar employee satisfaction network (namely one new 
“implicit” network). The overall contribution of the thesis is to find new evidence 
of return predictability in the inter-firm networks. These new inter-firm return 
predictabilities are not only an interesting practical fact with implications for 




1 The focal firm means the firm that I mainly study and focus on. 
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In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I find the subsidiary-parent return predictability 
and parent-subsidiary return predictability in a global sample and different 
regional samples. In Chapter 4, I find that the returns of similar employee-
satisfaction-linked firm peers have predictive power over focal firm returns. 
These results have important implications to call for a new asset pricing model 


















This PhD thesis consists of three empirical chapters, which investigates 
information diffusion and return predictability in corporate networks in terms of 
the ownership network and the employee satisfaction linkage. The chapter 2 
and the chapter 3 can be read jointly. The chapter 4 can be read independently. 
 
In the Chapter 2, I find the return predictability in the complex ownership 
network. The focal firm’s returns can be forecasted by the lagged returns of 
their subsidiaries or parent firms. This return predictability pattern cannot be 
explained or subsumed by a series of firm characteristics and industry 
characteristics. This chapter finds the new evidence of return predictability in 
the explicit or concrete corporate network. 
 
The Chapter 3 investigates possible mechanisms to explain the empirical 
findings of the Chapter 2. I find underlying mechanisms of the investors’ limited 
attention, the limits to arbitrage, the opaque internal information of the 
conglomerate, and the information complexity, can explain the return 
predictability along ownership links. This chapter contributes new economic 
mechanisms to explain the return predictability in the corporate network.  
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In the Chapter 4, I study a novel inter-firm linkage, the employee satisfaction 
link. I find that lagged returns of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers can 
predict the returns of focal firms in the same labor competition network. 
Different with the product competition market, the common shocks to the labor 
competition market lead to the return predictability between employee 
satisfaction-linked firms. Different with the Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this 
















CHAPTER 1 — Introduction 
 
Modern finance began in the early 1970s. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and efficient market hypothesis (EMH) were established during that 
period. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was proposed by Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). The CAPM measures market risk 
and return relationship, and explains why some stocks, strategies, portfolios 
and funds can gain more returns than others in the market. Basically, a high 
expected return involves high market risks. The efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) was proposed by Malkiel and Fama (1970). The EMH claims that 
current stock prices instantaneously reflect all value-relevant information about 
the market and individual firms.  
 
During the 1970s, academics believed that returns could not be forecasted. 
Firstly, stock returns are unpredictable. Stock prices are close to random walks 
over time. Efficient market hypothesis introduced analyses that tried to 
examine whether past stock prices, moving average line and trading volumes 
could predict future stock prices and help investors to earn an abnormal return 
above the market return. Any apparent stock return predictability can either be 
regarded as data snooping, which will be disappeared out of sample, or non-
existent if I consider the transaction costs and trading constraints.  
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Secondly, bond returns are almost unpredictable. Bond returns come from the 
expectation model of term structure. If the short-term yields are less than the 
long-term yields, resulting in an upward sloping yield curve, this does not 
necessarily mean that the expected short-term bond returns are lower than the 
expected long-term bond returns. It is expected that the short-term interest 
rates will increase in the ensuing periods and investors can earn the same 
amounts by investing in either short-term or long-term bonds, if they invest in 
successive short-term bonds. 
 
In addition, the FX rates are not predictable. If one foreign country has higher 
interest rates than the home country’s interest rates, this does not necessarily 
indicate that abnormal returns can be earned by investing in that foreign 
country’s bonds rather than the home country’s bonds with a similar risk level, 
since its FX rate will be depreciated. Assuming the uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP) relationship holds, once you exchange the foreign bonds for the 
currency of your home country, you are expected to earn the same amount of 
funds from trading in bonds of the foreign or home country. 
 
Empirical evidence shows that professional fund managers are not able to 
outperform passively managed funds after correcting for market risk. Some 
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managers can beat the market index in some years, but that is attributed to 
good luck. Others do worse than the market in any given year, and the 
outcome looks like bad luck. Managers cannot maintain the good performance 
until the next year, though the amount they earn is above the average in the 
current year. The evidence shows that the historical average of actively 
managed funds does roughly 1% worse than the indices portfolios. 
 
These views indicate that asset markets are informationally efficient markets, 
which suggests that stock prices in the market reflect most fundamental value 
information. Competition leads to informational efficiency. It is not easy to 
make quick money, since the discovery of information about the traded assets’ 
value is very competitive. The only way to earn more profits is by bearing more 
risks. 
 
However, all of the above points have been replaced by a new series of return 
predictability research. Firstly, empirical evidence shows that stock returns 
were predictable through various financial ratios, such as the dividend-price 
and earnings-price ratios (Fama and French, 1989; Lewellen, 2004; Cochrane, 
2011). Later, other variables were also shown to have the ability to forecast 
stock returns, such as the spread between long-term and short-term bond 
yields, the consumption-wealth ratio, macroeconomic variables, and corporate 
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decision variables (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; Campbell and Thompson, 
2008). Hou et al. (2018) summarize 452 forecasting variables that can explain 
and predict the cross-section of stock returns in the US sample. 
 
The literature also covered returns on other asset classes, such as bonds, 
currencies, commodities, mutual funds, hedge funds, and real estate of many 
countries. First, bond returns are predictable. Although the expected model of 
term structure works in long periods, a soaring yield curve indicates that the 
expected returns of short-term bonds are lower than the expected returns of 
long-term bonds for the near future (Fama and French, 1989; Kirby, 1997; 
Ludvigson and Ng, 2009). 
 
In addition, the FX returns are predictable. For example, if you purchase bonds 
in a country where interest rates are not usually higher than bond interest rates 
in the US, you can still earn more profits from investing that country’s bonds 
after converting the money to dollars (Bekaert and Hodrick, 1992). The trading 
strategy is called the carry trade (i.e., borrow in a low interest rate market and 
invest in a high interest rate market). 
 
Finally, many funds can beat passive indices after correcting for market risks. 
Fund returns are predictable. For example, historically winning funds can 
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continue to outperform previously losing funds in the future. The persistent skill 
is proven successfully in active management. However, the multifactor model 
explains why some funds can earn consistent profits by chasing stable factor-
based investing ‘styles’ rather than persistent unique skills of stock selection 
(Ang et al., 2009; Ang, 2014). 
 
In this thesis, I study whether stock returns are predictable. Specifically, I study 
whether the focal firm’s2 linked partners or linked peers can forecast its future 
returns. The literature of return predictability has found that a large number of 
forecasting variables (Hou et al., 2018), which are mainly constructed by the 
focal firm’s own characteristics, can predict its future returns, but the predictive 
power from explicitly or implicitly linked firms is still not fully explored and 
understood. The study of inter-firm return predictability has become an 
interesting and important research field, since it challenges current asset 
pricing theory and models. 
 
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) propose that firms are not independent but linked 
with each other. Some links are clear and contractual, but some links are 
implicit and less transparent. A firm’s stock returns are not only influenced by 
the firm’s own information, but also by the linked firms’ value-relevant 
 
2 The focal firm means the firm that I mainly study and focus on. 
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information. The inter-firm return predictability is based on the use of the linked 
firms’ lagged returns to forecast the future returns of focal firms. The gradual 
information diffusion (Hong and Stein, 1999) can explain the return 
predictability across firms. The gradual information diffusion model predicts 
that as private information travels across the population, pricing accuracy 
would improve, and asset prices would exhibit momentum as a result. 
 
A large body of evidence confirms that the return predictability among firms 
has links to economics, technology, ownership and analysts, among others. 
Scholars have found that economically linked firms have return predictability. 
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) assess predictability between customers and 
suppliers. Cohen and Lou (2012) concentrate on the links between 
standalones and conglomerates. Huang (2015) and Finke and Weigert (2017) 
show that the foreign operation information of US firms and worldwide 
multinational firms can predict their returns. Cao et al. (2016) find that strategic 
alliance leads to return predictability. Parsons et al. (2019) find that some 
neighboring stocks can be predictors to forecast the future returns of focal 
returns. Lee et al. (2019) find technological innovation spillovers and 
predictable returns across firms. Ali and Hirshleifer (2019) find that stock 




An interesting question raised by this research is: why is there still return 
predictability over a long-time horizon (e.g., one month) even in a world where 
information transfers promptly through the existence of business networks? 
Although investors could conveniently receive a lot of financial information in 
this market of information explosion, investors still have limited cognitive 
abilities to deal with a wealth of information and may lack attention to essential 
value-relevant data that is not easy to observe. Here are two examples to 
highlight my points. Huberman and Regev (2001) study investors’ inattention 
to salient news about a company. They found that the stock price of a company 
soared on the rerelease of information in the New York Times that was 
published in Nature five months earlier. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) study 
investors’ inattention to the information of a firm’s main customers. The firm 
(Callaway) announced a big drop in revenue on June 2001, but the stock price 
of the supplier (Coastcast) did not plunge until July 2001. The two examples 
indicate that investors may have longer responses to the public information. 
These delayed responses led to return predictability over a long-time horizon 
(e.g., one month). 
 
In this thesis, the overriding research questions are whether inter-firm return 
predictability exists in the ownership network (namely one new “explicit” 
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network) and the inter-firm return predictability in the similar employee 
satisfaction network (namely one new “implicit” network). The main 
contribution of the thesis is to find new evidence of return predictability in the 
inter-firm networks. These new inter-firm return predictabilities are not only an 
interesting practical fact with implications for investing and hedging, but also 
have essential implications for new asset pricing factors. These new inter-firm 
return predictabilities indicate that the stock market is not fully efficient or 
sometimes is inefficient due to investors’ objective cognitive constraints (e.g., 
investors’ limited attention) and investors’ subjective biased beliefs (e.g., 
investors’ sentiment force). 
 
The Chapter 2 investigates the return predictability along ownership links. I 
study the subsidiary-parent and parent-subsidiary return predictabilities in a 
global sample and different regional samples. In addition, I study the sub-
predictors by dividing the subsidiaries or parent firms into different sub-
samples to predict the future returns of parent firms or subsidiaries.  
 
There are two main contributions in the Chapter 2. Firstly, I find new inter-firm 
return predictabilities among ownership networks. The new predictors cannot 
be subsumed3 by traditional predictors including the firm’s characteristics and 
 
3  “subsumed” means “absorbed”, “digested”, or “explained”. In the literature of return 
predictability, “subsume” or “subsumed” is widely used. For example, Finke and Weigert (2017, 
 28 
industry momentum. In addition, I find that ownership-linked firm peers 
consisting of foreign firms, different industrial firms, minor firms, different name 
firms, or indirect firms can generate a greater predictive power over the returns 
of the focal firms. It indicates that investor responses are more seriously 
delayed when it comes to information from different countries, different 
industries, or uncertain sources. Finally, market-wide sentiment and attention 
can explain and provide a deeper understanding of the return predictability 
effect. 
 
The Chapter 3 examines the mechanisms that can explain the return 
predictabilities along ownership links. The limits to arbitrage and the investors’ 
limited attention are two behavioral mechanisms that can be used to explain 
the empirical findings of inter-firm return predictabilities (Cohen and Frazzini, 
2008; Cohen and Lou, 2012; Huang, 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Finke and Weigert, 
2017; Parsons et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). In this 
chapter, I further find that the opaque internal information of the conglomerate 
and the information complexity can explain the return predictability. These 
findings contribute knowledge about the new mechanisms to understand the 
inter-firm return predictability. 
 
p. 2215) state that “Hence, the Foreign_Info effect is different from the impact of other firm 
characteristics and is not subsumed by stock return reversal, momentum, and/or industry 
momentum.” In Ali and Hirshleifer (2019), “subsume” or “subsumed” is widely used. One 
example is “We also find that past 12-month (skipping the most recent month) CF return 
subsumes the predictive power of past 12-month industry and geographic return variables”. 
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The Chapter 4 studies the return predictability of employee satisfaction-linked 
firms through novel firm-ranking data based on employee satisfaction. I find 
that the returns of employee satisfaction-linked firms have predictive power 
over focal firm returns. A long-short strategy based on this effect yields a 
monthly Fama and French (2018) six-factor alpha of 135 basis points with 1% 
significance level. This effect is distinct from industry momentum and is not 
easily attributed to risk-based explanations. I find that investors’ limited 
attention, limits to arbitrage, and information complexity may be mechanisms 
and reasons for the under-reaction to information about employee satisfaction-
linked firms. 
 
Given the obvious concrete links between firms, the current literature focus is 
probably not surprising. However, other potentially more subtle sources of 
information transfers may not be captured by concrete membership. Return 
predictability among firms that are linked by an alternative source or 
characteristic is less understood. In Chapter 4, I find that a type of intangible 
information, employee satisfaction, is a new linkage that enables the analysis 
of the information spillovers and return predictability across firms. 
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Overall, this thesis provides two new pieces of empirical evidence to prove 
inter-firm return predictability. The first is a concrete linkage, ownership links, 
and the other one is a soft linkage, employee satisfaction links. In addition, I 



































La Porta et al. (1999) illustrate that public parent firms in Europe and Asia 
present a complex ownership structure, compared with Berle and Means 
(1932)’s image of a flat ownership of modern firms. There are plenty of 
potential benefits associated to this complex ownership structure, including the 
potential for operating and financing efficiently and a relatively low cost of 
monitoring. Investing in these complexed structured parent firms may present, 
however, tremendous challenges to some investors that have limited 
capacities and resources to deal with complicated value-relevant information. 
The presence of ownership structural horizontal complexities and vertical 
complexities, have the latent capacity to bring about market inefficiencies in 
the form of gradual, rather than immediate, information diffusion into stock 
prices (Hong and Stein, 2007; Duffie, 2010). It is possible to enable the 
information which derives from distant or poorly understood subsidiaries or 




A parent firm, which controls its subsidiaries by ownership links, is exposed to 
unexpected stock price shocks because of stock price fluctuations of its 
financially linked subsidiaries. Particularly, a positive or negative shock to the 
main subsidiaries which are owned by their parent firm directly or indirectly is 
likely to rise or reduce the parent firm’s future financial performance. There are 
at least two conceivable explanations to understand the return effect. Firstly, 
from an investment perspective, the partial equity ownership of subsidiaries 
can be regarded as an investment on behalf of their parent firm. If the stock 
price of subsidiaries increases, the parent firm's stock price should also 
increase contemporaneously to reflect appreciating assets. In other words, the 
equity in other firms represents an asset. If this asset increases in value, the 
market value of the parent firm will reflect it. Secondly, from an accounting 
perspective, since total or partial earnings of subsidiaries are included in their 
parent firm’s total earnings in its consolidated financial statements,4 changes 
in earnings of subsidiaries affect the stock prices of subsidiaries and their 
parent firm. If one parent firm has two subsidiaries, one subsidiary has positive 
information, but the other subsidiary has negative information, the total 
subsidiary information is difficult to analyze promptly by parent firm investors. 
Parent firm investors may have delayed responses to complicated information 
of subsidiaries. 
 
4 Consolidated financial statements refer to the combined financial statements of a parent firm 
and its subsidiaries. 
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The investors of subsidiaries may have delayed responses to the information 
of parent firms. Although the parent firm’s earnings would not be included in 
the earnings of their subsidiaries, the parent firm has indirect influence on the 
performance of subsidiaries via capital, product, technology, and talent 
channels. In addition, from the viewpoint of the investors of listed subsidiaries, 
the parent firm’s value-relevant information may be less informative since the 
performances of other subsidiaries may blur that of the listed subsidiaries. 
Hence, a more sophisticated analysis may be required to enable the 
understanding of how the consolidated information relates to the individual 
entities of the parent firm. 
 
The literature in strategy, management, and marketing argues that the success 
of conglomerates depends on each entity’s capability to transfer and manage 
the spillover of knowledge and resources (e.g., capital, markets, technologies, 
and talents) to other entities, and how each entity of the conglomerate 
effectively utilizes the said knowledge and resources. These specific transfers 
and spillovers include customer resource sharing, economic and strategic 
cooperation, technology transfer, manager appointment, talent allocation, 
brand redeployment, and business ethics influence. Valuable and rare 
knowledge and resource transfers affect subsidiary and parent firm 
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performances in the long run and lead a conglomerate to a position of 
sustained competitive advantage.5 
 
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) document return predictability across economically 
linked firms. They find that the lagged one-month return of main customers 
can predict the monthly returns of their suppliers. However, the mechanism 
behind the economic links is different from that of ownership links. Economic 
links refer to the firm’s supply chain network, and reflect the firm’s sales and 
operations activities, e.g., for firms with suppliers and/or customers. Ownership 
links refer to the company's ownership network, and reflect the company's 
investment and financing status, e.g., for firms with parent firms and/or 
subsidiaries. Their differences are also reflected in the changes in earnings on 
the financial statements. Customers’ earnings are not part of the suppliers’ 
total earnings in financial statements. Changes in the earnings of customers 
influence the sales of the suppliers and generate a new change in the earnings 
of the suppliers. However, the total or partial earnings of subsidiaries directly 
affect the value of the parent firm’s total earnings in financial statements 
because of ownership links. According to the U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles) and IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
 
5 See, for example, Barney (1991), Kogut and Zander (1993), Tsoukas (1996), Capron and 
Hulland (1999), Tsai (2001), Kor and Mahoney (2005), Berry et al. (2006), Dyer and Hatch 
(2006), Fang et al. (2007). 
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Standards),6 parent firms must prepare annual and quarterly consolidated 
financial statements to report the financial wellbeing of both the parent firm and 
all of its subsidiaries.7 
 
A large body of evidence confirms inter-firm return predictability among firms 
that have economic links. Scholars find that linked firms exist return 
predictability. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) assess predictability between 
customers and suppliers. Using a data set of the firms’ main customers to 
identify a set of economically related firms, they show that the stock prices of 
suppliers do not incorporate news and information from their main customers, 
generating predictable stock returns. Cohen and Lou (2012) concentrate on 
the links between standalones and conglomerates. They find that when the 
same piece of information affects two groups of firms, one group does 
straightforward processing to incorporate information into stock prices, while 
the other group requires a more complicated analytical process to update the 
stock prices. Huang (2015) and Finke and Weigert (2017) show that the 
 
6 Since the end of the 1990s, U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) are the two predominant accounting 
standards.  
7 Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS require parent firms to consolidate subsidiaries in which they 
own more than 50% of the voting rights. When it comes to associate entities in which the 
parent owns between 20% and 50% of voting rights, IFRS standards require the parent firm 
to consolidate the entity if the company is presumably de facto controlled by the parent firm, 
whereas U.S. GAAP requires the consolidation of these entities only if the parent firm 
demonstrates the exercise of a significant influence, namely “effective control”, through board 
control or voting rights. In either case, consolidated financial statements use the equity 
approach. 
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information about the foreign operations of US firms and worldwide 
multinational firms can predict their returns. They both find that foreign 
operation information only dilutes the stock prices of multinational firms 
gradually. Cao et al. (2016) find that strategic alliance partners8 lead to return 
predictability. However, return predictability among firms that are linked 
financially is less understood. Li et al. (2016) find that the lagged one-monthly 
returns of US local subsidiaries (parent firms) can predict next one-monthly 
returns of US parent firms (subsidiaries). They find that the subsidiary-to-
parent return predictability is due to equity ownership, since the subsidiary-to-
parent return predictability does not exist before the equity ownership is 
established. However, they find that the parent-to-subsidiary return 
predictability is unlikely to be caused by equity ownership; rather it is probably 
caused by the industry lead-lag effects. The investor’s inattention and limits to 
arbitrage lead to the return effect. My study differs from theirs in other important 
dimensions. This chapter first provides comprehensive and thorough analysis, 
along with evidence to show global and regional sample results. In addition, I 
find a series of new predictors by sorting subsidiaries or parent firms into 
subsamples based on different categories. Finally, I find that market-wide 
 
8 Chan et al. (1997) document that strategic alliance partners are formed for several reasons 
including licensing, marketing or distribution, development or research, technology transfer or 
systems integration, or some combination of the above. 
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sentiment and attention can explain the return predictability along ownership 
links. 
 
In this chapter, I study the return predictability between subsidiaries and parent 
firms and test a global sample including twenty-three developed markets. This 
broader international sample enables us to investigate whether the 
predictability effect is a common feature to markets globally. More importantly, 
I find that the subsamples of predictors have different predictive power based 
on different classifications. For instance, the return predictability effect differs 
between foreign and local predictors. Predictors that are in a different industry 
from the focal firm have a different return predictability effect from predictors 
that are in the same industry as the focal firm. Minor ownership predictors have 
a different return predictability effect from major ownership predictors. 
 
I show that the information of subsidiaries has significant predictive ability for 
the parent firm’s future stock returns on a global scale through different 
geographical subsamples. In the worldwide sample, from January 2008 to 
December 2017, the CAPM alpha is 1.19% in month ! between parent firms’ 
stocks with the highest monthly returns of ownership-weighted subsidiaries’ 
portfolio at month ! − 1  and parent firms’ stocks with the lowest monthly 
returns of ownership-weighted subsidiaries’ portfolio at month ! − 1 . After 
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controlling for other risk factors, using the Fama and French six-factor model 
(Fama and French, 2018), I obtain 1.07% (t-statistic is 6.16) monthly abnormal 
returns of the value-weighted parent firms’ portfolio. In addition, I find the 
monthly abnormal returns of the value-weighted portfolio through different 
geographical subsamples such as Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America, 
which equal 1.03%, 1.47%, and 1.49%, respectively. I refer to this return 
predictability as “subsidiary momentum”. 
 
To test for the return predictability of a parent-subsidiary pair, I implement the 
following strategy. For each subsidiary $ in month !, I calculate the control-
weighted portfolio return of parent firms that own the subsidiary with at least 
20% stakes. I then sort the subsidiaries into quintile portfolios using returns 
earned by a portfolio of their parent firms in the previous month. My results 
show that the lagged one-month return of the parent firms’ portfolio has 
significant predictability for the subsidiaries’ return in the next month. 
Specifically, a portfolio that goes long in the subsidiaries with a parent firms’ 
portfolio that performed the best in the prior month and goes short in the 
subsidiaries with a parent firms’ portfolio that performed the worst in the prior 
month yields a value-weighted CAPM alpha of 106 basis points (t = 3.79) and 
an value-weighted six-factor alpha of 94 basis points (t = 3.02) per month. I 
refer to this return predictability as “parent firm momentum”.  
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Furthermore, lagged one-monthly ownership-linked firms’ returns make a 
statistically and economically significant difference on future monthly returns 
of the focal firm in multivariate Fama-MacBeth stock-level regressions after 
controlling for assorted firm characteristics. The predictive relationship 
between past monthly returns of the predictor and one-month-ahead returns 
of the focal firm remains significant in the statistical and economic sense after 
controlling for the aforementioned characteristics of the firms. 
 
Finally, anomalies can be driven by two common behavioral forces, namely 
‘subjective’ sentiment, which represents investors' subjective biased beliefs, 
and ‘objective’ limited attention, which represents investors' objective cognitive 
constraints. Stambaugh et al. (2012) find that the returns of anomalies are 
higher in market-wide high sentiment periods and lower in market-wide low 
sentiment periods. Duan et al. (2018) find that the returns of anomalies are 
higher in market-wide low attention periods and lower in market-wide high 
attention periods. Therefore, I propose that the abnormal returns of anomalies 
are higher in a high sentiment and low attention period. 
 
This chapter emphasizes the existing literature by documenting worldwide 
evidence of return predictability along ownership links. The contribution of this 
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chapter is to find new evidence of inter-firm return predictability in the 
ownership networks. These new forecasting powers which use past 
subsidiaries’ or parent firms’ returns to predict future parent firms’ or 
subsidiaries’ returns not only constitute a thought-provoking empirical fact with 
implications for systematic investment and risk hedging, but also has important 
implications to call for a new asset pricing model that explicitly incorporates 
value-relevant information from ownership networks. 
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
data collection procedures and summary statistics, as well as explains the 
methodology of the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 presents the main results 
on portfolio sorts, cross-sectional regressions, and robustness tests. Section 
2.4 shows the anomaly performance in different market-wide sentiment and 
attention periods. Section 2.5 studies the change status of ownership links and 
return predictability. Section 2.6 examines the impact of transaction costs on 




2.2 Data and Methodology  
2.2.1 Data 
The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed 
markets. The twenty-three developed markets are based on the MSCI world 
developed market index as of December 2017. The 23 developed markets 
include two North American markets (Canada and United States), sixteen 
European markets (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom), and five Asia-Pacific markets (Australia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore). I collect price, volume, and 
return data for US firms from the Centre for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), and the same data for non-US firms from Thomson Reuter’s Eikon. 
Institutional ownership data and analyst coverage for all firms in the sample 
are obtained from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) and Thomson 
Reuters I/B/E/S, respectively. I collect time-varying ownership links and 
shareholdings data from the FactSet database. I exclude stocks with prices 
below $5 to avoid market microstructure problems. I cover all industrial firms 
except firms in the financial sector9 (with two-digit NAICS code = 52). The 
sample period is from January 2008 to December 2017 with a total of 120 
 
9 Financial firms are often excluded in empirical asset pricing literature (e.g., Finke and 
Weigert, 2017, Lee et al., 2019) since the characteristics of accounting variables of financial 
firms are very different from firms operating in the real economy. 
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months.10 Like other international asset pricing literature, all stocks returns are 
denominated in USD.11 Following Fama and French (2012), I use the one-
month US T-bill rate for the USA and the remaining countries to calculate 
monthly excess returns.12 
 
My aim is to investigate the return predictability from subsidiaries to their 
parent firms and the return predictability from parent firms to their subsidiaries. 
I have a reasonable cut-off of the ownership stake to study return effects. In 
La Porta et al. (2000), a large ownership stake is defined using a minimum of 
10% in voting rights. Claessens et al. (2000) and Ginglinger et al. (2018) use 
a 20% cut-off to retain an ownership percentage equal to or more than 20%. 
Likewise, I also utilize 20 percent of ownership as a cut-off.13 Since 2005, 
there has been a strong push for harmonization of accounting standards and 
principles with the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for public firms, which largely coincides with the U.S. GAAP. 
Both the U.S. GAAP and IFRS require parent firms to consolidate controlled 
subsidiaries. IFRS standards require the parent to consolidate the entity if 
 
10 I have only 10 years’ historical ownership data due to the data availability. 
11 For example, Griffin (2002) and Fama and French (2012). 
12 My results are stable if I use local currency returns and work with raw returns rather than 
excess returns. 
13 I use the 10%, 15%, 25%, and 30% of ownership as a cut-off, but the results are not 
influential. 
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there is de facto control, which is interpreted as the ownership of a stake of 
20% or more by the parent firm. 
 
In order to test the return predictability for ten years, I collect ten annual time-
varying ownership links. I use the ownership links in June of year % − 1 to test 
the return predictability from January to December in year %. 
 
2.2.2 Predictor – Subsidiaries’ portfolio 
The regressor of interest is the lagged one-monthly return of subsidiaries. It is 
referred to as &'(),+,-. In order to construct the predictor, I use the portfolio 
returns of subsidiaries, since one parent firm may have many subsidiaries. 
&'(),+,-  is constructed as the ownership-weighted 14  portfolio returns of 
subsidiaries: 
 









14 I compare different weighting approaches, including value-weighted, equal-weighted, and 
shareholding-weighted portfolios. But the ownership-weighted portfolio returns of subsidiaries 
have the largest predictive power to forecast parent firm’s return based on the results of 
univariate portfolio sorts and cross-sectional regressions. 
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where &'(),+,- denotes parent firm $’s ownership-weighted portfolio returns 
of all subsidiaries, 123),4,+,- is parent firm $’s ownership stakes to subsidiary 
A  in month 	! − 1 , 67!4,+,-  is the subsidiary A ’s returns in month ! − 1 , 
&ℎ9:7;<=>	),4,+,- is parent firm $’s shareholding percentages to the subsidiary 
A  in month ! − 1 , &$?74,+,-  is the market capitalization of subsidiary A  in 
month ! − 1. For example, a parent firm (P) has two subsidiaries (S1 and S2) 
in the first layer and S1 has a subsidiary (S11) in the first layer. S11 is a 
second-layer subsidiary to the parent firm (P). The market capitalizations of P, 
S1, S2 and S11 are 200 million, 100 million, 50 million, and 50 million, 
respectively. A parent firm P has shareholdings of 60% and 100% in S1 and 
S2. S1 has a shareholding of 50% in S11. In other words, P has a shareholding 




60%	 ∗ 100 ∗ 	67!E-,+,- + 	100% ∗ 50 ∗	67!EH,+,- + 30% ∗ 50 ∗	67!E--,+,-
60% ∗ 100 + 	100% ∗ 50 + 30% ∗ 50
 
 
2.2.3 Predictor - Parent firms’ portfolio  
The regressor of interest is the lagged one-monthly return of parent firms. It is 
referred to as J9:),+,-. In order to construct the predictor, I use the portfolio 
returns of parent firms, since one subsidiary may have two or more parent 
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firms.  J9:),+,-  is constructed as the control-weighted15 portfolio return of 
parent firms: 
 








where J9:),+,- denotes subsidiary $’s control-weighted portfolio return of all 
parent firms, K<3!:<=),4,+,- is subsidiary $’s stake controlled by parent firm A 
in month ! − 1 , 67!4,+,-  is parent firm A ’s return in month ! − 1 , 
&ℎ9:7;<=>	),4,+,-  is subsidiary $ ’s shareholding percentages controlled by 
parent firm A in month ! − 1. For example, a subsidiary (S) has two parent 
firms (P1 and P2) in the first layer and P1 has a parent firm (P11) in the first 
layer. P11 is a second-layer parent firm to the subsidiary (S). P1 holds a 30% 
stake in S. P2 holds a 20% stake in S. P11 has a 50% shareholding in P1. In 




30%	 ∗ 	67!L-,+,- + 	20%	 ∗ 	67!LH,+,- + 15%	 ∗ 	67!L--,+,-
30% + 	20% + 15%
 
 
15 I compare different weighting approaches, including value-weighted, and equal-weighted 
portfolios. But the control-weighted portfolio returns of parent firms have the largest predictive 




2.2.4 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 shows the sample coverage and firm characteristics of the sample. 
In Panel A, I report the coverage of the sample. There are average 949 parent 
firms and 1702 subsidiaries each month. For each focal firm, it has 1.79 
subsidiaries and 1.52 parent firms, respectively. 
 
In Panel B, I summarize the firm characteristics. Parent firms’ mean Size is 
17.98 billion per month16 and mean Ln(B/M) is -0.15 per month. Parent firms’ 
mean Asset Growth (AG) and gross profitability (GP) are 0.14 and 0.39, 
respectively. Subsidiaries’ mean Size is 2.86 billion per month and mean 
Ln(B/M) is -0.12 per month. Subsidiaries’ mean Asset Growth (AG) and gross 
profitability (GP) are 0.19 and 0.43, respectively. 
 
The parent firm’s average size is 6.29 times greater than the subsidiary’s 
average size in the global sample. This result is similar to statistics of Li et al. 
(2016). They find that the parent firm’s average size is 6.54 times larger than 
the subsidiary’s average size in the US sample.
 
16 In the multi-layer ownership network, one parent firm may be not a top-layer parent firm 
(ultimate owner). For example, in the three-layer ownership network, one second-layer 
subsidiary is also a parent firm to the third-layer subsidiaries. Therefore, the parent firm’s 
average size is not very big, since sometimes one subsidiary is also a parent firm in the multi-
layer ownership network. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for parent firm variables and subsidiary variables used in the cross-sectional regressions. Financial firms (with two-
digit NAICS code = 52) and stocks with price less than $5 at portfolio formation are excluded. Firm characteristics include firm’s market capitalization 
(Size) in billions, book-to-market ratio (Ln(B/M)), asset growth (AG), gross profitability (GP). All variables are winsorized within each cross-section at 1% 
and 99% level. Panel A reports the sample description statistics. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for firm characteristics. The sample covers 
parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
Panel A: Sample description      
Global Mean Sd Min Med Max 
# of parent firms 949 95 674 827 1212 
# of subsidiaries 1702 186 1161 1589 2274 
Average # subsidiaries per focal firm 1.79 1.14 1 2 7 
Average # parent firms per focal firm 1.52 1.03 1 1 4 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Parent firm Mean Sd Min Med Max 
Size ($ bln) 17.98 31.21 2.37 17.10 47.92 
Ln(B/M) -0.15 0.14 -0.47 -0.18 0.26 
AG 0.14 0.36 -0.60 0.08 8.83 
GP 0.39 0.24 -0.84 0.37 1.29 
Subsidiary      
Size ($ bln) 2.86 8.06 0.57 2.94 14.09 
Ln(B/M) -0.12 0.17 -0.43 -0.14 0.31 
AG 0.19 0.36 0.00 0.03 1.37 
GP 0.43 0.36 -0.41 0.40 1.21 
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2.3 Empirical Results 
I next show the main results in the chapter. First, I report the empirical analysis 
of univariate portfolio sorts. Second, I show that return predictability is robust 
after controlling for a series of firm characteristics, industry momentum, and 
other inter-firm momentum. In addition, I show that return predictability is 
robust in different sub-periods and sub-samples. Finally, I report the 
performances of sub-predictors. 
 
2.3.1 Univariate Portfolio Sorts 
In this section, I report an empirical analysis of univariate portfolio sorts. 
Univariate portfolio sorts represent an intuitive and nonparametric way to test 
the cross-sectional variation of expected returns in response to a common 
predictor. They provide an essential cross-check for the cross-sectional 
regression tests, which I will present in the subsequent section. 
 
In each month ! , I rank focal firm returns based on the ranking of their 
ownership-linked firms’ (subsidiaries’ or parent firms’) portfolio returns in 
month ! − 1. Then, I classify focal firm stocks into 5 quintiles.17 Quintile 1 
 
17 Following the inter-firm return predictability literature (e.g., Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Li et 
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includes focal firms with the lowest ownership-linked firms’ portfolio returns 
over a lagged one-month period. Quintile 5 includes focal firms with the highest 
ownership-linked firms’ portfolio returns over a lagged one-month period. Next, 
I report the value-weighted portfolio returns of Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 as well 
as the hedged portfolio returns of Quintile 5 minus Quintile 1 with a 
corresponding statistical significance level. 18  Univariate portfolio sorts are 
conducted in five regions: the Global sample, the Global sample excluding the 
USA, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America.19 The global and regional 
pricing factors are procured from Kenneth French’s webpage. 20  Finally, 
results are reported in Table 2.2. I show results of subsidiary-parent in Panel 
A-C and results of parent-subsidiary in Panel D-F.  
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)21 is unable to explain satisfactorily 
the cross-sectional stock returns (Fama and French, 1992; Jagannathan and 
Wang, 1996). Therefore, I use Fama and French’s (2015) five-factor model 
and Fama and French’s (2018) six-factor model to examine cross-sectional 
 
al., 2016; Finke and Weigert, 2017; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019), I sort sample firms into quintiles. 
My results are also robust for decile portfolios. 
18 In order to adjust for serial correlation in monthly stock returns, I use Newey and West (1987) 
standard errors in the statistical tests. 
19 In order to show the universality and robustness of my strategy, I test my strategy in the 
global sample and four regional samples. Finke and Weigert (2017) also conduct univariate 
portfolio sorts in five different regions to show the robustness of their strategy. 
20 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
21 This is the static CAPM. 
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variation in alphas, since the cross-sectional variation in expected returns can 
be captured by these hedged style factors (SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, and 
MOM). If the hedged portfolio returns have high correlation with one hedged 
style factor returns, those hedged portfolio returns are absorbed or subsumed 
by the hedged style factor returns. In other words, that hedged portfolio 
(strategy) does not contribute abnormal returns (alphas). 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): 
$%&' − $( = 	+, + ./(12! − $() +	4', 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model: 
$%&' − $( = 	+, + ./(12! − $() + .5617 + .891: + .;$1< + .=>1? +	4', 
Fama and French (2018) six-factor model: 




Following Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018), I define these risk factors in 
the thesis. 12! − $(, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, and MOM include all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ firms. Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018) use the six 
value-weight portfolios formed on size and book-to-market, the six value-
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weight portfolios formed on size and operating profitability, the six value-weight 
portfolios formed on size and investment, and the six value-weight portfolios 
formed on size and prior (2-12) returns to construct SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, 
and MOM factors. 
 
12! − $( : the excess return of the market. 12! − $(  is the value-weight 
return of all CRSP firms minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
 
SMB (Small Minus Big): the nine small stock portfolios’ average return minus 


































HML (High Minus Low): the two value portfolios’ average return minus the two 





	(6GHII	JHIKL + 7ST	JHIKL) −	
1
2
	(6GHII	ONPQ!ℎ + 7ST	ONPQ!ℎ). 
 
RMW (Robust Minus Weak): the two robust operating profitability portfolios’ 





	(6GHII	$PXKY! + 7ST	$PXKY!) −	
1
2
	(6GHII	<LH2 + 7ST	<LH2). 
 
CMA (Conservative Minus Aggressive): the two conservative investment 





	(6GHII	>P]YLN^H!S^L + 7ST	>P]YLN^H!S^L) −	
1
2
	(6GHII	?TTNLYYS^L + 7ST	?TTNLYS^L). 
 
MOM: the two high prior return portfolios’ average return minus the two low 




	(6GHII	9STℎ + 7ST	9STℎ) −	
1
2
	(6GHII	:PQ + 7ST	:PQ). 
 
Table 2.2: Univariate Portfolio Sorts 
This table reports the results of value-weighted univariate portfolio sorts. The results are 
shown for five regions: Global, Global ex USA, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America. I 
report univariate portfolio sorts of subsidiary-parent return predictability in Panel A-C. I report 
univariate portfolio sorts of parent-subsidiary return predictability in Panel D-F. Panel A and D 
present CAPM alphas for each quintile portfolio and the 5-1 difference portfolio. Panel B and 
E report risk-adjusted returns for each quintile portfolio and the 5-1 difference portfolio using 
a regional version of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Panel C and F report risk-
adjusted returns for each quintile portfolio and the 5-1 difference portfolio using a regional 
version of the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model. The risk factors are downloaded from 
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the webpage of Kenneth French. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using 
Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from 
twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub – Par    
CAPM alphas (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Value Weights Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
1 (Low) -0.97*** -0.88*** -0.56*** -1.12*** -1.24*** 
2 -0.47*** -0.38** -0.10 -0.60** -0.15 
3 -0.24* -0.02 -0.06 -0.26 -0.23 
4 -0.19 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.23 
5 (High) 0.22* 0.33* 0.31* 0.42* 0.35* 
5-1 1.19*** 1.21*** 0.87*** 1.54*** 1.58*** 
 (7.33) (6.58) (4.15) (5.42) (4.25) 
 
Panel B: Sub – Par   
Five-factor alphas (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Value Weights Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
1 (Low) -0.96*** -0.83*** -0.60*** -1.30*** -1.23*** 
2 -0.41** -0.30 0.05 -0.90*** -0.23 
3 -0.18 0.07 -0.04 -0.63* -0.33 
4 -0.15 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.16 
5 (High) 0.11* 0.27* 0.42* 0.20* 0.27* 
5-1 1.07*** 1.10*** 1.02*** 1.50*** 1.50*** 
 (5.96) (4.26) (4.48) (4.76) (4.04) 
 
Panel C: Sub – Par   
Six-factor alphas (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Value Weights Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
1 (Low) -0.96*** -0.83*** -0.64*** -1.28*** -1.20*** 
2 -0.41** -0.30 0.03 -0.92*** -0.22 
3 -0.18 0.06 -0.05 -0.65* -0.35 
4 -0.14 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.15 
5 (High) 0.12* 0.27* 0.40* 0.19* 0.29* 
5-1 1.07*** 1.10*** 1.03*** 1.47*** 1.49*** 
 (6.16) (4.24) (4.31) (4.53) (3.95) 
 
Panel D: Par – Sub    
CAPM alphas (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Value Weights Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
1 (Low) -0.75*** -0.48* -0.67* -0.80* -0.37* 
2 -0.59** -0.31 -0.52 0.20 -1.41*** 
3 -0.07 0.06 0.43 -0.49 -0.05 
4 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 0.46 0.04 
5 (High) 0.31* 0.67** 0.81** 0.21 0.55* 
5-1 1.06*** 1.16*** 1.48*** 1.01** 0.92** 
 (3.79) (3.86) (4.14) (2.34) (2.23) 
 
Panel E: Par – Sub   
Five-factor alphas (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Value Weights Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
1 (Low) -0.80** -0.50* -0.60* -1.09*** -0.32 
2 -0.60* -0.35 -0.56 0.07 -1.15** 
3 -0.23 -0.21 0.50 -0.57 -0.10 
4 -0.11 -0.23 -0.18 0.45 0.16 
5 (High) 0.16 0.49* 1.03*** 0.27 0.57* 
5-1 0.96*** 0.99** 1.63*** 1.36*** 0.89** 
 (2.91) (2.55) (4.89) (3.23) (2.02) 
 
Panel F: Par – Sub   
Six-factor alphas (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Value Weights Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
1 (Low) -0.80** -0.50* -0.68* -1.19*** -0.40 
2 -0.58* -0.36 -0.63 0.08 -1.19** 
3 -0.22 -0.22 0.46 -0.62 -0.16 
4 -0.11 -0.23 -0.30 0.51 0.18 
5 (High) 0.14 0.50* 1.14*** 0.29 0.45* 
5-1 0.94*** 1.00*** 1.82*** 1.48*** 0.85** 
 (3.02) (2.99) (5.42) (3.59) (1.97) 
 
Panel A demonstrates that monthly CAPM alphas of parent firm stocks with 
the highest lagged one-month returns for the subsidiaries’ portfolio have 
obviously higher monthly CAPM alphas than those with the lowest lagged one-
month returns for the subsidiaries’ portfolio. The CAPM factor is market excess 
 55 
returns (market returns minus riskless rate). In the global samples, value-
weighted parent firms’ stocks in the highest quintile earn average monthly 
CAPM alphas of 0.22% with a significance level of 10%, but value-weighted 
parent firms’ stocks in the lowest quintile earn average monthly CAPM alphas 
of -0.97% with a significance level of 1%. The return spread is 1.19% with a 
significance level of 1%. The value-weighted portfolio return spreads of the 
other region samples are 1.21% (Global ex USA), 0.87% (Asia-Pacific), 1.54% 
(Europe), and 1.58% (North America). All of these spreads in returns are 
statistically significant at 1%. The results of Panel A indicate that subsidiaries’ 
returns have predictive power for future returns of focal firms in the global 
sample and in different geographical subsamples, since the CAPM fails to 
explain the return spreads. 
 
Panel B reports the achievement of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
risk-adjusted returns for Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 and the hedged portfolio 
(Quintile 5 minus Quintile 1). The five factors are market excess returns, SMB, 
HML, RMW, and CMA. The value-weighted portfolio abnormal returns are 1.07% 
(Global), 1.10% (Global ex USA), 1.02% (Asia-Pacific), 1.50% (Europe), and 
1.50% (North America). All of these spreads in returns are statistically 
significant at 1%. The results of Panel B indicate that subsidiaries’ returns have 
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predictive power for future returns of focal firms in the global sample and in 
different geographical subsamples, since the Fama and French (2015) five-
factor model fails to explain the return spreads. 
 
In Panel C, I use the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model to capture 
abnormal returns. The six factors are market excess returns, SMB, HML, RMW, 
CMA, and MOM. The value-weighted portfolio abnormal returns become 1.07% 
(Global), 1.10% (Global ex USA), 1.03% (Asia-Pacific), 1.47% (Europe), and 
1.49% (North America). All of these spreads in returns are statistically 
significant at 1%. The results of Panel C indicate that subsidiaries’ returns have 
predictive power for future returns of focal firms in the global sample and in 
different geographical subsamples, since the Fama and French (2018) six-
factor model fails to explain the return spreads. 
 
Panel D demonstrates that the monthly CAPM alphas of subsidiary stocks 
which have the highest lagged one-month return in the parent firm portfolio 
have obviously higher monthly CAPM alphas than those with the lowest lagged 
one-month return. The CAPM factor is market excess returns (market returns 
minus riskless rate). In the global samples, value-weighted subsidiary stocks 
in the highest quintile earn average monthly CAPM alphas of 0.31% with a 
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significance level of 10%, but value-weighted subsidiary stocks in the lowest 
quintile earn average monthly CAPM alphas of -0.75% with a significance level 
of 1%. The return spread is 1.06% with a significance level of 1%. The value-
weighted portfolio return spreads of the other region samples are 1.16% 
(Global ex USA), 1.48% (Asia-Pacific), 1.01% (Europe), and 0.92% (North 
America). All of these spreads in returns are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The results of Panel D indicate that parent firms’ returns have predictive 
power for future returns of focal firms in the global sample and in different 
geographical subsamples, since the CAPM fails to explain the return spreads. 
 
Panel E reports the Fama and French (2015) five-factor risk-adjusted returns 
for Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 and the hedged portfolio (Quintile 5 minus Quintile 
1). The five factors are market excess returns, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA. I 
find that the spread returns of Quintile 5 minus Quintile 1 are statistically 
significant at the 5% level in five sample regions. Additionally, the value-
weighted portfolio abnormal returns are 0.96% (Global), 0.99% (Global ex 
USA), 1.63% (Asia-Pacific), 1.36% (Europe), and 0.89% (North America). The 
results of Panel E indicate that parent firms’ returns have predictive power for 
future returns of focal firms in the global sample and in different geographical 
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subsamples, since the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model fails to 
explain the return spreads. 
 
In Panel F, I use the Fama–French (2018) six-factor model to capture 
abnormal returns. The six factors are market excess returns, SMB, HML, RMW, 
CMA, and MOM. The value-weighted portfolio abnormal returns become 0.94% 
(Global), 1.00% (Global ex USA), 1.82% (Asia-Pacific), 1.48% (Europe), and 
0.85% (North America). All of these spreads in returns are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The results of Panel F indicate that parent firms’ 
returns have predictive power for future returns of focal firms in the global 
sample and in different geographical subsamples, since the Fama and French 
(2018) six-factor model fails to explain the return spreads. 
 
To briefly restate the main points, the results of Table 2.2 illustrate that lagged 
one-monthly returns of the ownership-linked firms’ portfolio can forecast the 
returns of the focal firm in the next month. Moreover, the abnormal returns 
cannot be explained by implying asset pricing models, including global and 
regional Fama and French (2015, 2018) five-factor and six-factor models. 
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2.3.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
In this section, I make use of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to 
analyze if the subsidiary-parent return predictability and parent-subsidiary 
return predictability remain robust after a set of risk factors and an array of 
different firm characteristics are regulated. Compared with other approaches 
(e.g., pooled OLS regressions) to deal with panel data, the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions take into account the cross-correlations and the serial correlation 
in the error term, so that the t-statistics are much more conservative (Choe et 
al., 2005). In addition, the Fama-MacBeth regressions are computationally 
simple to implement and are widely used in the literature of return predictability 
(Cochrane, 2005; Hou et al., 2018). The stock level’s Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are made up of two steps. In the first step, I run the cross-sectional 
regression in each month as the following: 
 
$%&',c − $(,c = 	 d,,c + d/,e,c + d5,f,c	+	d8,c	6KX',cg/ +	d;,c
h	i',cg/ +	4',c, 
and 
$%&',c − $(,c = 	 d,,c + d/,e,c	+	d5,f,c + 	d8,c	jHN',cg/ +	d;,c
h	i',cg/ +	4',c, 
 
where $%&',c − $(,c	is the excess return on the focal firm’s stock S in month !; 
d,,c denotes the intercept; d/,e,c	is a country-specific dummy variable which is 
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equal to one if firm S  is from country k  and zero otherwise; 	d5,f,c	 is an 
industry-specific dummy variable which is equal to one if firm S is from industry 
l and zero otherwise; 6KX',cg/	is the lagged subsidiary stock return in month 
! − 1; jHN',cg/	is the lagged parent firm stock return in month ! − 1; i',cg/ 
represents a vector of controls, including :](6SmL) the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization (Banz, 1981), :](7/1) the natural logarithm of book-to-
market equity ratio (Basu, 1983), 1PG the cumulative return of stock S from 
month ! − 12  to ! − 2  (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), $%&',cg/	 the stock 
return of focal firm S in month	! − 1 (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lo and MacKinlay, 
1990), Turnover the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding during a day, averaged over the past twelve months (Rouwenhorst, 
1999; Ibbotson et al., 2013), o]l_GPG  the value-weighted two-digit SIC 
industry return of the focal firm in month ! − 1 (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 1999; 
Nijman et al., 2004), asset growth (?O) the year-over-year growth rate of total 
assets (Cooper et al., 2008), and gross profitability (Oj) the revenue minus 
cost of goods sold scaled by assets (Novy-Marx, 2013). 
 
The literature has found 452 forecasting variables to explain and predict the 
cross-sectional stock returns (Hou et al., 2018). However, I cannot use all of 
these forecasting variables as controls in my Fama-MacBeth regressions, 
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since there is the serious overfitting problem (Han et al., 2018). I have to 
choose limited representative variables from different categories of variables. 
For example, the book/market ratio is a representative variable of the “value” 
variables, since Fama and French (1993) find that the book/market ratio can 
explain the value effect and absorb the predictive power of other “value” 
variables (e.g., earnings/price, dividend yield, and cash flow/price). Hou et al. 
(2018) divide 452 anomalies/forecasting variables into six categories (value, 
momentum, investment, profitability, intangibles, and trading frictions). 
Therefore, I select some representative forecasting variables from six 
categories as controls. These control variables are also widely used in Fama- 
MacBeth regressions in other inter-firm return predictability papers (e.g., 
Cohen and Lou, 2012; Lee et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). 
 
After the first step, I obtain the time-series coefficients for each explanatory 
variable. The second step is to verify whether the average coefficient estimates 
are statistically different from zero. Bali et al. (2016) document steps to 
calculate standard errors by using the Newey-West (1987) method. In the 
second step, I firstly calculate the mean of time-series coefficients for each 
explanatory variable. Then I regress the time-series coefficients on a vector of 
ones to obtain the time-series residuals for each explanatory variable. Thirdly, 
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I input the time-series residuals and a vector of ones to the Newey and West 
(1987) adjustment to compute the standard errors to deal with 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Finally, the t-statistics are calculated 
by the mean of time-series coefficients divided by the standard errors. Table 
2.3 reports the mean of time-series coefficients and the corresponding t-
statistics. 
 
The standard errors are computed using the Newey and West (1987) 
adjustment with 6 lags. The choice of the lag length from 1 to 12 does not 
influence the significance of any of my tests. The monthly return predictability 
literature believes that residuals are heteroskedastic and/or autocorrelated 
within half a year or one year. For example, Cohen and Lou (2012) use Newey 
and West (1987) adjustment with 12 lags to compute the standard errors. Li et 
al. (2016) use Newey and West (1987) adjustment with 6 lags to compute the 
standard errors.  
 
In addition, I study the delay in the information transmission process and 
capture this within a regression framework. Following Hou and Moskowitz 
(2005), I run the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of the focal firm’s excess 
returns on contemporaneous returns and four months of lagged returns on the 
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subsidiaries’ portfolio or parent firms’ portfolio and a vector of control variables 
in the global sample and several regional samples. The regression can identify 
the delay in the information transmission process. 
 








where $%&',c − $(,c	is the excess return on the focal firm’s stock S in month !; 
d,,c denotes the intercept; d/,e,c	is a country-specific dummy variable which is 
equal to one if firm S  is from country k  and zero otherwise; 	d5,f,c	 is an 
industry-specific dummy variable which is equal to one if firm S is from industry 
l and zero otherwise;	6KX',c, 6KX',cg/, 6KX',cg5, 6KX',cg8, and 6KX',cg; are the 
ownership-weighted subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm S  from month !  to 
month ! − 4. jHN',c, jHN',cg/, jHN',cg5, jHN',cg8, and jHN',cg; are the control-
weighted parent firms’ returns of focal firm S from month ! to month ! − 4; 
i',cg/ represents a vector of controls, including :](6SmL) the natural logarithm 
of the market capitalization (Banz, 1981), :](7/1) the natural logarithm of 
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book-to-market equity ratio (Basu, 1983), 1PG the cumulative return of stock 
S  from month ! − 12 to ! − 2 (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), 	$%&',cg/	 the 
stock return of focal firm S  in month 	! − 1  (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990), Turnover the number of shares traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding during a day, averaged over the past twelve 
months (Rouwenhorst, 1999; Ibbotson et al., 2013), o]l_GPG  the value-
weighted two-digit SIC industry return of the focal firm in month ! − 1 
(Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 1999; Nijman et al., 2004), asset growth (?O) the 
year-over-year growth rate of total assets (Cooper et al., 2008), and gross 
profitability (Oj) the revenue minus cost of goods sold scaled by assets (Novy-
Marx, 2013). 
 
Table 2.3: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table reports the results of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. $%&',c 
is the excess return of focal firm S  in month ! . 6KX',c , 6KX',cg/ , 6KX',cg5 , 6KX',cg8 , and 
6KX',cg;  are the ownership-weighted subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm S  from month ! to 
month ! − 4. jHN',c, jHN',cg/, jHN',cg5, jHN',cg8, and jHN',cg; are the control-weighted parent 
firms’ returns of focal firm S from month ! to month ! − 4. Panel A reports the excess return 
of focal firm S, $%&',c  is regressed on 6KX',cg/ and a vector of control variables. Panel B 
reports the excess return of focal firm S, $%&',c  is regressed on jHN',cg/  and a vector of 
control variables. Panel C reports the excess return of focal firm S, $%&',c is regressed on 
contemporaneous and four months of lagged returns on the subsidiaries’ portfolio. Panel D 
reports the excess return of focal firm S, $%&',c is regressed on contemporaneous and four 
months of lagged returns on the parent firms’ portfolio. Control variables include Ln(Size) (the 
log market capitalization at the end of December of previous calendar year), Ln(B/M) (the log 
book-to-market ratio at the end of December of previous calendar year), $%&',cg/ (the lagged 
one-monthly return of the focal firm), Mom (the lagged focal firm’s cumulative returns from 
month ! − 12  to  month ! − 2 ), Turnover (the number of stocks traded divided by the 
number of stocks outstanding during a day, averaged over the past twelve months), o]l_GPG 
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(the lagged one-monthly domestic industry return), AG (asset growth, the year-over-year 
growth rate of total asset), and GP (gross profitability, the revenue minus cost of goods sold 
scaled by assets). T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated by using the Newey-
West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three 
developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub-Par (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Dep Variable $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c 
6KX',cg/ 6.32*** 4.86** 2.06*** 4.63** 4.15*** 
 (3.35) (2.33) (5.92) (2.02) (3.30) 
Ln(Size) -0.10* -0.13* -0.07** -0.06 0.05 
 (-1.75) (-1.81) (-2.37) (-1.21) (0.86) 
Ln(B/M) 0.23** 0.50*** 0.44** 0.43*** -0.17 
 (2.11) (4.04) (2.32) (3.26) (-0.36) 
$%&',cg/ -6.73*** -4.19*** -1.41 -6.38** -9.96*** 
 (-3.52) (-3.13) (-1.11) (-2.00) (-3.53) 
Mom -0.28 0.23 0.31 0.89 0.05 
 (-0.52) (0.66) (0.41) (0.95) (0.05) 
AG -0.41*** -0.23** 0.23 -0.44 0.23 
 (-2.61) (-2.34) (0.63) (-1.24) (0.42) 
GP 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04*** 0.02 
 (0.72) (1.10) (0.75) (2.91) (0.66) 
Turnover -0.06** -0.05 -0.06* -0.07 -0.19* 
 (-2.03) (0.62) (-1.84) (-1.43) (-1.94) 
o]l_GPG 1.06** 1.05** 1.10** 1.14** 1.03** 
 (2.51) (2.09) (2.11) (2.12) (2.33) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 106,330 74,794 29,275 9,782 
$5 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.28 
 
Panel B: Par-Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Dep Variable $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c 
jHN',cg/ 1.72*** 1.40*** 1.90*** 0.80*** 2.50*** 
 (6.48) (5.69) (6.17) (3.56) (3.72) 
Ln(Size) -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.05 -0.40* 
 (-3.56) (-3.04) (-3.33) (-0.82) (-1.70) 
Ln(B/M) 0.24** 0.33*** 0.33** 0.27** 0.01 
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 (2.11) (2.60) (2.42) (2.09) (0.04) 
$%&',cg/ -1.51 -0.39 0.26 -4.07** -7.97*** 
 (-1.20) (-0.29) (0.17) (-2.25) (-3.28) 
Mom -0.88 -0.63 -0.78 1.12* -2.48 
 (-1.21) (-0.95) (-1.06) (1.65) (-1.30) 
AG -0.01 -0.03 -0.35** 0.05 0.26 
 (-0.01) (-0.30) (-2.37) (0.18) (0.49) 
GP -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (-3.01) (-2.80) (-1.31) (-0.64) (-1.60) 
Turnover -0.08 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.61 
 (0.73) (0.79) (0.97) (0.21) (1.56) 
o]l_GPG 0.80** 0.70 0.46 -0.52 -1.16 
 (2.34) (1.12) (0.73) (-0.41) (-0.59) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 191,819 136,216 51,771 16,220 
$5 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.24 
 
Panel C: Sub-Par (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Dep Variable $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c 
6KX',c 12.75*** 8.39*** 4.32*** 9.23*** 9.22*** 
 (7.50) (4.94) (13.66) (4.78) (7.32) 
6KX',cg/ 4.44** 3.77* 1.62*** 3.57* 2.99** 
 (2.45) (1.85) (4.40) (1.81) (2.34) 
6KX',cg5 2.77 2.34 1.03*** 2.24 2.03 
 (1.52) (1.11) (2.86) (0.91) (1.55) 
6KX',cg8 1.72 1.28 0.51 1.18 0.85 
 (0.79) (0.56) (1.28) (0.56) (0.89) 
6KX',cg; 0.69 0.52 0.35 0.70 0.48 
 (0.51) (0.26) (1.12) (0.37) (0.58) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 106,330 74,794 29,275 9,782 
$5 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.41 
 
Panel D: Par-Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Dep Variable $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c $%&',c 
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6KX',c 3.25*** 2.79*** 2.95*** 1.24*** 5.14*** 
 (9.77) (12.97) (13.00) (7.03) (9.22) 
6KX',cg/ 1.36*** 0.98*** 1.33*** 0.63*** 1.81*** 
 (4.79) (4.30) (4.64) (2.66) (2.71) 
6KX',cg5 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.84*** 0.39* 1.12* 
 (2.71) (2.59) (2.63) (1.75) (1.84) 
6KX',cg8 0.43 0.33 0.53 0.22 0.65 
 (1.54) (1.58) (1.39) (0.74) (0.99) 
6KX',cg; 0.25 0.16 0.30 0.11 0.34 
 (0.68) (0.65) (1.20) (0.41) (0.50) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 191,819 136,216 51,771 16,220 
$5 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.35 
 
Panel A of Table 2.3 presents the regression results of the excess returns of 
the focal firm on 6KX',cg/ and a vector of control variables in the global sample 
and various regional samples. The results demonstrate that the coefficient of 
6KX',cg/ is statistically significant at the 1% level for the global sample, the 
Asia-Pacific sample, and the North America sample. The results demonstrate 
that the coefficient of 6KX',cg/ is statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
Global ex USA sample and the Europe sample. In addition, the predictive 
power of the lagged subsidiaries’ returns is not subsumed by reversal, 
momentum, and industry momentum of the stock return. The results of Panel 
A indicate that subsidiaries’ returns can predict future returns of focal firms 
after controlling for firm characteristics. 
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Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the regression results of excess returns of the 
focal firm on jHN',cg/ and a vector of control variables in the global sample 
and several regional samples. The results demonstrate that the coefficient of 
jHN',cg/ is statistically significant at the 1% level for the global sample and all 
regional samples. Additionally, the predictive power of lagged parent firms’ 
returns is not subsumed by reversal, momentum, and industry momentum of 
the stock return. The results of Panel B indicate that parent firms’ returns can 
predict future returns of focal firms after controlling for firm characteristics. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.3 presents the regression results of excess returns of the 
focal firm on contemporaneous returns and four months of lagged returns on 
the subsidiaries’ portfolio and a vector of control variables in the global sample 
and several regional samples. My results show that the coefficients of 
subsidiaries’ returns (6KX',cg/ , 6KX',cg5 , 6KX',cg8 , and 6KX',cg; ) are always 
positive but decrease monotonically from month ! − 1 to month ! − 4. The 
results demonstrate that the coefficient of 6KX',cg/ is statistically significant for 
all five samples. But the coefficient of 6KX',cg5 is only statistically significant 
for the Asia-Pacific sample. The coefficients of 6KX',cg8 and 6KX',cg; are not 
statistically significant for all five samples. The results of Panel C indicate that 
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subsidiaries’ information is gradually transmitted into the focal firm’s stock 
price within one month. 
 
Panel D of Table 2.3 presents the regression results of excess returns of the 
focal firm on contemporaneous returns and four months of lagged returns on 
the parent firms’ portfolio and a vector of control variables in the global sample 
and several regional samples. My results show that the coefficients of parent 
firms’ returns (jHN',cg/, jHN',cg5, jHN',cg8, and jHN',cg;) are always positive but 
decrease monotonically from month ! − 1  to month ! − 4 . The results 
demonstrate that the coefficients of jHN',cg/  and jHN',cg5  are statistically 
significant for all five samples. But the coefficients of 6KX',cg8 and 6KX',cg; 
are not statistically significant for all five samples. The results of Panel D 
indicate that parent firms’ information is gradually transmitted into the focal 
firm’s stock price within two months. 
 
In summary, the cross-sectional regression results indicate the predictive 
effect of lagged subsidiaries’ returns and the predictive effect of lagged parent 
firms’ returns. The predictive effect cannot be subsumed by several firm 
characteristics. The predictive pattern is consistent with a gradual diffusion of 
information along ownership links. 
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2.3.3 Controlling for Other Inter-firm Links 
In addition, I test whether the predictive power of ownership-linked firms 
cannot be subsumed by other inter-firm momentum. I test a series of inter-firm 
momentum variables. 6Kt_o]l',cg/ and >KY_o]l',cg/ are the supplier industry 
return and the customer industry return of focal firm S in the previous month 
(Menzly and Ozbas, 2010).	>KY',cg/ is the customer return of focal firm S in 
the previous month (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). j>',cg/  is the pseudo-
conglomerate portfolio return of focal firm S in the previous month (Cohen and 
Lou, 2012). 6?',cg/ is the strategic alliance partners’ portfolio return of focal 
firm S in the previous month (Cao et al., 2016).	&Lkℎ',cg/ is the technological 
partners’ portfolio return of focal firm S  in the previous month (Lee et al., 
2019).	OLP',cg/ is the average return of all other stocks headquartered in the 
same city of U.S. 20 largest cities in the previous month (Parsons et al., 2019). 
>6',cg/ is the weighted average return of stocks that are connected through 
shared analyst coverage in the previous month (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). I 
also add control variables of Table 2.3 in all regressions. For brevity, these 
control variables are not reported. 
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Table 2.4: Controlling for Other Inter-firm Links 
This table reports the results of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting regressions. This table reports the excess return of focal firm !, 
"#$%,'  is regressed on the lagged one-monthly returns of ownership-linked firm peers (()*%,'+,  or -./%,'+,) , inter-firm momentum (()1_345%,'+, , 
6)7_345%,'+, , 6)7%,'+, , -6%,'+, , (8%,'+, , $9:ℎ%,'+, , <9=%,'+, , or 6(%,'+, ), and a vector of control variables, including industry momentum and firm 
characteristics in Table 2.3. For brevity, coefficients of control variables in regressions are not reported. ()1_345%,'+, and 6)7_345%,'+, are the supplier 
industry return and the customer industry return of focal firm ! in the previous month (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010).	6)7%,'+, is the customer return of focal 
firm ! in the previous month (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). -6%,'+, is the pseudo-conglomerate portfolio return of focal firm ! in the previous month (Cohen 
and Lou, 2012). (8%,'+,  is the strategic alliance partners’ portfolio return of focal firm !  in the previous month (Cao et al., 2016).	$9:ℎ%,'+,  is the 
technological partners’ portfolio return of focal firm !  in the previous month (Lee et al., 2019). 	<9=%,'+,  is the average return of all other stocks 
headquartered in the same city of U.S. 20 largest cities in the previous month (Parsons et al., 2019). 6(%,'+, is the weighted average return of stocks that 
are connected through shared analyst coverage in the previous month (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated 
using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers 
parent firms and subsidiaries in US market from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
*100 US US US US US US US US US US US 
Dep Variable "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' 
()*%,'+, 5.32*** 4.78*** 4.84*** 4.72*** 4.52*** 4.27*** 4.40*** 3.95*** 3.57** 3.76** 3.00** 
 (3.66) (3.08) (3.11) (3.05) (2.94) (2.81) (2.88) (2.64) (2.44) (2.54) (2.13) 
()1_345%,'+,  0.66  0.42       0.45 
  (1.10)  (0.72)       (0.78) 
6)7_345%,'+,   3.18** 2.19       2.63* 
   (2.04) (1.45)       (1.68) 
6)7%,'+,     2.82**      1.72 
     (2.27)      (1.53) 
 72 
-6%,'+,      2.88**     1.82 
      (2.16)     (1.51) 
(8%,'+,       0.71    0.56 
       (1.51)    (1.23) 
$9:ℎ%,'+,        2.11**   1.53 
        (2.05)   (1.40) 
<9=%,'+,         3.10**  1.63 
         (2.34)  (1.26) 
6(%,'+,          3.66** 1.74 
          (2.19) (1.07) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,521 7,202 7,202 7,202 3,424 4,673 3,955 4,357 7,080 6,498 2,825 
"? 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
*100 US US US US US US US US US US US 
Dep Variable "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' 
-./%,'+, 2.81*** 2.39*** 2.41*** 2.36*** 2.32*** 2.26*** 2.29*** 2.17** 2.07** 2.12** 1.91** 
 (4.32) (3.14) (3.21) (3.02) (2.89) (2.64) (2.76) (2.32) (1.99) (2.13) (2.37) 
()1_345%,'+,  0.36  0.20       0.18 
  (1.12)  (0.65)       (0.60) 
6)7_345%,'+,   1.27* 1.19*       0.82 
   (1.93) (1.76)       (1.47) 
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6)7%,'+,     0.78***      0.45 
     (2.78)      (1.60) 
-6%,'+,      0.40     0.25 
      (0.33)     (0.22) 
(8%,'+,       0.67    0.52 
       (1.42)    (1.25) 
$9:ℎ%,'+,        1.75**   1.30* 
        (2.44)   (1.82) 
<9=%,'+,         1.62**  1.27* 
         (2.32)  (1.94) 
6(%,'+,          1.35** 0.67* 
          (2.54) (1.72) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 12,388 11,862 11,862 11,862 5,640 7,697 6,515 7,176 11,662 10,703 4,654 
"? 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 
Column 1 of Table 2.4 shows the initial result without inter-firm momentum 
controls. Columns 2-10 show that the predictor !"#$,&'( or )*+$,&'( cannot be 
subsumed by other inter-firm links, such as supplier industry and customer 
industry returns, customer returns, ‘pseudo-conglomerate’ portfolio returns, 
alliance partners’ returns, and technological partners’ returns, geographic 
peers’ returns, and shared analyst coverage peers’ returns, respectively. In 
column 11, I find that coefficient for !"#$,&'( or )*+$,&'( remains statistically 
significant at 5% level after adding all these inter-firm variables. The 
coefficients of most inter-firm momentum variables become economically tiny 
and statistically insignificant. To sum up, these results indicate that I find two 
new inter-firm predictors which cannot be explained by industry momentum, a 
series of firm characteristics, and other known inter-firm predictors.  
 
2.3.4 Performance of Sub-predictors 
In this section, I conduct Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to compare 
the predictive power of two sub-predictors after adding control variables. The 
dependent variable is the excess returns of focal firm (,-.$,& ) and the 
explanatory variable of interest are lagged returns of the sub-predictors. 
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/01*2	!"#$,&'( are the local subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous 
month. 50+6478	!"#$,&'( are the foreign subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4 in 
the previous month. !*96	:8;	!"#$,&'( are the same industrial subsidiaries’ 
returns of focal firm 4  in the previous month. <4==	:8;	!"#$,&'(  are the 
different industrial subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. 
>*?0+	!"#$,&'(  are the major (>50% shareholding percentage) ownership 
subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. >480+	!"#$,&'( are 
the minor (<=50% shareholding percentage) ownership subsidiaries’ returns 
of focal firm 4 in the previous month. !*96	8*96	!"#$,&'( are the same name 
subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. <4==	8*96	!"#$,&'( 
are the different name subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4  in the previous 
month. <4+	!"#$,&'( are the directly linked subsidiaries’ returns of focal firm 4 
in the previous month. :8;4+	!"#$,&'(  are the indirectly linked subsidiaries’ 
returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. 
 
/01*2	)*+$,&'( are the local parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous 
month. 50+6478	)*+$,&'( are the foreign parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 in 
the previous month. !*96	:8;	)*+$,&'( are the same industrial parent firms’ 
returns of focal firm 4  in the previous month. <4==	:8;	)*+$,&'(  are the 
different industrial parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. 
>*?0+	)*+$,&'(  are the major (>50% shareholding percentage) ownership 
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parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. >480+	)*+$,&'( are 
the minor (<=50% shareholding percentage) ownership parent firms’ returns 
of focal firm 4 in the previous month. !*96	8*96	)*+$,&'( are the same name 
parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. <4==	8*96	)*+$,&'( 
are the different name parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 in the previous 
month. <4+	)*+$,&'( are the directly linked parent firms’ returns of focal firm 4 
in the previous month. :8;4+	)*+$,&'(  are the indirectly linked parent firms’ 
returns of focal firm 4 in the previous month. 
Table 2.5: Performances of sub-predictors 
This table compares the performances of sub-predictors by using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. In Panel A, the regressors of interest are local 
subsidiaries, foreign subsidiaries, same industrial subsidiaries, different industrial subsidiaries, major subsidiaries, minor subsidiaries, same name 
subsidiaries, different name subsidiaries, directly linked subsidiaries, indirectly linked subsidiaries. In Panel B, the regressors of interest are local parent 
firms, foreign parent firms, same industrial parent firms, different industrial parent firms, major parent firms, minor parent firms, same name parent firms, 
different name parent firms, directly linked parent firms, indirectly linked parent firms. Control variables are same as in Table 2.3. T-statistics are shown 
in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A 
Excess return (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) (10) 
 
(11) (12) (13) 
 
(14) (15) 
*100 Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()*+	-./$,&01 5.24*  3.39             
 (1.82)  (0.95)             
2(34567	-./$,&01  10.23*** 9.45***             
 
 (3.56) (3.28)             
-*84	97:	-./$,&01    4.13*  2.35          
    (1.88)  (1.12)          
;5<<	97:	-./$,&01     7.21*** 6.48**          
     (2.63) (2.32)          
=*>(3	-./$,&01       4.83*  2.31       
       (1.75)  (0.98)       
=57(3	-./$,&01        5.87*** 5.22**       
        (2.60) (2.32)       
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-*84	7*84	-./$,&01          3.52**  1.98*    
          (2.20)  (1.73)    
;5<<	7*84	-./$,&01           4.39*** 4.19***    
           (2.78) (2.64)    
;53	-./$,&01             2.82*  1.62 
             (1.90)  (1.33) 
97:53	-./$,&01              4.23*** 3.46** 
              (2.89) (2.26) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 15,232 15,232 15,232 17,078 17,078 17,078 19,924 19,924 19,924 18,215 18,215 18,215 15,939 15,939 15,939 
!? 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 
Panel B 
Excess return (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) (10) 
 
(11) (12) (13) 
 
(14) (15) 
*100 Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()*+	@*3$,&01 2.02**  1.37*             
 (2.44)  (1.80)             
2(34567	@*3$,&01  4.11*** 3.08***             
 
 (3.21) (2.95)             
-*84	97:	@*3$,&01    2.04**  1.29          
    (2.16)  (1.60)          
;5<<	97:	@*3$,&01     4.29*** 3.21**          
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     (3.69) (2.47)          
=*>(3	@*3$,&01       1.89**  1.06       
       (2.05)  (1.45)       
=57(3	@*3$,&01        4.31*** 3.23***       
        (4.35) (3.17)       
-*84	7*84	@*3$,&01          3.06*  2.32    
          (1.93)  (1.59)    
;5<<	7*84	@*3$,&01           6.32*** 4.57***    
           (3.77) (2.83)    
;53	@*3$,&01             2.65*  1.32 
             (1.88)  (1.33) 
97:53	@*3$,&01              4.85*** 3.29** 
              (3.52) (2.50) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 24,764 24,764 24,764 30,056 30,056 30,056 35,422 35,422 35,422 32,203 32,203 32,203 27,927 27,927 27,927 




(1) Performance of local firms vs. foreign firms 
In columns (1)-(3) of Panel A of Table 2.5, I find that foreign subsidiaries have 
larger predictive power than local subsidiaries due to larger coefficient and t-
statistic value. The predictive information of foreign subsidiaries can absorb 
the predictive information of local subsidiaries. In columns (1)-(3) of Panel B 
of Table 2.5, I find that foreign parent firms have larger predictive power than 
local parent firms due to larger coefficient and t-statistic values. The predictive 
information of foreign parent firms can absorb the predictive information of 
local parent firms. 
 
These results are consistent with the findings in Huang (2015). Huang (2015) 
finds that investors have difficulties to promptly process different language, 
cultural, and time zone foreign operation information. She finds that the 
predictive power of foreign operation information can absorb the predictive 
power of local operation information. My results show that investors are also 
difficult to promptly process foreign ownership-linked firms’ value-relevant 
information. 
 
(2) Performance of same industrial firms vs. different industrial 
firms 
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In columns (4)-(6) of Panel A of Table 2.5, I find that different industrial 
subsidiaries have larger predictive power than same industrial subsidiaries 
due to larger coefficient and t-statistic value. The predictive information of 
different industrial subsidiaries can absorb the predictive information of same 
industrial subsidiaries. In columns (4)-(6) of Panel B of Table 2.5, I find that 
different industrial parent firms have larger predictive power than same 
industrial parent firms due to larger coefficient and t-statistic values. The 
predictive information of different industrial parent firms can absorb the 
predictive information of same industrial parent firms.  
 
The explanation is that there are plenty of industry analysts to improve 
investors prompt reaction to same industrial firms’ information, comparing with 
fewer analyst coverages to multiple industries. These results are consistent 
with the findings in Ginglinger et al. (2018). Ginglinger et al. (2018) find that 
when entities are operating in different industries, it may be harder for investors 
to comprehend these entities and to promptly process the information released 
by these entities. My results show that investors are difficult to promptly 
process different industrial ownership-linked firms’ value-relevant information. 
 
(3) Performance of major firms vs. minor firms 
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In columns (7)-(9) of Panel A of Table 2.5, I find that minor subsidiaries have 
larger predictive power than major subsidiaries due to larger coefficient and t-
statistic value. The predictive information of minor subsidiaries can absorb the 
predictive information of major subsidiaries. In columns (7)-(9) of Panel B of 
Table 2.5, I find that minor parent firms have larger predictive power than major 
parent firms due to larger coefficient and t-statistic values. The predictive 
information of minor parent firms can absorb the predictive information of major 
parent firms.  
 
There are two explanations. First, investors have larger uncertainty to 
information and news of minor ownership-linked firms rather than major 
ownership-linked firms. It delays investors’ reaction to information from minor 
ownership-linked firms. Second, investors believe that minor ownership-linked 
firms’ information or news are not important than that of major ownership-
linked firms. Therefore, investors choose to ignore the minor information. 
These results are consistent with the findings in Ginglinger et al. (2018). 
Ginglinger et al. (2018) find that when entities are minor or not important in the 
group, it may be harder for investors to comprehend these entities and to 
promptly process the information released by these entities. My results show 




(4) Performance of same name firms vs. different name firms 
In columns (10)-(12) of Panel A of Table 2.5, I find that different name 
subsidiaries have larger predictive power than same name subsidiaries due to 
larger coefficient and t-statistic value. The predictive information of different 
name subsidiaries can absorb the predictive information of same name 
subsidiaries. In columns (10)-(12) of Panel B of Table 2.5, I find that different 
name parent firms have larger predictive power than same name parent firms 
due to larger coefficient and t-statistic values. The predictive information of 
different name parent firms can absorb the predictive information of same 
name parent firms.  
 
The economic explanation is that investors may have lower attention to 
information of different name ownership-linked firms whose names do not 
reveal any connections. Therefore, Investors’ lower attention lead to stronger 
predictive power of different name ownership-linked firms. These results are 
consistent with the findings in Ginglinger et al. (2018). Ginglinger et al. (2018) 
find that when entities whose names do not reveal any connection, it may be 
harder for investors to comprehend these entities and to promptly process the 
information released by these entities. My results show that investors are 
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difficult to promptly process different name ownership-linked firms’ value-
relevant information. 
 
(5) Performance of direct firms vs. indirect firms 
In columns (13)-(15) of Panel A of Table 2.5, I find that indirectly linked 
subsidiaries have larger predictive power than directly linked subsidiaries due 
to larger coefficient and t-statistic value. The predictive information of indirectly 
linked subsidiaries can absorb the predictive information of directly linked 
subsidiaries. In columns (13)-(15) of Panel B of Table 2.5, I find that indirectly 
linked parent firms have larger predictive power than directly linked parent 
firms due to larger coefficient and t-statistic values. The predictive information 
of indirectly linked parent firms can absorb the predictive information of directly 
linked parent firms.  
 
The economic intuition is that investors’ myopia effect delays investors’ 
reaction to farther information from indirectly ownership-linked firms. These 
results are consistent with the findings in Ginglinger et al. (2018). Ginglinger 
et al. (2018) find that when entities are far away from the focal firm investors, 
it may be harder for investors to notice these entities and to promptly process 
the information released by these entities. My results show that investors are 
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This section supplies information about the additional analyses and stability 
checks conducted to guarantee the robustness of the main empirical results. I 
perform univariate portfolio sorts in the global samples to reveal the results of 
different stability and robustness checks. Table 2.6 reports the results of 
diverse robustness checks. All abnormal returns are adjusted using the Fama 
and French (2018) six-factor model. 
 
First, I conduct univariate portfolio sorts in two sub-period samples. Second, I 
conduct univariate portfolio sorts of only using local ownership-linked firms and 
only using foreign ownership-linked firms. In addition, I conduct univariate 
portfolio sorts of only using same industrial ownership-linked firms and only 
using different industrial ownership-linked firms. Finally, I conduct univariate 
portfolio sorts of only using major (>50% shareholding percentage) ownership-
linked firms and only using minor (<=50% shareholding percentage) 
ownership-linked firms. 
Table 2.6: Robustness 
This table presents robustness checks. I perform univariate portfolio sorts on the global sample and value-weighted returns for five quintile portfolios, and 
the 5-1 difference portfolio using a global version of the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model. The six risk factors are obtained from the homepage 
of Kenneth French. Panel A reports results of subsidiary-parent return predictability. Panel B reports results of parent-subsidiary return predictability. 
Column (1) and (2) report two subperiods’ results of univariate portfolio sorts. Column (3) reports the results of univariate portfolio sorts of only using local 
ownership-linked firms. Column (4) reports the results of univariate portfolio sorts of only using foreign ownership-linked firms. Column (5) reports the 
results of univariate portfolio sorts of only using same industrial ownership-linked firms. Column (6) reports the results of univariate portfolio sorts of only 
using different industrial ownership-linked firms. Column (7) reports the results of univariate portfolio sorts of only using major (>50% shareholding 
percentage) ownership-linked firms. Column (8) reports the results of univariate portfolio sorts of only using minor (<=50% shareholding percentage) 
ownership-linked firms. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to 
December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub – Par (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Value Weights 1st period 2nd period Local Foreign Same Different Major Minor 
1 (Low) -1.00*** -0.87*** -0.46*** -0.78*** -0.38** -0.82*** -0.63*** -0.80*** 
2 -0.37* -0.51* -0.24 -0.35* -0.35** -0.37* -0.27* -0.27 
3 0.02 -0.37 -0.16 -0.29 -0.15 -0.38* -0.12 -0.31 
4 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.31* -0.13 -0.26 -0.11 -0.38* 
5 (High) 0.25 0.10 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.14 
5-1 1.25*** 0.97*** 0.68*** 1.01*** 0.49*** 1.01*** 0.75*** 0.95*** 
 (6.29) (3.71) (4.35) (5.36) (2.91) (4.88) (4.73) (4.90) 
 
Panel B: Par – Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Value Weights 1st period 2nd period Local Foreign Same Different Major Minor 
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1 (Low) -0.53 -0.53* -0.50* -0.90** -0.49* -1.23*** -0.58** -0.64** 
2 -0.40 -0.22 -0.06 -0.48* -0.26 -0.47* -0.10 -0.44* 
3 -0.72* -0.15 -0.15 -0.31 -0.09 -0.19 -0.14 -0.14 
4 -0.42 0.12 0.02 -0.37 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.25 
5 (High) 0.62* 0.23 0.06 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.09 0.16 
5-1 1.15*** 0.76** 0.56* 0.92*** 0.73** 1.24*** 0.67** 0.80*** 
 (3.20) (2.19) (1.75) (2.86) (2.36) (4.00) (2.43) (3.36) 
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In Panel A, I test the robustness of subsidiary-parent return predictability. 
Firstly, I examine the samples of portfolio abnormal returns for the subperiods. 
In the period between January 2008 and December 2012, I find that the value-
weighted parent firms’ portfolio alpha is 1.25 (t-statistic = 6.29). In the period 
between January 2013 and December 2017, I find that the value-weighted 
parent firms’ portfolio alpha is 0.97 (t-statistic = 3.71). I also examine the 
subsamples of predictors based on different classifications. Both local and 
foreign subsidiaries can predict future returns of the parent firm. The value-
weighted portfolio abnormal returns of using local subsidiaries and using 
foreign subsidiaries are 0.68% (t-statistic = 4.35) and 1.01% (t-statistic = 5.36) 
respectively. Both same industrial subsidiaries and different industrial 
subsidiaries can predict future returns of the parent firm. The value-weighted 
portfolio abnormal returns of using same industrial subsidiaries and using 
different industrial subsidiaries are 0.49% (t-statistic = 2.91) and 1.01% (t-
statistic = 4.88) respectively. Both major ownership subsidiaries and minor 
ownership subsidiaries can predict future returns of the parent firm. The value-
weighted portfolio abnormal returns of using major ownership subsidiaries and 
using minor ownership subsidiaries are 0.75% (t-statistic = 4.73) and 0.95% (t-
statistic = 4.90) respectively. The results of Panel A indicate that subsidiary-
parent return predictability is robust in different sub-samples. 
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In Panel B, I test the robustness of parent-subsidiary return predictability. In 
the period between January 2008 and December 2012, I find that the value-
weighted subsidiaries’ portfolio alpha is 1.15 (t-statistic = 3.20). In the period 
between January 2013 and December 2017, I find that the value-weighted 
subsidiaries’ portfolio alpha is 0.76 (t-statistic = 2.19). Both local parent firms 
and foreign parent firms can predict future subsidiary returns. The value-
weighted portfolio abnormal returns of using local parent firms and using 
foreign parent firms are 0.56% (t-statistic = 1.75) and 0.92% (t-statistic = 2.86) 
respectively. Both same industrial parent firms and different industrial parent 
firms can predict future subsidiary returns. The value-weighted portfolio 
abnormal returns of using same industrial parent firms and using different 
industrial parent firms are 0.73% (t-statistic = 2.36) and 1.24% (t-statistic = 
4.00) respectively. Both major parent firms and minor parent firms can predict 
future subsidiary returns. The value-weighted portfolio abnormal returns of 
using major parent firms and using minor parent firms are 0.67% (t-statistic 
2.43) and 0.80% (t-statistic = 3.36) respectively. The results of Panel B indicate 
that parent-subsidiary return predictability is robust in different sub-samples. 
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2.4 Market-wide Sentiment and Attention 
Anomalies can be driven by two common behavioral forces, namely ‘subjective’ 
sentiment, which represents investors’ subjective biased beliefs, and ‘objective’ 
limited attention, which represents investors’ objective cognitive constraints. I 
use the market-wide sentiment of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and the market-
wide attention indices of Duan et al. (2018) to examine whether the abnormal 
returns discovered based on the subsidiary momentum and parent momentum 
can be explained by market-wide sentiment and market-wide attention. I 
expect that abnormal returns will be higher during high investor sentiment 
periods due to the binding of short-selling constraints and optimistic investors’ 
biases (Stambaugh et al., 2012). It is expected that abnormal returns will be 
higher during low investor attention periods due to investors’ limited reaction 
across ownership links (Duan et al., 2018). 
 
Table 2.7: Market-wide Sentiment and Attention 
This table reports Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas in different sentiment and 
attention periods. In this table, I report focal firms’ six-factor alphas. I equally divide whole 
period into two sentiment subperiods, high sentiment period and low sentiment period, based 
on the market sentiment indices. I equally divide whole period into two attention subperiods, 
high attention period and low attention period, based on market attention indices. The sample 
covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 
to December 2017. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub – Par Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
High Sentiment 1.23*** 1.27*** 1.18*** 1.69*** 1.71*** 
Low Sentiment 0.91** 0.94* 0.88* 1.25** 1.27* 
High Attention 0.80** 0.83* 0.77* 1.10** 1.12* 
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Low Attention 1.34*** 1.38*** 1.29*** 1.84*** 1.86*** 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Par – Sub Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
High Sentiment 1.08*** 1.15*** 2.09*** 1.69*** 1.08*** 
Low Sentiment 0.80* 0.85* 1.55** 1.25* 0.63 
High Attention 0.71* 0.75* 1.37** 1.10* 0.57 
Low Attention 1.18*** 1.25*** 2.28*** 1.84*** 1.18*** 
 
Panel A of Table 2.7 shows that parent firms’ abnormal returns are higher in a 
high sentiment period and lower in a low sentiment period. In a high sentiment 
period, abnormal returns in all five regional markets are strongly significant at 
the 1% level and large in magnitude from 118 basis points to 171 basis points. 
However, in a low sentiment period, abnormal returns in three regional markets 
are only weakly significant at the 10% level and small in magnitude from 88 
basis points to 127 basis points. Panel A of Table 2.7 shows that parent firms’ 
abnormal returns are higher in a low attention period and lower in a high 
attention period. In a low attention period, abnormal returns in all five regional 
markets are strongly significant at the 1% level and large in magnitude from 
129 basis points to 186 basis points. However, in a high attention period, 
abnormal returns in three regional markets are only weakly significant at the 
10% level and small in magnitude from 77 basis points to 112 basis points. 
These results are consistent with Stambaugh et al. (2012) and Duan et al. 
(2018). Abnormal returns are higher during high investor sentiment periods 
and low investor attention periods. 
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Panel B of Table 2.7 shows that subsidiaries’ abnormal returns are higher in a 
high sentiment period and lower in a low sentiment period. In a high sentiment 
period, abnormal returns in four regional markets are strongly significant at the 
1% level and large in magnitude from 108 basis points to 209 basis points. 
However, in a low sentiment period, abnormal returns in three regional markets 
are only weakly significant at the 10% level and small in magnitude from 80 
basis points to 125 basis points. Panel B of Table 2.7 shows that subsidiaries’ 
abnormal returns are higher in a low attention period and lower in a high 
attention period. In a low attention period, abnormal returns in four regional 
markets are strongly significant at the 1% level and large in magnitude from 
118 basis points to 228 basis points. However, in a high attention period, 
abnormal returns in three regional markets are only weakly significant at the 
10% level and small in magnitude from 71 basis points to 110 basis points. 
These results are consistent with Stambaugh et al. (2012) and Duan et al. 
(2018). Abnormal returns are higher during high investor sentiment periods 
and low investor attention periods. 
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2.5 Change status of ownership links 
In this section, I conduct a test of ownership-linked firms’ returns forecasting 
future returns of focal firm, by examining a particular setting where I can follow 
the same firm without ownership links and with ownership links. I restrict the 
analysis to solely those firms without ownership links that transition to with 
ownership links, through mergers and acquisitions, and initial public offerings 
of firms. The advantage of this test is that I can now examine the time lags in 
information updating of the exact same firms when them without ownership 
links that transition to them with ownership links.  
 
The sanity is that, when the same firm has not ownership linked firms, its 
ownership-linked firms should have relatively weaker or insignificant 
predictability over its future returns. However, when the same firm has 
ownership linked firms, its ownership-linked firms should be a significant and 
positive predictor of its future return. 
 
Table 2.8 Change Status of Ownership Links 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of stock returns in two subsamples. 
I identify all cases in which a firm without ownership link transitions into the firm with ownership 
link. I then include observations within two years prior to the status change in the firm without 
the ownership link, and those within two years subsequent to the status change in the firm 
with the ownership link. In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable is the monthly return 
of the parent firm, the independent variable is the monthly return of the subsidiary; In columns 
(2) and (4), the dependent variable is the excess return of the subsidiary, the independent 
variable is the monthly return of the parent firm. Control variables are same as in Table 2.3 
and are unreported for brevity. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using 
Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
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10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from 
twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
 Before ownership link After ownership link 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
*100 Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()$,&*+ 
2.02    
(1.23)    
,-.$,&*+ 
 0.48*   
 (1.81)   
'()$,&*+ 
  4.52***  
  (2.67)  
,-.$,&*+ 
    
   1.55*** 
   (4.06) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,554 8,168 4,554 8,168 
!/ 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.07 
 
I implement this test by identifying all cases in which a firm without the 
ownership link transitions into a firm with the ownership link. I then include 
observations within two years prior to the link change, and those within two 
years subsequent to the link change. I conduct Fama-MacBeth return 
predictive regressions and the results are reported in Table 2.8. When a firm 
has not ownership links, its predictor is insignificant or weakly significant. 
However, when that firm has ownership links, its predictor becomes 
statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests that linked firms have 
predictive power after firms are ownership connected. 
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2.6 Transaction Costs 
In this section, I test the impact of trading costs on trading strategy. Following 
Cao et al. (2016), I calculate trading costs. I obtain the closing bid and ask 
prices for 23 developed markets’ stocks. 0123$	 is half the bid–ask spread 
divided by the stock price for stock 5. The number of stocks that enter the long 
portfolio is denoted as 61; the number of stocks that exit the long portfolio is 
denoted as 63; and the number of stocks that remain in the portfolio is denoted 
as 62. The trading costs for the long side in month 3 are: 
:123;<=>,& = 	




The denominator denotes the average number of stocks in the long portfolio 
in month 3. I can also obtain the trading costs for the short side by using the 
same analysis. 
 
The monthly trading costs are averaged over time. This reduces subsidiary 
momentum trading strategy profits by 22 basis points from 107 basis points 
(Fama and French (2018) six-factor alpha) per month to 85 basis points per 
month (t-statistic = 4.86), and reduces parent firm momentum trading strategy 
profits by 36 basis points from 94 basis points (Fama and French (2018) six-
factor alpha) per month to 58 basis points per month (t-statistic = 1.87). It 
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This chapter analyzes subsidiary-parent return predictability and parent-
subsidiary return predictability by using a sample of firms from twenty-three 
developed countries worldwide. Lagged one-monthly returns of subsidiaries 
can predict the following monthly returns of parent firms. Lagged one-monthly 
returns of parents can predict the following monthly returns of subsidiaries. 
Two trading strategies can generate abnormal returns, which cannot be 
explained felicitously by risk factors and firm characteristics. 
 
In addition, I compare the performance of sub-predictors. I find that ownership-
linked firms consisting of foreign firms, different industrial firms, minor firms, 
different name firms, or indirect firms have a larger predictive power over the 
future monthly returns of focal firms. 
 
The contribution of this chapter is the new evidence of inter-firm return 
predictability in the ownership networks. These new inter-firm return 
predictabilities are not only an interesting practical fact with implications for 
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CHAPTER 3 — Mechanisms of The 
Return Predictability along Ownership 
Links 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In the last chapter, I studied inter-firm return predictabilities along ownership 
links. I found subsidiary-parent return predictability and parent-subsidiary 
return predictability on a global scale and in various regional samples. The 
returns from these strategies cannot be explained by risk factors, and firm 
characteristics. In this chapter, I test which mechanisms can drive inter-firm 
return predictabilities along ownership links. I propose four underlying 
mechanisms to explain the return predictability in complex ownership network. 
First, the investors’ limited attention to focal firms, ownership links, or 
ownership-linked firms may lead to the return predictability. Second, the limits 
to arbitrage, including high costs of arbitrage and difficult to leverage with 
borrowing capital, may explain the return predictability. Third, the opaque 
internal information of the conglomerate, such as active internal capital market 
and tunneling effect, could generate the return predictability. Finally, the 
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information complexity of focal firms or ownership-linked firms may delay 
investors’ prompt response to update price and lead to the return predictability. 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is the mechanisms it finds to explain the 
return predictability along ownership links. I find that not only traditional 
mechanisms, including investors’ limited attention and limits to arbitrage, can 
explain the inter-firm return predictability, but also the new mechanisms, 
including the opaque internal information and information complexity, can also 
explain the inter-firm return predictability. The two new mechanisms provide 
new perspectives to advance the understanding of the return predictability 
among the inter-firm networks. The two new mechanisms also have essential 
implications for behavioral finance models and theories. 
 
3.1.1 The Investors’ Limited Attention  
The investors’ limited attention to focal firms may explain inter-firm return 
predictability. For example, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that investors’ 
limited attention to suppliers leads to the return predictability from customers 
to suppliers. Cao et al. (2016) find that lagged stock returns of strategic alliance 
partners can forecast stock returns of focal firms, since investors have lower 
attention to these focal firms. Therefore, I propose that investors’ limited 
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attention to focal firms can explain the return predictability along ownership 
links. I use three common variables which have been widely used by previous 
studies (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Cohen and Lou, 2012; Huang, 2015), such 
as turnover, analyst coverage, and institutional investor holdings, to measure 
investors’ limited attention to focal firms.  
 
Investors may have lower attention to new ownership links. For example, when 
the parent firm has just acquired the equity of the other firm, investors may 
have lower attention to this new ownership link. However, investors may have 
higher attention to other old ownership links. Therefore, I propose that 
investors’ lower attention to new ownership links could lead to the return 
predictability. I use firms’ merger and acquisition data to identify new 
ownership links and old ownership links.  
 
In Chapter 2, I find that investors have lower attention to foreign firms, different 
industrial firms, minor firms, different name firms, and indirect firms. Therefore, 
I propose that when the ownership-linked firms are consisted of these firms to 




3.1.2 The Limits to Arbitrage 
The high costs of arbitrage may explain inter-firm return predictabilities along 
ownership links. For instance, Cao et al. (2016) find that high costs of arbitrage 
lead to return predictability between strategic alliance partners. More recently, 
Lee et al. (2019) find that return predictability between technological partners 
can be explained by the high costs of arbitrage. Shedding lights on these 
empirical studies which find that high costs of arbitrage can explain return 
predictability, I want to show that the return predictability along ownership links 
can be explained by the high costs of arbitrage and that these forecasting 
patterns are more pronounced among focal firm stocks with less market 
capitalization, and higher idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
The difficult to leverage with borrowing capital may explain return predictability. 
Akbas et al. (2015, 2016) find that when there are high capital inflows to hedge 
funds, hedge funds can better correct stock mispricing. I use broker-dealer 
capacity to proxy for the level of arbitrage capital and split the sample period 
into high and low funding liquidity periods. I find that abnormal returns 
produced from the strategies are higher in low funding liquidity period and 
lower in high funding liquidity period. 
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3.1.3 The Opaque Internal Information of The 
Conglomerate 
The opacity of cash flow transfers between subsidiaries in the internal capital 
market may reduce information processing efficiency. Berger and Ofek (1995) 
find that internal capital market activities, such as overinvestment and cross-
subsidization, in a group decrease information processing efficiency and bring 
about value discounts. Lamont (1997) finds that investment in nonoil segments 
of petroleum companies decreases when cash flow in oil segments falls 
dramatically due to the large plunge of oil prices in 1985. This finding indicates 
that investment of one subsidiary in a parent firm may depend on the cash 
flows of other subsidiaries in a parent firm through internal capital markets. I 
find that the more active internal capital market of the focal firm is, the stronger 
return predictability is. 
 
Investors may be worried about a potential tunneling effect. Focal firm’s 
investors fear rent extraction from that focal firm by other firms in a group (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Atanasov et al., 2010). When 
the ownership-linked firm announces a positive information, but even if the 
focal firm’s investors are aware of the ownership links and expect that the 
positive information at the level of the ownership-linked firm result from the 
focal firm, they could be still suspicious about whether this information is 
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positive for the focal firm. Inter-firm tunneling may influence the return 
predictability along ownership links. I use countries’ anti-self-dealing index and 
public enforcement index to proxy for the possibility of tunneling and split the 
all countries into high, medium, and low tunneling possibility countries. The 
abnormal returns are highest in high tunneling possibility countries. 
 
3.1.4 Information Complexity 
Investors may have limited capacities to respond promptly to complex 
information of ownership-linked firms. The more complex the information of 
ownership-linked firms is, the more stronger return predictability is. For 
example, Cohen and Lou (2012) find that the complexity of sales information 
drives the return predictability from standalones to conglomerates. Therefore, 
I propose that subsidiaries’ information complexity and parents’ information 
complexity can drive the return predictability. Investors are difficult to respond 
promptly to complex subsidiaries’ or parent firms’ information and their 
corresponding portfolio returns. 
 
Higher analysts’ forecast dispersion may lead to slower information responses 
and thus analysts’ complexity may explain return predictability along 
ownership links. Chan et al. (1996) find that price continuation comes from a 
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gradual response to information. Hirshleifer (2001) and Daniel et al. (1998, 
2001) find that behavioral biases are increased when there is more complex 
information. Zhang (2006) proposes that behavioral biases are larger and price 
response is slower when there is larger analysts’ forecast dispersion for the 
firm’s value. Therefore, investors are difficult to respond promptly, when there 
is larger analysts’ forecast dispersion.  
 
Investors have limited capacities to analyze information of complex intangibles. 
Intangibles’ complexity could lead to return predictability. Morck and Yeung 
(1991) find evidence that the value discounts of the firm increase with growth 
of R&D and advertising expenses. Multinational companies have a higher 
proportion of intangible assets than domestic companies (Morck and Yeung 
(1992)), which are associated with higher returns. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) find 
that more technology-intensive firms are likely to be difficult to value, leading 
to a slower and potentially stronger information diffusion effect. Therefore, I 
propose that parent firms and subsidiaries which have more complex 
intangibles (e.g., larger advertising expenses/market capitalization, or larger 




The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 shows data 
and methodology of testing mechanisms. Section 3.3 explores investors’ 
limited attention. Section 3.4 tests the limits to arbitrage. Section 3.5 tests the 
opaque internal information of the conglomerate. In section 3.6, I examine the 
information complexity. Section 3.7 compares these competing mechanisms. 
Section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data and Methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed 
markets. The twenty-three developed markets are based on the MSCI world 
developed market index as of December 2017. The 23 developed markets 
include two North American markets (Canada and United States), sixteen 
European markets (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom), and five Asia-Pacific markets (Australia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore). I collect price, return, and 
volume data for US firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and the same data for non-US firms from Thomson Reuter’s Eikon. I 
further collect accounting data for US firms from Compustat and accounting 
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data for non-US firms from Worldscope. Institutional ownership data and 
analyst data for all firms in the sample are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) and Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, respectively. I 
collect time-varying ownership links and shareholdings data from the FactSet 
database. I exclude stocks with prices below $5 to avoid market microstructure 
problems. I cover all industrial firms except firms in the financial sector22 (with 
two-digit NAICS code = 52). The sample period is from January 2008 to 
December 2017 with a total of 120 months.23 Like other international asset 
pricing literature, all stocks returns are denominated in USD.24  Following 
Fama and French (2012), we use the one-month US T-bill rate for the USA 
and the remaining countries to calculate monthly excess returns.25 
 
3.2.2 Methodology 
As for testing mechanisms to subsidiaries-parent return predictability, I 
construct a dummy variable, J$,&*+, which is equal to one if the corresponding 
mechanism (e.g., investor attention) proxy of firm 5 in the previous month is 
above the cross-sectional median of all firms. Then I run Fama-MacBeth 
 
22 Financial firms are often excluded in empirical asset pricing literature (e.g., Finke and 
Weigert, 2017, Lee et al., 2019) since the characteristics of accounting variables of financial 
firms are very different from firms operating in the real economy. 
23 I have only 10 years’ historical ownership data due to the data availability. 
24 For example, Griffin (2002) and Fama and French (2012). 
25 My results are stable if we use local currency returns and work with raw returns rather than 
excess returns. 
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regressions by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction term 
between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns ('()$,&*+) and the dummy variable 
(J$,&*+).  
 
!"#$,	& − 	!L,& = 	MN,& + M+,O,& + M/,P,&	+	MQ,&	'()$,&*+ + MR,&J$,&*+
+ MS,&'()$,&*+ × 	J$,&*+ + MU,&
V	W$,&*+ +	X$,&, 
 
where !"#$,& − !L,&	is the excess return on the focal firm’s stock 5 in month 3; 
MN,& denotes the intercept; M+,O,&	is a country-specific dummy variable which is 
equal to one if firm 5 is from country 0 and zero otherwise;	M/,P,&	is a industry-
specific dummy variable which is equal to one if firm 5 is from industry Y and 
zero otherwise; '()$,&*+	is the lagged subsidiary stock return in month 3 − 1; 
W$,&*+ represents a vector of controls, including 6Z('5[\) the natural logarithm 
of the market capitalization (Banz, 1981), 6Z(]/_) the natural logarithm of 
book-to-market equity ratio (Basu, 1983), _1` the cumulative return of stock 
5  from month 3 − 12 to 3 − 2 (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), !"#$,&*+	the 
stock return of focal firm 5  in month 	3 − 1  (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990), Turnover the number of shares traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding during a day, averaged over the past twelve 
months (Rouwenhorst, 1999; Ibbotson et al., 2013), aZY_`1`  the value-
weighted two-digit SIC industry return of the focal firm in month 3 − 1 
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(Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 1999; Nijman et al., 2004), asset growth (cd) the 
year-over-year growth rate of total assets (Cooper et al., 2008), and gross 
profitability (d,) the revenue minus cost of goods sold scaled by assets (Novy-
Marx, 2013). 
 
If the dummy variable ( J$,&*+ ) is one investor attention measure (e.g., 
institutional ownership, turnover, or analyst coverage), a significantly negative 
coefficient estimate for MS,& implies that the predictability effect of subsidiaries’ 
returns ('()$,&*+) is lower for firms with high investor attention and vice versa. 
In other words, investors’ limited attention can explain the return predictability. 
 
As for testing mechanisms to parents-subsidiary return predictability, I 
construct a dummy variable, J$,&*+, which is equal to one if the corresponding 
mechanism (e.g., investor attention) proxy of firm 5 in the previous month is 
above the cross-sectional median of all firms. Then I run Fama-MacBeth 
regressions by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction term 
between the lagged parent firms’ returns (,-.$,&*+) and the dummy variable 
(J$,&*+).  
 
!"#$,	& − 	!L,& = 	MN,& + M+,O,& + M/,P,&	+	MQ,&	,-.$,&*+ + MR,&J$,&*+




where !"#$,& − !L,&	is the excess return on the focal firm’s stock 5 in month 3; 
MN,& denotes the intercept; M+,O,&	is a country-specific dummy variable which is 
equal to one if firm 5 is from country 0 and zero otherwise;	M/,P,&	is a industry-
specific dummy variable which is equal to one if firm 5 is from industry Y and 
zero otherwise; ,-.$,&*+	is the lagged parent firm stock return in month 3 − 1; 
W$,&*+ represents a vector of controls, including 6Z('5[\) the natural logarithm 
of the market capitalization (Banz, 1981), 6Z(]/_) the natural logarithm of 
book-to-market equity ratio (Basu, 1983), _1` the cumulative return of stock 
5  from month 3 − 12 to 3 − 2 (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), !"#$,&*+	the 
stock return of focal firm 5  in month 	3 − 1  (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990), Turnover the number of shares traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding during a day, averaged over the past twelve 
months (Rouwenhorst, 1999; Ibbotson et al., 2013), aZY_`1`  the value-
weighted two-digit SIC industry return of the focal firm in month 3 − 1 
(Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 1999; Nijman et al., 2004), asset growth (cd) the 
year-over-year growth rate of total assets (Cooper et al., 2008), and gross 




If the dummy variable ( J$,&*+ ) is one investor attention measure (e.g., 
institutional ownership, turnover, or analyst coverage), a significantly negative 
coefficient estimate for MS,& implies that the predictability effect of parent firms’ 
returns (,-.$,&*+) is lower for firms with high investor attention and vice versa. 
In other words, investors’ limited attention can explain the return predictability. 
 
Compared with other approaches (e.g., pooled OLS regressions) to deal with 
panel data, the Fama-MacBeth regressions take into account the cross-
correlations and the serial correlation in the error term, so that the t-statistics 
are much more conservative (Choe et al., 2005). In addition, the Fama-
MacBeth regressions are computationally simple to implement and are widely 
used in the literature of return predictability (Cochrane, 2005; Hou et al., 2018). 
 
3.3 The Investors’ Limited Attention  
I test whether the results are driven by investors’ limited attention to focal firms, 
ownership links, or ownership-linked firms. I use some proxies for inattention 
to test this mechanism. Specifically, if investors’ limited attention plays an 
important role, I would expect stronger return predictability when investors 
have lower attention. I use three common variables to capture investors’ 
inattention to focal firms in the literature (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Cohen 
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and Lou, 2012; Huang, 2015; Lee et al., 2019): lower residual institutional 
ownership, 26  lower turnover, and lower analyst coverage. Residual 
institutional ownership (Res Inst Own) is institutional ownership of the focal 
firm orthogonalized with regard to firm size at the end of December in the 
previous calendar year. Turnover is the focal firm’s turnover measured as the 
average daily turnover in the previous calendar year, and No. Analysts is the 
number of analysts that cover the focal firm at the end of December in the 
previous calendar year. A dummy variable, J$,&*+ , is equal to one if the 
corresponding investor attention proxy (i.e., Res Inst Own, turnover, or No. 
Analysts) of focal firm 5 in the previous month is above the cross-sectional 
median of all firms. Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by adding the 
dummy variable ( J$,&*+ ) and an interaction term between the lagged 
subsidiaries’ returns (or the lagged parent firms’ returns) and the dummy 
variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Also, I use firms’ merger and acquisition data to identify new ownership links 
and old ownership links. For example, when the parent firm has just acquired 
the equity of the other firm, investors may have lower attention to this new 
ownership link. However, investors have higher attention to old ownership links. 
A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal to one if the parent firm has just acquired 
 
26 Note that residual institutional ownership here is the institutional ownership after being 
orthogonalized with respect to focal firm market capitalization. 
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the equity of the other firm in the last two years.27 Then Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction 
term between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns (or the lagged parent firms’ 
returns) and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Finally, investors have lower attention to foreign firms, different industrial firms, 
minor firms, different name firms, and indirect firms. Therefore, I expect that 
when the ownership-linked firms are consisted of these firms, the return 
predictability is more pronounced. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal to one if 
the ownership-linked firms are consisted of these firms (i.e., foreign firms, 
different industrial firms, minor firms, different name firms, or indirect firms). 
Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) 
and an interaction term between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns (or the lagged 
parent firms’ returns) and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Table 3.1: Investors’ Limited Attention 
This table reports that investors’ limited attention mechanisms. In Panel A and B, the 
dependent variable is the monthly excess return of the parent firm and explanatory variables 
include the lagged subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged 
subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the dummy variable. In Panel C and D, the dependent 
variable is the monthly excess return of the subsidiary and explanatory variables include the 
lagged parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged parent firms’ 
return (,-.$,&*+ ) and the dummy variable. I use different proxy variables to explain the 
mechanism of investors’ limited attention to focal firms, inter-firm linkages, or partial predictor 
information. Res Inst Own is institutional ownership of the focal firm orthogonalized with regard 
to firm size at the end of December in previous calendar year. Turnover is the focal firm’s 
 
27 I test new ownership links from one to five years. My results are not influenced. 
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turnover measured as the average daily turnover in previous calendar year, and No. Analysts 
is the number of analysts covering the focal firm at the end of December in previous calendar 
year. The dummy variable that takes the value of one if the proxy variable is above the sample 
median in the previous month and zero otherwise. New ownership links are dummy variables 
that take the value of one if the parent firm has just acquired the equity of the other firm in the 
last two years and zero otherwise. Foreign, Different Industry, Minor, different name, and 
Indirectly linked are dummy variables that take the value of one if the predictor has 
corresponding proxy variable information and zero otherwise. All regressions also include the 
dummy variable itself and lagged control variables. Control variables are same as in Table 2.3 
and are unreported for brevity. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using 
Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from 
twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017.  
 
Panel A: Sub – Par (1) (2) (3) (4) 
*100 Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()$,&*+ 
8.86*** 7.77*** 8.26*** 4.21*** 
(2.98) (2.76) (2.69) (3.25) 
'()$,&*+ * (Res Inst Own > Median) 
-4.23*    
(-1.87)    
'()$,&*+ * (Turnover > Median) 
 -3.28*   
 (-1.76)   
'()$,&*+ * (No. Analyst > Median) 
  -4.44*  
  (-1.89)  
'()$,&*+ * (New Ownership links) 
   3.78*** 
   (2.60) 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 113,851 113,851 113,851 
!/ 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 
Panel B: Sub – Par (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()$,&*+ 
7.22*** 6.12*** 5.29*** 4.76*** 4.39*** 
(3.68) (3.18) (2.84) (2.77) (2.70) 
'()$,&*+ * (Foreign) 
5.34***     
(3.12)     
'()$,&*+ * (Different industry) 
 3.52**    
 (2.16)    
'()$,&*+ * (Minor)   3.29**   
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  (2.09)   
'()$,&*+ * (Different name) 
   2.70**  
   (2.35)  
'()$,&*+ * (Indirectly linked) 
    2.59** 
    (2.03) 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 113,851 113,851 113,851 113,851 
!/ 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 
 
Panel C: Par – Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) 
*100 Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
,-.$,&*+ 
2.21*** 2.31*** 2.22*** 1.01*** 
(4.08) (4.54) (4.27) (4.05) 
,-.$,&*+ * (Res Inst Own > Median) 
-0.89***    
(-2.76)    
,-.$,&*+ * (Turnover > Median) 
 -0.94***   
 (-2.98)   
,-.$,&*+ * (No. Analyst > Median) 
  -0.84**  
  (-2.31)  
,-.$,&*+ * (New Ownership links) 
   1.74*** 
   (2.89) 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 204,207 204,207 204,207 
!/ 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
Panel D: Par – Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
,-.$,&*+ 
1.92*** 1.65*** 1.52*** 1.70*** 1.49*** 
(6.82) (6.14) (5.60) (6.35) (5.28) 
,-.$,&*+ * (Foreign) 
1.10***     
(3.17)     
,-.$,&*+ * (Different industry) 
 0.83**    
 (2.34)    
,-.$,&*+ * (Minor) 
  0.94***   
  (2.88)   
,-.$,&*+ * (Different name) 
   0.91***  
   (2.70)  
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,-.$,&*+ * (Indirectly linked) 
    0.86** 
    (2.43) 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 204,207 204,207 204,207 204,207 
!/ 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 
 
First, I test that the lower the parent firm investors’ attention is, the more severe 
the lag in incorporating information into parent firm’ s stock price will be, and 
thus the stronger the stock return predictability will be. 
 
In Panel A of Table 3.1, the first three interaction terms are only weakly 
significant at 10% level. This supports that investors’ limited attention to parent 
firms has limited explanatory power to subsidiary-parent return predictability. 
In the final column, I find that parent firm investors who have low attention to 
new ownership links can explain subsidiary-parent return predictability, since 
the interaction term is statistically significant at 1% level. These results are 
consistent with the inter-firm return predictability literature (e.g., Li et al., 2016; 
Lee et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). 
 
In Panel B of Table 3.1, all five interaction terms are statistically significant at 
5% level. These results indicate that parent firm investors’ limited attention to 
foreign subsidiaries, different industrial subsidiaries, minor subsidiaries, 
different name subsidiaries, and indirectly linked subsidiaries are main 
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reasons to the subsidiary-parent return predictability. These results are 
consistent with findings in Ginglinger et al. (2018). 
 
Second, I test that the lower the subsidiary investors’ attention is, the more 
severe the lag in incorporating information into subsidiary’ s stock price will be, 
and thus the stronger the stock return predictability will be. 
 
In Panel C of Table 3.1, Two of first three interaction terms are strongly 
significant with 1% level. This supports that comparing with parent firm 
investors, subsidiary investors have more lower attention to parent firms’ links 
and information. The potential explanation is that investors are more likely to 
draw an accurate picture of a complex parent firm when they invest in the head 
of the group rather than in an entity within the firm network. In addition, as for 
listed subsidiaries’ outside investors, the parent firm’s value-relevant 
information, could be less informative as other subsidiaries’ performances may 
blur that of the listed subsidiaries. In the final column, I find that subsidiary 
investors who have low attention to new ownership links can explain the 
parent-subsidiary return predictability, since the interaction term is statistically 
significant at 1% level. These results are consistent with the inter-firm return 




In Panel D of Table 3.1, all five interaction terms are statistically significant at 
5% level. These results indicate that subsidiary investors’ limited attention to 
foreign parent firms, different industrial parent firms, minor parent firms, 
different name parent firms, and indirectly linked parent firms are main reasons 
to the parent-subsidiary return predictability. These results are consistent with 
findings in Ginglinger et al. (2018). 
 
In addition, I introduce a transparency shock (international cross-listing) to test 
whether the change of firm visibility (investors’ attention) can impact return 
predictability. Baker et al. (2002) find that international firms can experience a 
significant transparency increase after listing their shares on two exchanges 
with a large number of international listings: the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Each year, the NYSE 
provides a list of non-U.S. stocks listed on the NYSE and the LSE provides a 
list of non-U.K. securities listed on the LSE. I define that the listing firms in 
domestic markets of other 21 developed countries cross-list their shares in 
NYSE or LSE as international cross-listing examples in the sample. And then, 
I conduct a test of the mechanism of ownership-linked firms’ returns forecast 
future returns of focal firm, by examining a particular setting where I can follow 
the same firm without international cross-listing and with international cross-
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listing. I restrict the analysis to solely those firms without international cross-
listing that transition to with international cross-listing, through cross-listing 
their shares in NYSE or LSE. The advantage of this test is that I can now 
examine the time lags in information updating of the exact same firms when 
them without international cross-listing that transition to them with international 
cross-listing.  
 
The sanity is that, when the firm has no international cross-listing, global 
investors (especially US and/or UK institutional investors) have lower attention 
to the firm. Therefore, its ownership-linked firms should have significant and 
positive predictability over its future returns. However, when the firm has 
international cross-listing, global investors (especially US and/or UK 
institutional investors) have higher attention to the firm. Therefore, its 
ownership-linked firms should be weaker predictors to its future return. 
 
Table 3.2 International Cross-Listing and Firm Transparency 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of stock returns in two subsamples. 
I identify all cases in which a firm without international cross-listing transitions into the firm with 
international cross-listing. I then include observations within three years prior to the status 
change in the firm without international cross-listing, and those within three years subsequent 
to the status change in the firm with international cross-listing. In columns (1) and (3), the 
dependent variable is the monthly return of the parent firm, the independent variable is the 
monthly return of the subsidiary; In columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is the excess 
return of the subsidiary, the independent variable is the monthly return of the parent firm. 
Control variables are same as in Table 2.3 and are unreported for brevity. T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample 
covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 
to December 2017. 
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 Before international cross-listing After international cross-listing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
*100 Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()$,&*+ 
3.67**    
(2.38)    
,-.$,&*+ 
 1.88***   
 (3.69)   
'()$,&*+ 
  2.53*  
  (1.87)  
,-.$,&*+ 
    
   1.29** 




Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,416 6,126 3,416 6,126 
!/ 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 
 
I implement this test by identifying all cases in which a firm without international 
cross-listing transitions into a firm with international cross-listing. I then include 
observations within three years prior to the international cross-listing, and 
those within three years subsequent to the international cross-listing. I conduct 
Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions and the results are reported in Table 
3.2. When a firm has no international cross-listing, its predictor is statistically 
significant at less than or equal to 5% level. However, when that firm has 
international cross-listing, its predictor becomes the weaker significance level. 
This suggests that linked firms have larger predictive power before 
international cross-listing. After the international cross-listing, firms obtain 
 120 
higher international investors’ attention. More international investors trade 
these mispriced stocks, so this mispricing effect becomes smaller and return 
predictability becomes weaker. These results are backed up with Baker et al. 
(2002). 
 
3.4 The Limits to Arbitrage 
3.4.1 Costs of Arbitrage 
In a frictionless market, predictable stock returns should be arbitraged away. 
However, stock mispricing could not disappear thoroughly due to high costs of 
arbitrage. When stocks have higher costs of arbitrage, I should observe a 
stronger return predictability effect, since more sophisticated investors who 
have found these mispricing are unable to make arbitrage profits. Prior 
literature nominates two measures of costs of arbitrage in the stock market: 
idiosyncratic volatility and firm size. Cohen and Lou (2012) report that a 
strategy based on slow price adjustment to standalone firms’ information is 
more pronounced for smaller firms and higher idiosyncratic volatility firms. 
Arbitrageurs’ demand for a stock is inversely related to its arbitrage risk, which 
is reflected in its idiosyncratic volatility (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). 
Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) argue that firms’ cross-sectional sensitivity to 
market-wide sentiment is also a function of their idiosyncratic volatility. Short-
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sale constraints are one of the most important costs of arbitrage (e.g., Jones 
and Lamont, 2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Nagel, 2005; Gromb and 
Vayanos, 2010). Trading costs are typically higher in the smaller firm stocks, 
and small firm stocks are difficult and costly to short (Israel and Moskowitz, 
2013). 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility (Idio Vol) is the standard deviation of the residuals from 
a regression of daily stock returns in the previous month on the Fama and 
French (1993) factors (at least ten daily returns required). Firm size (MktCap) 
is the market capitalization of the focal firm at the end of December in the 
previous calendar year. A dummy variable, J$,&*+ , is equal to one if the 
corresponding costs of arbitrage proxy (i.e., Idio Vol or MktCap) of focal firm 5 
in the previous month is above the cross-sectional median of all firms. Then 
Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and 
an interaction term between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns (or the lagged 
parent firms’ returns) and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Table 3.3: Costs of Arbitrage 
This table reports that high costs of arbitrage to explain return predictability. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is the monthly excess return of the parent firm and explanatory variables 
include the lagged subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged 
subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the dummy variable. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
the monthly excess return of the subsidiary and explanatory variables include the lagged 
parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged parent firms’ return 
(,-.$,&*+) and the dummy variable. There are two proxy variables to measure costs of arbitrage. 
Idio Vol is the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of daily stock returns in 
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the previous month on the Fama and French (1993) factors (at least ten daily returns required). 
MktCap is the market capitalization of the focal firm at the end of December in previous 
calendar year. All interaction terms are based on dummy variables that take the value of one 
if the proxy variable is above the sample median in the previous month and zero otherwise. 
All regressions also include the dummy variable itself and lagged control variables. Control 
variables are same as in Table 2.3 and are unreported for brevity. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers 
parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to 
December 2017.  
 
Panel A: Sub – Par (1) (2) 
*100 Global Global 




'()$,&*+ * (MktCap > Median) 
-4.88***  
(-3.18)  
'()$,&*+ * (Idio Vol > Median) 
 5.23*** 
 (3.35) 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 113,851 
!/ 0.12 0.12 
 
Panel B: Par – Sub (1) (2) 
*100 Global Global 




,-.$,&*+ * (MktCap > Median) 
-1.87***  
(-3.21)  
,-.$,&*+ * (Idio Vol > Median) 
 1.53** 
 (2.45) 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 204,207 
!/ 0.08 0.08 
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First, I test that the higher the parent firm’s costs of arbitrage are, the more 
severe the lag in incorporating information into parent firm’s stock price will be, 
and thus the stronger the stock return predictability will be. 
 
As shown in Column 2 of Panel A, Table 3.3, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between the idiosyncratic volatility dummy and '()$,&*+  is 
large and statistically significant, 5.23 (t-statistic = 3.35), which implies that the 
magnitude of the documented return effect is over 50% larger for stocks with 
high idiosyncratic volatility relative to those with low idiosyncratic volatility. This 
is consistent with my intuition that firms which are more probably to have large 
temporary stock price fluctuations, and are less magnetic to arbitrage capital, 
thus appear a stronger predictability effect. In the same vein, Column 1 of 
Panel A shows that, while the subsidiaries’ return effect among large parent 
firms is strong and significant, the effect in small parent firms is even larger. 
Both findings support to the intuition that subsidiaries’ information have even 
larger influence on high costs of arbitrage stocks. Although some investors 
could find this mispricing and return predictability, they still have difficulties and 
limitations to make the arbitrage due to high costs of arbitrage. These results 
are consistent with the literature (e.g., Cohen and Lou, 2012; Lee et al., 2019). 
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Second, I test that the higher the subsidiary’s costs of arbitrage are, the more 
severe the lag in incorporating information into subsidiary’s stock price will be, 
and thus the stronger the stock return predictability will be. 
 
As shown in Column 2 of Panel B, Table 3.3, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between the idiosyncratic volatility dummy and ,-.$,&*+  is 
large and statistically significant, 1.53 (t-statistic = 2.45), which implies that the 
magnitude of the documented return effect is over 50% larger for stocks with 
high idiosyncratic volatility relative to those with low idiosyncratic volatility. This 
is consistent with my intuition that firms which are more probably to have large 
temporary stock price fluctuations, and are less magnetic to arbitrage capital, 
thus appear a stronger predictability effect. In the same vein, Column 1 of 
Panel B shows that, while the parent firms’ return effect among large 
subsidiaries is strong and significant, the effect in small subsidiaries is even 
larger. Both findings support to the intuition that parent firms’ information have 
even larger influence on high costs of arbitrage stocks. Although some 
investors could find this mispricing and return predictability, they still have 
difficulties and limitations to make the arbitrage due to high costs of arbitrage. 
These results are consistent with the literature (e.g., Cohen and Lou, 2012; 
Lee et al., 2019). 
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3.4.2 Difficult to Leverage with Borrowing Capital 
There is a growing literature about the impact of funding liquidity on asset 
pricing. The stock market is not frictionless and arbitrageurs are constrained 
when there is a supply or demand shock on the capital. Duffie (2010) 
documents that when market friction exists, asset prices will not convert to the 
fundamental value immediately. Such shock may come from the difficulty to 
leverage with borrowing capital (Adrian et al., 2014). Akbas et al. (2015, 2016) 
find that hedge funds can better correct mispricing, when there are high capital 
inflows to hedge funds. 
 
Following Adrian et al. (2014), I use broker-dealer capacity to measure the 
level of arbitrage capital and split the sample period into low and high funding 
liquidity periods. The broker-dealer quarterly leverage is defined as total 
financial asset / (total financial asset - total financial liability) by Adrian et al. 
(2014). The leverage factor is seasonally adjusted log changes in the level of 
broker-dealer leverage. The data are obtained from Table L.129 of the Federal 
Reserve.  
 
Table 3.4: Difficult to Borrow Capital 
This table reports the results for low and high securities broker-dealer’s leverage in different 
periods. The broker-dealer’s quarterly leverage is defined by Adrian et al. (2014) and obtained 
from Federal Reverse. I report the Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas for the low 
funding liquidity period and high funding liquidity period. T-statistics are calculated using 
Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
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10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from 
twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub – Par (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parent alphas Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Low funding 
liquidity period 
1.68*** 1.72*** 1.62*** 2.23*** 2.25*** 
High funding 
liquidity period 
0.43** 0.45* 0.40* 0.70* 0.72* 
 
Panel B: Par – Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Subsidiary alphas Global Global ex USA Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Low funding 
liquidity period 
1.50*** 1.58*** 2.71*** 2.23*** 1.30*** 
High funding 
liquidity period 
0.44 0.48 0.94** 0.80* 0.45 
 
In Table 3.4, I find that Fama and French (2018) six-factor abnormal returns 
are higher in low funding liquidity period than in high funding liquidity period. 
In low funding liquidity period, all strategy alphas are statically significant at 1% 
level. However, in high funding liquidity period, most strategy alphas are not 
statically significant at 5% level. These results indicate that difficult to leverage 
with borrow capital can explain return predictability. Although some investors 
could find this mispricing and return predictability, they still cannot make the 
arbitrage due to the difficulty to leverage with borrowing capital. These results 
are backed up with the Cao et al. (2019b). 
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3.5 The Opaque Internal Information of The 
Conglomerate 
3.5.1 Internal Capital Markets 
The investor response to information of linked firms may depend on the 
existence of internal capital markets whereby cash flow in one subsidiary are 
used to fund investment needs in another subsidiary. Stulz (1990) argues that 
a parent firm may overinvest in subsidiaries with limited investment 
opportunities. Meyer et al. (1992) state that a parent firm may subsidize one 
loss-making subsidiary by transferring funds from profitable subsidiaries. Lang 
and Stulz (1994) use market-to-book ratios (Tobin’s Q) to measure the firm’s 
investment opportunity. Berger and Ofek (1995) find that internal capital 
market activities, e.g., overinvestment and cross-subsidization, in a group 
decrease information processing efficiency and bring about value discounts. 
Lamont (1997) finds that investment in nonoil segments of petroleum 
companies decreases when cash flow in oil segments falls dramatically due to 
the large plunge of oil prices in 1985. This finding indicates that investment of 
one subsidiary in a parent firm may depends on the cash flows of other 
subsidiaries in a parent firm through internal capital market. Lamont and Polk 
(2001) find that firms with larger value discounts have higher subsequent 
returns than that with smaller value discounts. Therefore, I propose that active 
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internal capital market may influence information processing efficiency and 
explain the return predictability. 
Shin and Stulz (1998) investigate whether the internal capital market is active 
by establishing one model. They found that one segment’s investment may be 
funded by other segments’ cash flows through internal capital market. I use 
their methodology here to test whether the internal capital market is active.  
Table 3.5: Internal Capital Markets 
This table reports that internal capital markets’ mechanisms. In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is the monthly excess return of the parent firm and explanatory variables include the 
lagged subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged subsidiaries’ 
return ('()$,&*+) and the dummy variable. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the monthly 
excess return of the subsidiary and explanatory variables include the lagged parent firms’ 
return (,-.$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) and 
the dummy variable. I test each parent firm’s (subsidiary’s) active internal capital market at 
three different significance levels (1%, 5%, and 10%). The dummy variable is equal to one if 
the focal firm’s internal capital market is active at different significance levels and zero 
otherwise. All regressions also include the dummy variable itself and lagged control variables. 
Control variables are same as in Table 2.3 and are unreported for brevity. T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample 
covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 
to December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub – Par (1) (2) (3) 
*100 Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()$,&*+ 
2.45*** 2.36*** 2.03*** 
(3.35) (3.23) (2.73) 
'()$,&*+ * (Active at 1% level) 
2.88***   
(2.93)   
'()$,&*+ * (Active at 5% level) 
 2.76***  
 (2.87)  
'()$,&*+ * (Active at 10% level) 
  2.38** 
  (2.07) 
 129 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 113,851 113,851 
!/ 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 
Panel B: Par – Sub (1) (2) (3) 
*100 Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
,-.$,&*+ 
1.32*** 1.14*** 0.97*** 
(5.23) (4.35) (4.02) 
,-.$,&*+ * (Active at 1% level) 
1.73**   
(2.32)   
,-.$,&*+ * (Active at 5% level) 
 1.56**  
 (2.11)  
,-.$,&*+ * (Active at 10% level) 
  1.23* 
  (1.83) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 204,207 204,207 
!/ 0.08 0.08 0.08 
I firstly examine subsidiary-parent return predictability. In this case, one parent 
firm has different subsidiaries. One subsidiary’s investment can be influenced 
by cash flows of other subsidiaries in the parent firm. When the subsidiary 
announces positive cash flows, but even if the parent firm’s investors are 
conscious of its ownership link and its other subsidiaries, parent firm’s 
investors may be skeptical about whether it is a positive information to the 
parent firm. For example, cash flows of the subsidiaries may be expropriated 
to investments of one subsidiary with limited investment opportunities, 
resulting in overall unclear (negative or positive) information to the parent firm. 
Therefore, the hypothesis I are going to test is that, the more active of internal 
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capital market of the parent firm is, the more severe the lag in incorporating 
information into parent firm’s price will be, and thus the stronger the return 
predictability will be. 
Shin and Stulz (1998) find that small subsidiaries in parent firms to benefit 
more from an efficient internal capital market because it would be easier for 
the internal capital market to fund subsidiaries with small capital expenditures 
relative to the firm’s total investment budget. Therefore, I test the parent firm’s 
smallest subsidiary’s financing effect in the internal capital market. 
For the smallest subsidiary 5 in parent firm e, I run time-series regression for 
36 months. Only stocks which have complete ownership links over the 36-
month are included in my analysis. I use Newey and West (1987)’s correction 
to calculate standard errors. 
a$,f(3)
#cf(3 − 1)









+ hRi$,f(3 − 1) + j$,f(3) 
Where a$,f(3) denotes the gross investment of the subsidiary 5 of parent firm 
e in month 3; #cf(3 − 1) is the book value of the total assets of firm e in 
month 3 − 1; :=<&	$,f(3) is the sum of the cash flow of the subsidiaries of 
parent firm e  except for the cash flow of the subsidiary 5  in month 3 ; 
'$,f(3 − 1) is the sales of subsidiary 5 of parent firm e in month 3 − 1; :$,f(3) 
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is the cash flow of subsidiary 5 of parent firm e in month 3; i$,f(3 − 1) is 
Tobin’s q for the subsidiary 5 of parent firm e in month 3 − 1. 
Following Shin and Stulz (1998), I define internal capital market as “active” if 
h+ is significant at 1% level. I also study for alternative definition of “active” 
defined at significance of 5% and 10%, which give similar results. A dummy 
variable, J$,&*+, is equal to one if the focal firm’s internal capital market is 
active at different significance levels and zero otherwise. Then Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction 
term between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
Panel A of Table 3.5 reports Fama–MacBeth predictive regression with the 
dependent variable being a parent firm return (,-.$,&) in the following month. 
In addition to the interaction term between the dummy variable and '()$,&*+, 
the dummy variable itself and all control variables from the full specification 
are also included, which are unreported for brevity. The results are reported in 
columns 1 to 3 of Panel A, Table 3.5. Two of three interaction terms are 
statistically significant at 1% level and one of three interaction terms is 
statistically significant at 5% level. It indicates that active internal capital market 
decreases information processing efficiency and leads to the subsidiaries-




In addition, I examine parent-subsidiary return predictability. In this case, one 
subsidiary has different parent firms. One subsidiary’s investment can be 
influenced by its parent firms’ other subsidiaries. When the loss-making 
subsidiary announces negative cash flows, but even if the subsidiary’s 
investors are conscious of its ownership link and its parent firms, they could 
be still suspicious about whether this information is negative for the loss-
making subsidiary. For example, cash flows of its parent firms’ other 
subsidiaries may be expropriated to investments of the loss-making subsidiary, 
resulting in overall unclear (positive or negative) information to the subsidiary. 
Therefore, the hypothesis I are going to test is that, the more active of internal 
capital market of the subsidiary is, the more severe the lag in incorporating 
information into subsidiary’s price will be, and thus the stronger the return 
predictability will be. 
For the subsidiary 5, I run time-series regression for 36 months. Only stocks 
which have complete ownership links over the 36-month are included in my 













+ hRi$(3 − 1) + j$(3) 
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Where a$(3) denotes the gross investment of the subsidiary 5 in month 3; 
#c$(3 − 1) is the book value of the total assets of subsidiary 5 in month 3 − 1; 
:=<&	$,f(3) is the sum of the cash flow of the other subsidiaries e of subsidiary 
5’s parent firms in month 3; '$(3 − 1) is the sales of subsidiary 5 in month 3 −
1; :$(3) is the cash flow of subsidiary 5 in month 3; i$(3 − 1) is Tobin’s i 
for the subsidiary 5 in month 3 − 1. 
Following Shin and Stulz (1998), I define internal capital market as “active” if 
h+ is significant at 1% level. I also study for alternative definition of “active” 
defined at significance of 5% and 10%, which give similar results. A dummy 
variable, J$,&*+, is equal to one if the focal firm’s internal capital market is 
active at different significance levels and zero otherwise. Then Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction 
term between the lagged parent firms’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
Panel B of Table 3.5 reports Fama–MacBeth predictive regression with the 
dependent variable being a subsidiary return ('()$,&) in the following month. In 
addition to the interaction term between the dummy variable and ,-.$,&*+, the 
dummy variable itself and all control variables from the full specification are 
also included, which are unreported for brevity. The results are reported in 
columns 1 to 3 of Panel B, Table 3.5. Two of three interaction terms are 
statistically significant at 5% level and one of three interaction terms is 
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statistically significant at 10% level. It indicates that active internal capital 
market decreases information processing efficiency and leads to the parents-
subsidiary return predictability. These results are supported by Berger and 
Ofek (1995). 
 
3.5.2 Tunneling Effect 
Fear of tunneling could be an alternative rationale. Focal firm’s Investors fear 
rent extraction from that focal firm by other firms in the group (e.g., Johnson et 
al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Atanasov et al., 2010). I can explain the 
sanity as following: when the parent firm announces a positive information, but 
even if the subsidiary’s investors are conscious of its ownership link and 
believe that the positive information of the parent firm result from the subsidiary, 
they could be still suspicious about whether this information is positive for the 
subsidiary. For example, the parent firm could extract earnings from the 
subsidiary by conducting self-dealing transactions at the expense of the 
subsidiary’s investors. Therefore, positive information of parent firm level may 
result from expropriation decisions by the parent firm, resulting in negative 
information to the subsidiary. 
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Similarly, when the subsidiary announces a positive information, but even if 
the parent firm’s investors are conscious of its ownership link and expect that 
the positive information of the subsidiary result from the parent firm or other 
subsidiaries in the group, they may be skeptical about whether the overall 
information is positive for the parent firm. For example, the subsidiary could 
extract earnings from other subsidiaries in a parent firm by conducting self-
dealing transactions at the expense of other subsidiaries’ investors. Therefore, 
positive information of the subsidiary may result from expropriation decisions 
from that subsidiary to other subsidiaries of a parent firm, resulting in overall 
negative information to the parent firm. 
 
I use the Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing index28 which estimates the 
legal protection of minority investors against expropriation and self-dealing and 
the Djankov et al. (2008) public enforcement index29 which estimates the 
extent to which contracts are enforced in a court of law to measure one 
country’s tunneling possibility.  
 
Table 3.6: Tunneling Effect 
This table reports that tunneling effect to explain return predictability. In panel A and B, for 
month 3, I sort parent firm stocks into three groups based on the 20th and 80th percentiles of 
the sample distribution of each proxy measured for tunneling. Within each of the proxy group, 
I further sort parent firm stocks into three portfolios using the 20th and 80th breakpoints of 
lagged subsidiary stock returns ('()$,&*+). In panel C and D, for month 3, I sort subsidiary 
 
28 This index was downloaded at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html. 
29 This index was downloaded at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html. 
 136 
stocks into three groups based on the 20th and 80th percentiles of the sample distribution of 
each proxy measured for tunneling. Within each of the proxy group, I further sort subsidiary 
stocks into three portfolios using the 20th and 80th breakpoints of lagged parent firm stock 
returns (,-.$,&*+). T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West 
(1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three 
developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A Anti-self-dealing 
'()$,&*+ Low Medium High High-Low 
Low 0.10 0.38 0.41* 0.31 
Medium 1.01* 0.54 0.47* -0.54 
High 1.56*** 0.98* 0.57** -0.99* 
High - Low 1.46*** 0.60* 0.16 -1.30** 
 (2.74) (1.86) (0.62) (-2.06) 
FF6 alpha 1.43*** 0.58* 0.13 -1.30** 
 (2.78) (1.87) (0.51) (-2.01) 
 
Panel B Public Enforcement 
'()$,&*+ Low Medium High High-Low 
Low 0.64* 0.48 -0.19 -0.83* 
Medium 0.62* 0.72** 0.61 -0.01 
High 0.80** 0.91** 1.43*** 0.63* 
High - Low 0.16 0.43 1.62*** 1.46** 
 (0.60) (1.25) (2.99) (2.42) 
FF6 alpha 0.17 0.35 1.47*** 1.30** 
 (0.74) (1.18) (3.05) (2.28) 
 
Panel C Anti-self-dealing 
,-.$,&*+ Low Medium High High-Low 
Low 0.05 0.36 0.45 0.40 
Medium 0.83* 0.76* 0.55* -0.28 
High 1.30*** 0.86* 0.75** -0.55* 
High - Low 1.25*** 0.50 0.30 -0.95* 
 (3.62) (1.56) (0.87) (-1.86) 
FF6 alpha 1.30*** 0.38 0.33 -0.98* 
 (3.78) (1.31) (0.96) (-1.73) 
 
Panel D Public Enforcement 
,-.$,&*+ Low Medium High High-Low 
Low 0.37 0.51 0.07 -0.30 
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Medium 0.36 0.70* 1.01* 0.65 
High 0.49 1.05** 1.29* 0.80* 
High - Low 0.12 0.54 1.22** 1.10* 
 (0.36) (1.58) (2.42) (1.93) 
FF6 alpha 0.13 0.43 1.15** 1.02* 
 (0.43) (1.51) (2.28) (1.81) 
 
In Table 3.6, I use anti-self-dealing index and public enforcement index to 
proxy for each country’s tunneling possibility and split the all countries into high, 
medium, and low tunneling possibility countries. First, I test anti-self-dealing 
index and enforcement index to explain subsidiary-parent return predictability. 
In panel A, I find abnormal returns in low anti-self-dealing group are higher 
than that in high anti-self-dealing group. The alpha differences are statistically 
significant at 5% level. Also, in panel B, I find abnormal returns in high public 
enforcement group are higher than that in low public enforcement group. The 
alpha differences are statistically significant at 5% level. These results indicate 
that investors’ fear of tunneling decreases information processing efficiency 
and leads to subsidiary-parent return predictability. These results are backed 
up with the literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Atanasov et al., 2010). 
 
In addition, I test anti-self-dealing index and enforcement index to explain 
parent-subsidiary return predictability. In Panel C, I find excess returns in low 
anti-self-dealing group are higher than that in high anti-self-dealing group. The 
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alpha differences are statistically significant at 10% level. Also, in panel D, I 
find excess returns in high public enforcement group are higher than that in 
low public enforcement group. The alpha differences are statistically significant 
at 10% level. These results indicate that investors’ fear of tunneling decreases 
information processing efficiency and leads to parent-subsidiary return 
predictability. These results are backed up with the literature (e.g., Johnson et 
al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Atanasov et al., 2010). 
 
3.6 The Information Complexity 
 
Table 3.7: Information Complexity 
This table reports information complexity to explain return predictability. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is the monthly excess return of the parent firm and explanatory variables 
include the lagged subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged 
subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) and the dummy variable. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
the monthly excess return of the subsidiary and explanatory variables include the lagged 
parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) and the interaction term between the lagged parent firms’ return 
(,-.$,&*+) and the dummy variable. The information complexity proxies include subsidiaries’ 
complexity index (':a), parents’ complexity index (,:a), analyst earnings one-year ahead 
forecast dispersion (Disp_1y), analyst earnings long-term growth forecast dispersion 
(Disp_Ltg), advertising expenses to market capitalization (Advertising/MktCap), and the 
number of employees to market capitalization (Employees/MktCap). I use these variables and 
construct the dummy variable that equals one if the focal firm is above the sample median and 
zero otherwise. All regressions also include the dummy variable itself and lagged control 
variables. Control variables are same as in Table 2.3 and are unreported for brevity. T-
statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with six 
lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from twenty-three developed markets from 
January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub – Par (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global Global Global Global 
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Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
'()$,&*+ 
9.12*** 3.82*** 3.29*** 3.83*** 3.24*** 
(3.28) (3.42) (3.34) (3.39) (3.00) 
'()$,&*+ * (':a > Median) 
-5.93***     
(-3.05)     
'()$,&*+ * (Disp_1y > Median) 
 3.39***    
 (3.87)    
'()$,&*+ * (Disp_Ltg > Median) 
  3.01***   
  (3.54)   
'()$,&*+ * (Advertising/MktCap > 
Median) 
   3.49***  
   (3.57)  
'()$,&*+ * (Employees/MktCap > 
Median) 
    3.01** 
    (2.54) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 113,851 113,851 113,851 113,851 113,851 
!/ 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 
 
Panel B: Par – Sub (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*100 Global Global Global Global Global 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& !"#$,& 
,-.$,&*+ 
2.54*** 1.34*** 1.21*** 1.02*** 1.48*** 
(5.05) (3.73) (3.41) (4.01) (4.57) 
,-.$,&*+ * (,:a > Median) 
-1.34**     
(-4.17)     
,-.$,&*+ * (Disp_1y > Median) 
 1.52**    
 (2.41)    
,-.$,&*+ * (Disp_Ltg > Median) 
  1.25**   
  (2.16)   
,-.$,&*+ * (Advertising/MktCap > 
Median) 
   1.68*  
   (1.94)  
,-.$,&*+ * (Employees/MktCap > 
Median) 
    1.93*** 
    (3.03) 
Country & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 204,207 204,207 204,207 204,207 204,207 
!/ 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
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3.6.1 The Complexity of Ownership-Linked Firms 
In this section, I examine the complexity of ownership-linked firms to influence 
the stock price updating of the focal firm in a certain extent. The more complex 
the ownership-linked firms are, the more stronger return predictability is. For 
example, Cohen and Lou (2012) find that the complexity of sales information 
drives the return predictability from easy-to-analyze firms to difficult-to-analyze 
firms. 
 
First, I examine that the more complex the parent firm’s subsidiaries are, the 
more severe the lag in incorporating information into parent firm stock price 
will be, and thus the stronger the stock return predictability will be. I design a 
subsidiary complexity index (':a) to measure how the ownership complicates 
a parent firm according to a parent firm’s segment ownerships. The ':a of 










1mZ\.2ℎ5o$,f = 	2ℎ-.\ℎ1qY5Zr$,f	 ∗ 	`-.t\3	0-o53-q5[-351Zf, 
 
where 2ℎ-.\ℎ1qY5Zr$,f  is the parent firm 5 ’s shareholding percentage to 
subsidiary e . `-.t\3	0-o53-q5[-351Zf  is the market capitalization of 
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subsidiary e. For instance, a parent firm P holds three subsidiaries S1, S2, S3 
with ownerships 40 million, 30 million, and 30 million, respectively. The 
subsidiary complexity index (':a) for this parent firm P is conveyed as (.4)/ +
(. 3)/ + (. 3)/ = 0.34. The idea behind this measure is that the more dispersed 
a parent firm’s subsidiaries are, the more complicated information needed to 
incorporate into parent firm’s stock price is. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal 
to one if the subsidiary complexity index (':a) of focal firm 5 in the previous 
month is above the cross-sectional median of all firms. Then Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction 
term between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
The results of the test are reported in Column 1 of Panel A, Table 3.7. The 
regression specification is similar to those in Table 2.3, i.e., a Fama-MacBeth 
predictive regression with the dependent variable being parent firm return 
(!"#$,&) in the following month. In addition to the interaction term between the 
dummy variable and '()$,&*+, the dummy variable itself along with all control 
variables from the full specification (Table 2.3, Panel A, Column 1) are also 
included, which are unreported for brevity. I observe from Column 1 that the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term between an indicator of less 
complicated firms and past subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+ ) is negative and 
statistically significant, -5.93 (t = -3.05). For comparison, the unconditional 
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coefficient on '()$,&*+ is 9.12. Thus, consistent with the subsidiary complexity 
of parent firms driving the return predictability pattern, parent firms that are 
relatively less complicated, and so require simpler processing to incorporate 
information about any single ownership segment into prices, exhibit less 
pronounced predictable stock returns. The result indicates that investors have 
limited abilities to analyze complex subsidiaries’ information and have delayed 
responses to complex subsidiaries’ information. The investors’ limited abilities 
to analyze complex information lead to the return predictability. It is consistent 
with the finding of Cohen and Lou (2012). 
 
Second, I examine that the more complex the subsidiaries’ parent firms are, 
the more severe the lag in incorporating information into subsidiary prices will 
be, and thus the stronger return predictability will be. I design the parent 











where 2ℎ-.\ℎ1qY5Zr$,f  is subsidiary 5 ’s shareholding percentage hold by 
parent firm e. For instance, the subsidiary S has three parent firms P1, P2, P3 
with shareholding 20%, 30%, and 30%, respectively. The ,:a  for this 
subsidiary S is calculated as (.25)/ + (. 375)/ + (. 375)/ ≈ 0.34 . The idea 
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behind this measure is that the more dispersed subsidiaries’ parent firms are, 
the more complicated the information needed to be incorporated into the 
subsidiary’s stock price is. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal to one if the 
parent complexity index (,:a) of focal firm 5 in the previous month is above 
the cross-sectional median of all firms. Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are 
run by adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction term between the 
lagged parent firms’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Column 1 of Panel B, Table 3.7 shows that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between an indicator of less shareholding dispersed parent 
firms and past parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+ ) is negative and statistically 
significant at -1.34 (3 = -4.17). For comparison, the unconditional coefficient 
on ,-.$,&*+  is 2.54. In line with the dispersed parent firms’ value-relevant 
information of subsidiaries driving the return predictability pattern, subsidiaries’ 
parent firms that are relatively less dispersed (thus require simpler processing 
of information about parent firms into subsidiary’s stock prices) exhibit less 
pronounced predictable stock returns. The result indicates that investors have 
limited abilities to analyze complex parent firms’ information and have delayed 
responses to complex parent firms’ information. The investors’ limited abilities 
to analyze complex information lead to the return predictability. It is consistent 
with the finding of Cohen and Lou (2012). 
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3.6.2 Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion 
In this section, I test whether analysts’ forecast dispersion can explain return 
predictability. This test is motivated by findings in the behavioral finance 
literature. Chan et al. (1996) find that price continuation comes from a gradual 
response to information. Hirshleifer (2001) and Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) find 
that behavioral biases are increased when there is more complex information. 
Zhang (2006) proposes that behavioral biases are larger and price response 
is slower when there is larger analysts’ forecast dispersion for the firm’s value. 
 
Following Zhang (2006), I use dispersion in analyst earnings one-year forward 
forecast and dispersion in analyst earnings long-term growth forecast to proxy 
information complexity. Dispersion in analyst earnings one-year forward 
forecast (Disp_1y) is calculated as the standard deviation of analyst earnings 
one-year forward forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean of the 
analyst earnings forecasts in the previous month. Dispersion in analyst 
earnings long-term growth forecast (Disp_Ltg) is calculated as the standard 
deviation of analyst earnings long-term growth forecast in the previous month.  
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I propose that firms which have higher analyst forecast dispersion will have 
larger information uncertainty and thus slower investors’ responses. 
 
First, I test that the more analysts’ complexity the parent firms have, the more 
severe the lag in incorporating information into their prices will be, and thus the 
stronger the return predictability will be. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal to 
one if the corresponding analysts’ complexity proxy (i.e., Disp_1y or Disp_Ltg) 
of focal firm 5 in the previous month is above the cross-sectional median of all 
firms. Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by adding the dummy variable 
(J$,&*+) and an interaction term between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns and 
the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Column 2 and 3 of Panel A, Table 3.7 show that the coefficient estimates on 
the interaction term between indicators of higher analyst forecast dispersion of 
parent firms and past subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) are positive and statistically 
significant. These results indicate that investors have limited abilities to deal 
with dispersed analysts’ forecast information and have delayed responses to 
dispersed analysts’ forecast information. The investors’ limited abilities to deal 
with dispersed information lead to the return predictability. It is consistent with 




Second, I test that the more analysts’ complexity the subsidiaries have, the 
more severe the lag in incorporating information into their prices will be, and 
thus the stronger the return predictability will be. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is 
equal to one if the corresponding analysts’ complexity proxy (i.e., Disp_1y or 
Disp_Ltg) of focal firm 5 in the previous month is above the cross-sectional 
median of all firms. Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by adding the 
dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction term between the lagged parent 
firms’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Column 2 and 3 of Panel B, Table 3.7 show that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between indicators of higher analyst forecast dispersion of 
subsidiaries and past parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) is positive and statistically 
significant. These results indicate that investors have limited abilities to deal 
with dispersed analysts’ forecast information and have delayed responses to 
dispersed analysts’ forecast information. The investors’ limited abilities to deal 
with dispersed information lead to the return predictability. It is consistent with 
the finding of Zhang (2006). 
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3.6.3 Intangibles’ Complexity 
In this section, I examine whether intangibles’ complexity can explain return 
predictability. Investors are difficult to value complex intangibles’ firms. Morck 
and Yeung (1991) find evidence that the value discounts of the firm increase 
with growth of R&D and advertising expenses. Morck and Yeung (1992) find 
that multinational companies have a higher proportion of intangible assets than 
domestic companies, which are associated with higher returns. Hirshleifer et 
al. (2013) find that more technology-intensive firms are likely to be difficult to 
value, leading to a slower and potentially stronger information diffusion effect. 
The parent firms and subsidiaries which have more complex intangibles are 
more likely to be mispriced by investors. 
 
Chan et al. (2001) examine whether stock prices fully value firms' intangible 
assets, specifically advertising expenses. Companies with high advertising 
expenses to equity market value earn large excess returns. Belo et al. (2014) 
find that more hiring rate firms have higher average stock returns than less 
hiring rate firms. 
 
I consider these intangible variables in the literature, such as advertising 
expenses to market capitalization (Advertising/MktCap) and the number of 
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employees to market capitalization (Employees/MktCap). I use these variables 
to measure focal firm’s intangibles’ complexity. 
 
First, I test that the more intangibles the parent firms have, the more severe 
the lag in incorporating information into their prices will be, and thus the 
stronger the return predictability will be. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal to 
one if the corresponding intangible proxy (i.e., Advertising/MktCap or 
Employees/MktCap) of focal firm 5 in the previous month is above the cross-
sectional median of all firms. Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by 
adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction term between the lagged 
subsidiaries’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Column 4 of Panel A, Table 3.7 shows that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between an indicator of more advertising expenses to market 
capitalization of parent firms and past subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) is positive 
and statistically significant at 3.49 (t-statistic = 3.57). For comparison, the 
unconditional coefficient on '()$,&*+ is 3.83. Column 5 of Panel A, Table 3.7 
shows that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between an 
indicator of more number of employees to market capitalization of parent firms 
and past subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) is positive and statistically significant at 
3.01 (t-statistic = 2.54). These results indicate that investors have limited 
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abilities to process complex intangibles’ information and have delayed 
responses to complex intangibles’ information. The investors’ limited abilities 
to deal with complex intangibles’ information lead to the return predictability. It 
is consistent with the literature (e.g., Chan et al., 2001; Hirshleifer et al., 2013; 
Belo et al., 2014). 
 
Second, I test that the more intangibles the subsidiaries have, the more severe 
the lag in incorporating information into their prices will be, and thus the 
stronger the return predictability will be. A dummy variable, J$,&*+, is equal to 
one if the corresponding intangible proxy (i.e., Advertising/MktCap or 
Employees/MktCap) of focal firm 5 in the previous month is above the cross-
sectional median of all firms. Then Fama-MacBeth regressions are run by 
adding the dummy variable (J$,&*+) and an interaction term between the lagged 
parent firms’ returns and the dummy variable (J$,&*+). 
 
Column 4 of Panel B, Table 3.7 shows that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between an indicator of more advertising expenses to market 
capitalization of subsidiaries and past parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) is positive 
and statistically significant at 1.68 (t-statistic = 1.94). For comparison, the 
unconditional coefficient on ,-.$,&*+ is 1.02. Column 5 of Panel B, Table 3.7 
shows that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between an 
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indicator of more number of employees to market capitalization of subsidiaries 
and past parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) is positive and statistically significant at 
1.93 (t-statistic = 3.03). These results indicate that investors have limited 
abilities to process complex intangibles’ information and have delayed 
responses to complex intangibles’ information. The investors’ limited abilities 
to deal with complex intangibles’ information lead to the return predictability. It 
is consistent with the literature (e.g., Chan et al., 2001; Hirshleifer et al., 2013; 
Belo et al., 2014). 
 
3.7 Comparison among mechanisms 
My next step is to understand the relative importance of each of the above 
mechanisms which are potentially responsible for the return predictability. 
Following Augustin et al. (2019), I use the specifications within the setting of 
Fama-MacBeth regressions by adding interaction terms between the lagged 
subsidiaries’ returns ('()$,&*+), or the lagged parent firms’ returns (,-.$,&*+) and 
four dummy variables (J+ , J/ , JQ , and JR ) reflecting four competing 
mechanisms (investor attention, limits to arbitrage, opaque internal information, 
and information complexity, respectively) at a time, namely: 
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!"#$,	& − 	!L,& = 	 MN,& + M+,O,& + M/,P,&+	MQ,&	'()$,&*+ + MR,&J+ + MS,&'()$,&*+ × 	J+ +
MU,&J/ + M{,&'()$,&*+ × 	J/ + M|,&JQ + M},&'()$,&*+ × 	JQ + M+N,&JR +
M++,&'()$,&*+ × 	JR + M+/,&
V	W$,&*+ +	X$,&, 
and 
!"#$,	& − 	!L,& = 	 MN,& + M+,O,& + M/,P,&+	MQ,&	,-.$,&*+ + MR,&J+ + MS,&,-.$,&*+ × 	J+ +
MU,&J/ + M{,&,-.$,&*+ × 	J/ + M|,&JQ + M},&,-.$,&*+ × 	JQ + M+N,&JR +
M++,&,-.$,&*+ × 	JR + M+/,&
V	W$,&*+ +	X$,&, 
 
I take a different approach to construct the mechanism measure. Instead of 
having a mechanism correspond to a single variable, I combine the information 
in multiple variables. For example, there are three variables (residual 
institutional ownership, turnover, and number of analysts) to proxy investor 
attention mechanism. Rather than construct a measure using firms’ rankings 
on a single variable, such as turnover, I construct a composite measure (e.g., 
composite investor attention) by averaging rankings across multiple variables 
(e.g., residual institutional ownership, turnover, and number of analysts). By 
averaging, I aim to achieve a less noisy measure of each mechanism.  
 
J+ is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the firm’s composite investor 
attention characteristic (the average ranking of residual institutional ownership, 
turnover, and number of analysts) is above the median, and zero otherwise; 
J/ is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the firm’s composite limits to 
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arbitrage characteristic (the average ranking of small size (the inverse of the 
market capitalization) and idiosyncratic volatility) is above the median, and 
zero otherwise; JQ is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the firm’s 
composite opaque internal information characteristic (active internal capital 
market at 1% significance level) is above the median, and zero otherwise. JR 
is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the firm’s composite information 
complexity characteristic (the average ranking of complexity index, analyst 
earnings one-year ahead forecast dispersion, analyst earnings long-term 
growth forecast dispersion, advertising expenses to market capitalization, and 
the number of employees to market capitalization) is above the median, and 
zero otherwise. All control variables and fixed effects are identical to those 
reported in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.8: Comparison among mechanisms 
This table compares four competing mechanisms of return predictability using Fama-MacBeth 
regressions by including interaction terms between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns ('()$,&*+) 
or the lagged parent firms’ returns (,-.$,&*+), and four dummy variables (J+, J/, JQ,	and JR) 
reflecting four competing mechanisms (investor attention, limits to arbitrage, the opaque 
internal information of the conglomerate, and information complexity) at a time, namely: 
!"#$,	& − 	!L,& = 	 MN,& + M+,O,& + M/,P,&+	MQ,&	'()$,&*+ + MR,&J+ + MS,&'()$,&*+ × 	J+ + MU,&J/ +
M{,&'()$,&*+ × 	J/ + M|,&JQ + M},&'()$,&*+ × 	JQ + M+N,&JR + M++,&'()$,&*+ × 	JR + M+/,&
V	W$,&*+ +	X$,&, 
and 
!"#$,	& − 	!L,& = 	 MN,& + M+,O,& + M/,P,&+	MQ,&	,-.$,&*+ + MR,&J+ + MS,&,-.$,&*+ × 	J+ + MU,&J/ +
M{,&,-.$,&*+ × 	J/ + M|,&JQ + M},&	,-.$,&*+ × 	JQ + M+N,&JR + M++,&,-.$,&*+ × 	JR + M+/,&
V	W$,&*+ +	X$,&, 
An indicator J+  equals one if the firm’s composite investor attention characteristic (the 
average ranking of residual institutional ownership, turnover, and number of analysts) is above 
the median and zero otherwise; J/  equals one if the firm’s composite limits to arbitrage 
characteristic (the average ranking of small size (the inverse of the market capitalization) and 
idiosyncratic volatility) is above the median and zero otherwise; JQ equals one if the firm’s 
composite opaque internal information characteristic (active internal capital market at 1% 
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significance level) is above the median and zero otherwise. JR  equals one if the firm’s 
composite information complexity characteristic (the average ranking of complexity index, 
analyst earnings one-year ahead forecast dispersion, analyst earnings long-term growth 
forecast dispersion, advertising expenses to market capitalization, and the number of 
employees to market capitalization) is above the median and zero otherwise. I construct a 
composite measure (e.g., composite investor attention) by averaging rankings across multiple 
variables (e.g., residual institutional ownership, turnover, and number of analysts). By 
averaging, I aim to achieve a less noisy measure of each mechanism. All regressions also 
include the dummy variable itself and lagged control variables. All control variables and fixed 
effects are the same as in Table 3.1. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated 
using Newey-West (1987) method with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries 
from twenty-three developed markets from January 2008 to December 2017. 
 
Panel A: Sub-Par  
*100 Global 




'()$,&*+ * (composite investor attention > Median) 
-1.40 
(-0.69) 
'()$,&*+ * (composite limits to arbitrage > Median) 
1.73 
(1.24) 
'()$,&*+ * (composite opaque internal information > Median) 
2.53** 
(2.40) 
'()$,&*+ * (composite information complexity > Median) 
0.99 
(0.94) 





Panel B: Par-Sub  
*100 Global 




,-.$,&*+ * (composite investor attention > Median) 
-0.78** 
(-2.26) 
,-.$,&*+ * (composite limits to arbitrage > Median) 
0.50 
(0.91) 
,-.$,&*+ * (composite opaque internal information > Median) 0.57 
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(0.86) 
,-.$,&*+ * (composite information complexity > Median) 
0.41 
(0.80) 





The test results are reported in Table 3.8. We report the estimates for the 
coefficients of four interaction terms. In Panel A, I compare four different 
mechanisms to explain the subsidiary-parent return predictability. I can see 
that the opaque internal information fully dominates the other three arguments 
in both economic and statistical terms. Other three arguments are subsumed 
by the opaque internal information. The interaction term between an indicator 
of more active internal capital market and past subsidiaries’ return ('()$,&*+) is 
positive and statistically significant at 2.53 (t-statistic = 2.40). The other three 
interaction terms are not statistically significant. The results of Panel A show 
that the opaque internal information mechanism is the most important 
mechanism to explain subsidiary-parent return predictability.  
 
In Panel B, I compare four different mechanisms to explain the parent- 
subsidiary return predictability. I can see that the investors’ limited attention 
fully dominates the other three arguments in both economic and statistical 
terms. Other three arguments are subsumed by the investors’ limited attention. 
The interaction term between an indicator of more investor attention and past 
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parent firms’ return (,-.$,&*+) is negative and statistically significant at -0.78 (t-
statistic = -2.26). The other three interaction terms are not statistically 
significant. The results of Panel B show that the investors’ limited attention 
mechanism is the most important mechanism to explain parent-subsidiary 
return predictability.  
 
I will explain why the main mechanisms are different for subsidiary-parent 
return predictability and parent-subsidiary return predictability. First, why is the 
subsidiary-parent return predictability mainly driven by the opaque internal 
information (i.e., the internal capital market) rather than the investors’ limited 
attention? The intuition is that many parent firms are important to the economy 
and the stock market and are usually followed by lots of analysts and media, 
so investors should not have low attention and high arbitrage costs to these 
high liquid parent firms’ stocks. Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that three 
interaction terms of investors’ limited attention are only weakly significant at 
10% level. Cohen and Lou (2012) also find that investors’ limited attention 
cannot explain the standalone-conglomerate return predictability, since many 
conglomerates are usually followed by lots of analysts and investors. They find 
that sales’ information complexity is a new and the most prominent mechanism 
to drive the standalone-conglomerate return predictability. Similar with the 
conclusion of Cohen and Lou (2012), I find that investors’ limited attention 
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mechanism (statistically insignificant) is much weaker than the internal capital 
market information complexity mechanism (statistically significant) to explain 
the subsidiary-parent return predictability. The active but opaque internal 
capital market dramatically decreases the information processing efficiency 
inside the parent firm and mainly drives the subsidiary-parent return 
predictability. 
 
Second, why is the parent-subsidiary return predictability mainly driven by the 
investors’ limited attention rather than the opaque internal information (i.e., the 
internal capital market)? The intuition is that many subsidiaries (e.g., with low 
stock turnover, in different industries, and/or in foreign countries) are less 
followed by lots of industry analysts and local institutional investors, so these 
subsidiaries have low investors’ attention. Panel C of Table 3.1 shows that two 
of three interaction terms of investors’ limited attention are strongly significant 
with 1% level. The literature finds that the investors’ limited attention is the 
most prominent mechanism to explain inter-firm return predictability (Cohen 
and Frazzini, 2008; Huang, 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2019; Parsons 
et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). Another explanation is that investors 
are more likely to draw an accurate picture of a complex parent firm when they 
invest in the head of the group rather than in an entity within the firm network. 
As for subsidiaries’ investors, the parent firm’s information and other 
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subsidiaries’ information may blur information of the subsidiaries. Therefore, 
many investors may have less interest to pay attention to subsidiaries. Section 
3.5.1 also implies that the internal capital market activities (e.g., 
overinvestment and cross-subsidization) between subsidiaries in one group is 
more active and significant than the internal capital market activities (e.g., 
overinvestment and cross-subsidization) between subsidiaries in different 
groups. It indicates that the internal capital market is the prominent mechanism 




In this chapter, I analyze which mechanisms can explain the return 
predictability along ownership links. I find four underlying mechanisms to 
explain the return predictability. These mechanisms include: (1) the investors’ 
limited attention to focal firms, ownership links, or ownership-linked firms; (2) 
the limits to arbitrage, including high costs of arbitrage and difficult to leverage 
with borrowing capital; (3) the opaque internal information of the conglomerate, 
such as active internal capital market and tunneling effect; (4) the information 
complexity of focal firms or ownership-linked firms. 
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The contribution of this chapter is to find different mechanisms to explain the 
inter-firm return predictability in the ownership network. Besides traditional 
mechanisms (i.e., investors’ limited attention and limits to arbitrage), I find that 
new mechanisms (i.e., the opaque internal information and information 
complexity) can also explain the inter-firm return predictability. The two new 
mechanisms have essential implications for behavioral finance models and 
theories. In addition, I find that the opaque internal information mechanism is 
the most important mechanism to explain subsidiary-parent return 
predictability and the investors’ limited attention mechanism is the most 
important mechanism to explain parent-subsidiary return predictability. This 
chapter provides new perspectives to advance the understanding of the return 











CHAPTER 4 – Return Predictability in 
the Labor Competition Network based 
on Employee Satisfaction 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the relationship between employee 
satisfaction and firm value. In the traditional theory that focuses on the capital-
intensive firms in the early 20th century, employees are treated as a 
homogeneous and low-skilled labor force (Taylor, 1991). To maximize profits, 
a firm minimizes labor costs; hence, improvement of employee satisfaction 
comes at the cost of firm profits. However, the revolution of firms and the 
market over the past century has dramatically changed the role of human 
capital in firm performance. Innovation, quality, and management efficiency – 
all of which are crucial factors of firm success – depend on human capital. 
Edmans (2011) and Edmans et al. (2017) provide empirical support to the 
human capital-centered theories of firms: employee satisfaction is found to be 
positively correlated with future firm value and stock returns. Green et al. (2019) 
find that firms with improved employee satisfaction significantly outperform 
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firms with declines and conclude that employee reviews reveal fundamental 
firm information. 
 
What follows from the above is that firms with similar employee satisfaction 
must share similar firm fundamentals. With investors’ limited attention, firms 
with fundamental similarities or linkages exhibit momentum spillovers (Ali and 
Hirshleifer, 2019). Previous studies on limited attention and firm linkages have 
mainly focused on clear or contractual links among firms (e.g., Cohen and 
Frazzini, 2008; Lee et al., 2019). In contrast, the link investigated in the present 
study is implicit and less transparent. I focus on the implications of employee 
satisfaction similarity across firms on market price discovery and firms’ stock 
returns.  
 
According to the human relations theory, employee satisfaction could benefit 
firms via the following two non-mutually exclusive channels: motivation and 
retention. With regard to motivation, considering that employees are afraid to 
lose jobs they are satisfied with (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), employee 
sanitization can motivate effort (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986). Furthermore, 
employees satisfied with their firm are likely to self-identify with it and, on 
internalizing their firm’s goals, invest more effort into their work (McGregor, 
1960). Consequently, firms with different levels of employee satisfaction are 
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expected to show heterogeneous performance when they have to confront 
firm-specific shocks. For instance, during recessions, the firms with a relatively 
high level of employee satisfaction are more likely to demonstrate a better 
performance due to the high motivation of their employees.  
 
Retention, which is the second channel through which employee satisfaction 
can benefit firms, is particularly important in knowledge-intense industries 
where employees are a key source of value creation (Edmans, 2011). The 
firms associated with a high level of employee satisfaction tend to be more 
attractive for talented workforce. Accordingly, many of the largest firms in the 
world, such as Amazon, Coca-Cola, GM, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, 
among others, attempt to retain employees (and thus improve employee 
satisfaction) by providing highly competitive salaries, rich and diverse 
employee benefits, and a transparent mechanism of employee promotion. Yet, 
firms’ competition for employees is becoming increasingly fierce and 
transcends traditional industry- and state boundaries. For instance, IT firms 
are losing their technologists to quant hedge funds; robotics specialists are 
grabbed by not only engineering firms, but also by insurance, healthcare, and 
real-estate companies.30 In a study based on job posting reports, Liu and Wu 
 
30 See https://news.efinancialcareers.com/us-en/292721/silicon-valley-losing-top-talent-to-
quant-hedge-funds. Also, in its December 2, 2018 issue, The Wall Street Journal writes: 
“Some of the biggest recruiters of people with robotics expertise aren’t just tech outfits or 
manufacturers, for instance, but also banks and real-estate firms. Auto makers and a slew of 
Silicon Valley firms are hiring autonomous-driving technicians, but so is insurance giant 
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(2018) find that the overlap between product market rivals and firm’s labor 
competitors is less than 20%. As the competition for talents is not limited to the 
rivals within the same industry, a high level of employee satisfaction becomes 
a universal firm advantage.  
 
Due to the differences in the level of retention of talented employees, firms 
with a lower employee satisfaction will suffer more when the industry or the 
entire economy experiences shocks. Therefore, in order to retain talented 
workers and to attract new workforce so that to maintain and improve firms’ 
competitive positions, firms have to improve the satisfaction level of their 
employees.31 Firms frequently learn from and interact with each other, which 
leads to consistent knowledge spillovers among firms (Jaffe et al., 1993). Since 
firms with similar employee satisfaction operate in the common labor 
competition network, they have peer effects on employee policies. Such 
externalities in corporate policies across firms have been well documented in 
recent studies. For instance, in a study on peer effects among product rivals 
in terms of the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR), Cao et al. 
(2019a) found that employee welfare policy, a key component of CSR, is also 
 
Allstate Corp. And health-care company Johnson & Johnson has been recruiting experts in 
three-dimensional printing – touted as the next revolution in manufacturing – to develop 
customized orthopedics and surgical tools”. 
31 According to USA Today from Sep. 16, 2015, even snacks may “lure employees to new 
companies: 48% of respondents said that if they were looking for a new job, they would weigh 
company perks, including availability of snacks, in their decision”.  
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influenced by peer firms’ decisions. Furthermore, Lee et al. (2019) show that 
predictable returns across firms sharing similar technology are driven by 
spillovers in technological innovation among these peer firms. If there are two 
firms in the labor market, whenever one firm implements a new employee 
welfare policy, the other firm may also implement a similar (or the same) policy 
to maintain its competitive advantage.32 Owing to these peer effects on firms’ 
employee policies, one can expect a high return predictability among firms with 
similar employee satisfaction. 
 
In the present study, I investigate the level of employee satisfaction by using 
Glassdoor data – the largest career website that publishes, along with job 
postings for potential employees, company reviews written by former and 
current employees. The overall rating of a firm’s employee satisfaction is 
based on the following five sub-categories: Culture & Values, Work/Life 
Balance, Senior Management, Compensation & Benefits, and Career 
Opportunities. Based on each firm’s ratings on Glassdoor in June of the 
previous year, I obtain and rank top 1,000 listed firms (excluding financial 
 
32 For example, in its August 6, 2018 issue, The Wall Street Journal writes: “General Motors 
Co. has struck a deal with a Detroit-based hospital system to offer a new coverage option to 
employees…in an attempt to lower costs and improve care… A smaller number of companies, 
including Walt Disney Co., Boeing Co., and Intel Corp. have taken the more-ambitious 
approach of having the health-care provider manage nearly all of the care of enrolled 
employees... GM is the latest of a growing list of employers that are choosing to negotiate their 
own terms with health-care providers…”. 
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firms33 ) and test them for return predictability in the current year. 34  The 
predictor is defined as the distance- or equally-weighted measure of closeness 
of 20 neighbor firms (before and after the focal firm) with the employee 
satisfaction level similar to that of the focal firm. 
 
I start by testing whether similar employee satisfaction firms are fundamentally 
linked to each other as discussed above. I find that the annual employment 
growth of the focal firm can be predicted by the annual employment growth of 
its similar employee satisfaction peer firms in the previous year. I also find that 
similar employee satisfaction partners’ annual growth in revenues and 
profitability predict the focal firm’s annual growth in revenues and profitability, 
respectively. This evidence of fundamental linkages uncovers the economic 
nature of firms with similar employee satisfaction levels. 
 
Then, I empirically demonstrate a striking relation wherein the stock returns of 
the focal firms exhibit a predictable lag corresponding to the portfolio return of 
their respective peer firms with similar employee satisfaction. Focal firms with 
similar employee satisfaction firm peers that earn higher (lower) returns will 
 
33 Financial firms are often excluded in empirical asset pricing literature (e.g., Finke and 
Weigert, 2017, Lee et al., 2019) since the characteristics of accounting variables of financial 
firms are very different from firms operating in the real economy. 
34 Among all the US listed firms on Glassdoor, I focus on the top 1,000 listed firms with a high 
employee satisfaction, because human capital is less valuable in firms with a low employee 
satisfaction.  
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similarly earn higher (lower) returns in subsequent months. A trading strategy 
using a proxy based on the lagged monthly return of the distance-weighted 
similar employee satisfaction firm peers yields a monthly Fama and French 
(2018) six-factor alpha of 135 (value-weighted) and 179 (equally-weighted) 
basis points. Moreover, I observe a similar predictability with regard to each of 
the five sub-ratings of employee satisfaction. The results of cross-sectional 
regressions in the presence of various controls demonstrate that returns of 
similar employee satisfaction firms predict focal firms’ returns.  
 
I then conduct a number of tests to ensure that the predictive effect of similar 
employee satisfaction firms cannot be subsumed by the well-known industry 
momentum effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Hou, 2007) and various 
inter-firm momentum effects, such as the focal firm’s supplier and customer 
industry returns (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and Ozbas, 2010), the 
focal firm’s “pseudo-conglomerate” firm peers’ returns (Cohen and Lou, 2012), 
the focal firm’s strategic alliance partners’ returns (Cao et al., 2016), the focal 
firm’s technological partners’ returns (Lee et al., 2019), the focal firm’s 
geographic (i.e., headquartered in the same city of U.S. 20 largest cities) peers’ 
returns (Parsons et al., 2019), the focal firm’s analyst (shared analyst coverage) 
peers’ returns (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019), the focal firm’s subsidiaries’ returns 
or parent firms’ returns. Taken together, the results of all these tests 
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convincingly demonstrate that the return predictability across similar employee 
satisfaction firms is distinct from the return predictability arising from industry 
linkages or other inter-firm connections. 
 
I also test the return predictability between similar employee satisfaction firms 
internationally. To prevent a bias caused by a small number of multinational 
firms that are on the top employee satisfaction companies list of many 
countries, I use the top 1,000 listed firms (excluding financial ones) 
headquartered and primarily listed in Canada, France, Germany, and the UK. 
The results are mixed. In Canada and the UK, the returns of similar employee 
satisfaction firm peers predict focal firm’s returns. However, in France and 
Germany, such return predictability is not observed. These results are 
consistent with those reported by Edmans et al. (2017) who find that employee 
satisfaction is associated with larger economic values only in more flexible 
labor markets (e.g., Canada, the UK, and the US). In these markets, since 
firms face lower hiring and firing constraints, and employees have a larger 
flexibility to respond to higher employee satisfaction, employee satisfaction 
can improve recruitment, retention, and motivation. 
 
To better understand the mechanisms behind return predictability across 
similar employee satisfaction firms, I examine whether this predictability can 
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be explained by investors’ limited attention (proxied by firm turnover, analyst 
coverage, and residual institutional ownership), limits to arbitrage (proxied by 
firm size, idiosyncratic volatility, and funding liquidity), and/or information 
complexity (proxied by firm analysts’ dispersion, and number of employees). 
Based on tests, my results show that, focal firms exhibit a slow price response 
largely due to lower investor attention, more difficult to arbitrage, and larger 
information complexity. 
 
Next, in order to investigate the main reasons of the similar employee 
satisfaction firm peers’ anomaly, I analyze the stock price reaction around 
earnings announcements. This setting is frequently used to test whether risk-
based or mispricing factors can explain the existence of an anomalous return 
behavior (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1989; La Porta et al., 1997; Gleason and 
Lee, 2003; Engelberg et al., 2018, Lee et al., 2019). Here, if a significantly 
larger part of the return anomaly is realized around earnings announcement 
days, then investors’ misperceptions about a firm’s future performance and 
cash flows (i.e., mispricing) become a candidate explanation of the 
phenomenon. Alternatively, without spikes in the return anomaly on earnings 
announcement days, a more likely driver is some risk factor. According to my 
results, similar employee satisfaction firm peers’ anomaly spread is 800% 
larger on the earnings announcement days than on other days, suggesting that 
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it is mispricing (rather than risk) that is the more likely driver of similar 
employee satisfaction firm predictability. 
 
However, as argued by Lee and So (2015), return predictability can still be 
attributed to risk, even if the source of risk is unidentifiable. To test this 
possibility, I use an alternative approach to examine whether similar employee 
satisfaction firm predictability is consistent with a gradual diffusion of news 
relevant for a firm’s future cash flows, rather than with a change in discount 
rate or risk. I analyze the impact of lagged returns of similar employee 
satisfaction firms on focal firm’s standardized unexpected earnings (SUEs). 
This setting is not confounded by the possible existence of non-measurable 
risks. My results show that lagged returns of similar employee satisfaction 
firms can indeed predict SUEs, but with a decreasing predictive power over 
time that becomes insignificant after three quarters. This result provides further 
support to the conclusion that my return predictability pattern is unlikely to be 
related to risk. 
 
The contribution of my results to the literature is two-fold. First, I add to the 
growing research on the impact of employee satisfaction on firm performance. 
As shown by Edmans (2011, 2012), the stock market does not promptly value 
intangibles, such as employee satisfaction. Furthermore, Green et al. (2019) 
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argue that employee satisfaction is the source of fundamental information 
about the firm. Psychological and sociological scholars found the reciprocal 
effect between employee satisfaction and own firm’s performance (e.g., Weitz 
and Nuckols, 1955; Brayfield and Crockett, 1955; McGregor, 1960; Akerlof, 
1982; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Schneider et al., 
2003). All these studies highlight the importance of employee satisfaction to 
their own firms. In contrast, I examine the impact of other firms with similar 
employee satisfaction on the focal firm’s performance and find this relation to 
be distinct from other well-documented inter-firm links. 
 
Second, I contribute to studies on inter-firm competition for employees. 
According to the extant strategy theory (Hall, 1993; Coff, 1997), human capital 
is a source of sustainable competitive advantage for firms. Furthermore, Yu 
and Cannella (2007) found that the theory of rivalry for employees is limited to 
the firms within the same industry. However, Markman et al. (2009) point out 
that the competition for employees goes beyond the boundaries of the same 
product market and the same industry. I find inter-firm return predictability 
based on employee satisfaction and provide new evidence on human capital 
competition that transcends industry boundaries. 
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My results have important implications to the study of return predictability from 
the implicit inter-firm networks. Current literature focuses on research of return 
predictability in the explicit inter-firm networks (e.g., Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; 
Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). However, this chapter recommends further research 
to explore new return predictability from implicit and less transparent networks. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes 
the data and variables. Section 4.3 presents my main results on fundamental 
links and return predictability between employee satisfaction-linked firms. 
Section 4.4 analyzes underlying mechanisms. Section 4.5 rules out risk-based 
explanations by conducting both return-based and non-return-based tests. 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data and Variables 
I collect price, volume, and return data of US firms from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting information from 
Compustat. For non-US firms, I collect price, volume, and return data from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon and accounting information from Worldscope. I obtain 
time-varying Glassdoor ratings of top 1000 employee satisfaction ratings’ 
listed firms (excluding financial firms) where are headquartered and primarily 
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listed in the US market at the end of June each year, from 2009 (beginning 
year) to 2017 (end year). If two firms have same overall ratings, I compare 
their standard errors of five category ratings. The firm with small standard error 
of category ratings is ranked ahead of the firm with large standard error of 
category ratings. I use the Glassdoor firm ranking in June of year ~ − 1 to test 
return predictability from January to December in year ~.  
 
Institutional ownership data and analyst coverage for all firms in the sample 
are obtained from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) and Thomson 
Reuters I/B/E/S, respectively. The sample period is from January 2010 to 
December 2018 with a total of 108 months. Following Fama and French (2012), 
I use the one-month US T-bill rate to calculate monthly excess returns. 
 
The regressor of interest is lagged-one monthly returns of employee 
satisfaction-linked firm peers. It refers to as "'$,&*+. "'$,&*+ is constructed as 
the distance-weighted or equal-weighted portfolio returns of employee 

















where !\3f,&*+ is the stock returns of firm e in month 3 − 1. Y52_m\5rℎ3$,f,&*+ 
is a closeness measure between firm 5 and firm e in month 3 − 1. For each 
firm, I use 20 neighbor firms before and after the firm to construct firm peer 
predictor. I use the distance-weighted portfolio of firm peers to forecast the 
focal firm’s future returns. When firm 5  and firm e  are ranked closer, the 
predictive effect from firm e to firm 5 is stronger. For example, if firm A, B, C, 
D, and E rank 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, I use two neighbor stocks to construct firm peer 
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In contrast, \i(_m\5rℎ3$,f,&*+ is an equal-weighted measure. For each firm, I 
use 20 neighbor firms before and after the firm to construct firm peer predictor. 
I use the equal-weighted portfolio of firm peers to forecast the focal firm’s future 
returns. For example, if firm A, B, C, D, and E rank 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, I use two 
neighbor stocks to construct firm peer predictor. Firm C’s predictor at time 3 −
1  is defined as "'Å,&*+ = 	
+
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Table 4.1 shows the sample coverage and firm characteristics of the sample. 
In Panel A, I report the coverage of the sample as a fraction of the CRSP 
universe. The firms in the sample cover 65% of the CRSP common stock 
universe in terms of market capitalization, and 24% in terms of the total number 
of firms. The mean employee satisfaction-linked firms in the same industry and 
in same geographical location with the focal firm is 0.16 and 0.07, respectively. 
 
In Panel B, I summarize the firm characteristics. Firms’ mean market 
capitalization ($ bln) and B/M are 5.29 and 0.78 per month, respectively. Firm’s 
mean Asset Growth (AG) and gross profitability (GP) are 0.23 and 0.42, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for sample coverage and firm characteristics. The US 
sample covers top 1000 employee satisfaction listed firms (excluding financial firms) based on 
time-varying Glassdoor firm ratings from January 2010 to December 2018. These firms are 
NYSE/NYSE MKT/NASDAQ-listed and their share codes are 10 or 11 that are contained in 
the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged data file. Financial firms (with one-digit SIC code = 6) and 
stocks with price less than $5 at the end of previous year are excluded.  
Panel A: Sample Coverage Mean Sd Min Med Max 
% of total number of stocks covered 0.24 0.03 0.23 0.25 0.27 
% of total market capitalization covered 0.65 0.02 0.54 0.61 0.69 
% linked stocks in same industry 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.77 
% linked stocks in same geographic location 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.64 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics Mean Sd Min Med Max 
Market Capitalization ($ bln) 5.29 9.40 0.65 4.33 47.62 
B/M 0.78 1.16 0.04 0.52 5.17 
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AG 0.23 0.43 -0.73 0.21 0.99 
GP 0.42 0.27 -0.96 0.40 1.07 
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
I next show the main results in this chapter. First, I verify whether employee 
satisfaction-linked firms are fundamentally related. Second, I show that return 
predictability is robust after controlling for a series of firm characteristics, 
industry momentum, and other inter-firm momentum. In addition, I show that 
return predictability is robust in different sub-periods and sub-samples. Finally, 
I report the international tests. 
 
4.3.1 Fundamental Links 
I test whether employee satisfaction-linked firms are fundamentally linked with 
each other. First, I regress focal firms’ the growth of annual number of 
employees on the average growth measure of their employee satisfaction-
linked firm peers. In addition, I regress focal firms’ annual revenues and 
profitability growth on the average growth measures of their employee 
satisfaction-linked firm peers. I include year fixed effects and size and book-
to-market as control variables in all regressions. For brevity, the coefficients 
on these controls are not reported in the table. For ease of interpretation, all 
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independent variables are cross-sectionally standardized to have zero mean 
and unit variance. 
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Table 4.2: Fundamental Linkages 
This table reports the results of panel regressions. ES Employees’ growth (t) is calculated as the distance-weighted average employees’ growth of 
employee satisfaction-linked firm peers. ES Revenue growth (t) is calculated as the distance-weighted average revenue growth of employee satisfaction-
linked firm peers. ES Profit growth (t) is calculated as the distance-weighted average profit growth of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers. All variables 
are measured at the end of each calendar year and are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Independent variables are cross-sectionally standardized to 
have zero mean and unit variance. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects and size and book-to-market ratio as control variables. T-
statistics based on standard errors clustered by year are shown below coefficient estimates. *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level. The sample 
covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 














ES Employees’ growth (t) 0.272***      
 (19.30)      
ES Employees’ growth (t)  0.045***     
  (3.28)     
ES Revenue growth (t)   0.186***    
   (17.23)    
ES Revenue growth (t)    0.033***   
    (4.52)   
ES Profit growth (t)     0.047***  
     (16.18)  
ES Profit growth (t)      0.008*** 
      (4.21) 
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Year & Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 8640 7680 8,640 7,680 8,640 7,680 




The results are shown in Table 4.2. In the first two columns of Table 4.2, the 
dependent variables are focal firm’s current-year and one-year ahead number 
of employees’ growth. The column 2 shows that distance-weighted employee 
satisfaction-linked firm peers’ number of employees’ growth can positively 
predict firm number of employees’ growth. In column 3 and 4, the dependent 
variables become current-year and one-year ahead focal firm’s revenues 
growth. The column 4 shows that distance-weighted employee satisfaction-
linked firm peers’ revenues growth can positively forecast firm revenues 
growth. In final two columns, the dependent variables are current-year and 
one-year ahead focal firm’s profit growth. The result in column 6 shows that 
distance-weighted employee satisfaction-linked firm peers’ profit growth is a 
strong predictor of future firm profit growth. 
 
These results strongly justify that employee satisfaction-linked firms are 
fundamentally related. The evidence of fundamental linkages uncovers that 
the economic nature of firms with similar employee satisfaction level. 
 
4.3.2 Univariate Portfolio Sorts  
In this section, I design a trading strategy between employee satisfaction-
linked firms. To conduct the test, I construct distance-weighted portfolio of 
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employee satisfaction-linked firm peers and equal-weighted portfolio of 
employee satisfaction-linked firm peers as two predictors. According to the 
Glassdoor firm ranking in year ! − 1, I classify stocks into 5 quintiles. Quintile 
1 focal firms have lowest employee satisfaction-linked firm peers’ portfolio 
returns of lagged one-month. Quintile 5 focal firms have highest employee 
satisfaction-linked firm peers’ portfolio returns of lagged one-month. Then, I 
calculate the value weighted and equal weighted portfolio returns of lowest and 
highest quintiles as well as the hedged portfolio returns of Quintile 5 minus 
Quintile 1 with corresponding statistical significance level.35 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)36 is unable to explain satisfactorily 
the cross-sectional stock returns (Fama and French, 1992; Jagannathan and 
Wang, 1996). Therefore, I use Fama and French’s (2015) five-factor model 
and Fama and French’s (2018) six-factor model to examine cross-sectional 
variation in alphas, since the cross-sectional variation in expected returns can 
be captured by these hedged style factors (SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, and 
MOM). If the hedged portfolio returns have high correlation with one hedged 
style factor returns, those hedged portfolio returns are absorbed or subsumed 
 
35 In order to adjust for serial correlation in monthly stock returns, I use Newey and West (1987) 
standard errors with three lags in the statistical tests. 
36 This is the static CAPM. 
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by the hedged style factor returns. In other words, that hedged portfolio 
(strategy) does not contribute abnormal returns (alphas). 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): 
$%&' − $( = 	+, + ./(123 − $() +	5', 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model: 
$%&' − $( = 	+, + ./(123 − $() + .6718 + .9:1; + .<$1= + .>?1@ +	5', 
Fama and French (2018) six-factor model: 




Following Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018), I define these risk factors in 
the thesis. 123 − $(, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, and MOM include all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ firms. Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018) use the six 
value-weight portfolios formed on size and book-to-market, the six value-
weight portfolios formed on size and operating profitability, the six value-weight 
portfolios formed on size and investment, and the six value-weight portfolios 
formed on size and prior (2-12) returns to construct SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, 
and MOM factors. 
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123 − $( : the excess return of the market. 123 − $(  is the value-weight 
return of all CRSP firms minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
 
SMB (Small Minus Big): the nine small stock portfolios’ average return minus 








































HML (High Minus Low): the two value portfolios’ average return minus the two 




	(7HIJJ	KIJLM + 8TU	KIJLM) −	
1
2
	(7HIJJ	POQR3ℎ + 8TU	POQR3ℎ). 
 
RMW (Robust Minus Weak): the two robust operating profitability portfolios’ 





	(7HIJJ	$QYLZ3 + 8TU	$QYLZ3) −	
1
2
	(7HIJJ	=MI2 + 8TU	=MI2). 
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CMA (Conservative Minus Aggressive): the two conservative investment 





	(7HIJJ	?Q^ZMO_I3T_M + 8TU	?Q^ZMO_I3T_M) −	
1
2
	(7HIJJ	@UUOMZZT_M + 8TU	@UUOMZT_M). 
 
MOM: the two high prior return portfolios’ average return minus the two low 




	(7HIJJ	:TUℎ + 8TU	:TUℎ) −	
1
2
	(7HIJJ	;QR + 8TU	;QR). 
 
Table 4.3 provides strong evidence that lagged returns of employee 
satisfaction-linked firm peers can forecast focal firm’s stock returns. Panel A 
shows that monthly excess returns of focal firm stocks which have highest 
lagged one-month’s returns of distance- or equal-weighted portfolio of 
employee satisfaction-linked firm peers have significantly higher monthly 
excess returns than those which have lowest lagged one-month’s returns of 
distance- or equal-weighted portfolio of employee satisfaction-linked firm 
peers.  
 
In Panel B and Panel C of Table 4.3, I report five-factor and six-factor abnormal 
returns of long-short focal firm portfolios based on distance- and equal-
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weighted portfolio of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers. The alpha results 
show the consistent results as excess returns of Panel A. The value- and 
equal-weighted long-short strategy based on lagged one-monthly return of 
distance-weighted portfolio of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers yields 
monthly Fama and French six-factor (2018) abnormal returns of 135 basis 
points (3 = 3.03) and 179 basis points (3 = 3.64). Overall, the results in Table 
4.3 show that employee satisfaction-linked firm peers’ lagged returns have 
predictive power to focal firm’s future returns. 
 
Table 4.3: Univariate Portfolio Sorts 
This table reports the results of value- and equal-weighted univariate portfolio sorts of return 
predictability in labor competition network based on employee satisfaction. I use equal- and 
distance- weighted portfolio of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers to forecast the returns 
of focal firms. Panel A presents average excess returns for lowest and highest quintile 
portfolios and the 5-1 difference portfolio. Panel B reports abnormal returns for lowest and 
highest quintile portfolios and the 5-1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2015) 
five-factor model. Panel C reports abnormal returns for lowest and highest quintile portfolios 
and the 5-1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model. The risk 
factors are downloaded from the webpage of Kenneth French. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with three lags. **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers firms 
from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 
Panel A: Excess returns 
US (1) (2) 
Value Weights Equal Distance 
1 (Low) -0.20 -0.21 
5 (High) 0.82** 0.96** 
5-1 1.02** 1.17*** 
 (2.43) (2.70) 
Equal Weights Equal Distance 
1 (Low) -0.08 -0.07 
5 (High) 1.27*** 1.49*** 
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5-1 1.35*** 1.56*** 
 (2.84) (3.22) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
alphas 
US (1) (2) 
Value Weights Equal Distance 
1 (Low) -0.73* -0.86* 
5 (High) 0.50* 0.58* 
5-1 1.23*** 1.44*** 
 (2.81) (3.19) 
Equal Weights Equal Distance 
1 (Low) -0.90** -1.08** 
5 (High) 0.72* 0.83* 
5-1 1.62*** 1.91*** 
 (3.32) (3.84) 
 
Panel C: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
US (1) (2) 
Value Weights Equal Distance 
1 (Low) -0.67* -0.79* 
5 (High) 0.49 0.56 
5-1 1.16*** 1.35*** 
 (2.69) (3.03) 
Equal Weights Equal Distance 
1 (Low) -0.82** -0.99** 
5 (High) 0.70 0.80 
5-1 1.53*** 1.79*** 
 (3.17) (3.64) 
 
Furthermore, I also test the long-run return pattern of the predictive effect of 
firm peers with similar employee satisfaction. My aim here is to examine 
whether the documented strong return predictability effect represents an 
overreaction in focal firm information, in which case I should expect a reversal 
in the longer run. Alternatively, if similar employee satisfaction firm peers’ 
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information truly captures the focal firms’ fundamental information, I should 
see no reversal.  
 
To examine these two alternative explanations, I look at the cumulative excess 
returns (CERs) to the portfolio strategy over the 12-month period. In Figure 4.1, 
I depict these long-run CERs delivered by both value-weighted and equally-
weighted portfolios. As can be seen in the figure, there is a significant upward 
drift in CERs over the first six months. The CERs flatten for the later months, 
showing no signs of reversal in the long run. These findings imply that the 
similar employee satisfaction firm predictability effect is not a simple 
overreaction to information. Rather, consistent with previous inter-firm return 
predictability studies (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Lee et al., 2019), my results 
reflect a delayed updating of focal firm prices to their fundamental values 
based on important information emanating from their similar employee 
satisfaction firm peers. 
 
Figure 4.1: Long-run Cumulative Excess Returns 
This figure shows cumulative excess returns (CERs) of the hedged similar employee 
satisfaction (SES) firm portfolio in the twelve months after portfolio formation. The sample 
period is from January 2010 to December 2018. At the beginning of each month, each focal 
firm is ranked in the ascending order based on the portfolio return of its peer firms with similar 
employee satisfaction at the end of the previous month. The portfolio of peer firms is based 
on [-20, +20] neighbor stocks for each focal firm. The ranked stocks are assigned into the five 
quintile portfolios. All stocks are value- (equal-) weighted within each portfolio, and the 





4.3.3 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
In this section, I use Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to analyze 
whether the employee satisfaction-linked firms’ return predictability remains 
robust after regulating the industry momentum and an array of different firm 
characteristics. Compared with other approaches (e.g., pooled OLS 
regressions) to deal with panel data, the Fama-MacBeth regressions take into 
account the cross-correlations and the serial correlation in the error term, so 
that the t-statistics are much more conservative (Choe et al., 2005). In addition, 
the Fama-MacBeth regressions are computationally simple to implement and 








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Cumulative excess returns on the hedged portfolio of SES firms
Value-weighted Equally-weighted
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et al., 2018). The stock-level’s Fama-MacBeth regression is made up of two 
steps. In the first step, I utilize the cross-sectional regression in each month as 
following: 
 




where $%&',g − $(,g	is the excess return on focal firm’s stock T in month 3; h,,g 
denotes the intercept; h/,i,g industry-specific dummy variable which is equal 
to one if focal firm T  is from industry m  and zero otherwise; %7',gj/	 is 
employee satisfaction-linked firms’ stock return in month 3 − 1 ; l',gj/ 
represents a vector of firm characteristics, including Ln(Size) the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalization measured in million dollars (Banz. 1981), 
Ln(B/M) the natural logarithm of book-to-market equity ratio (Basu, 1983), 
1QH  the cumulative return of stock T  from month 3 − 12	3Q	3 − 2 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), $%&',gj/	the stock return of focal firm T  in 
month 	3 − 1  (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lo and MacKinlay, 1990), Turnover the 
number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding during 
a day, averaged over the past twelve months (Rouwenhorst, 1999; Ibbotson 
et al., 2013), n^m_HQH the value-weighted two-digit SIC industry return of the 
focal firm in month 3 − 1 (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 1999; Nijman et al., 2004), 
asset growth (AG) the year-over-year growth rate of total assets (Cooper et al., 
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2008), gross profitability (GP) the revenue minus cost of goods sold scaled by 
assets (Novy-Marx, 2013), and best employee satisfaction companies (BC) to 
define as a 0-1 dummy variable that equals one if the focal firm is in the most 
recent top 100 employee satisfaction firm list and zero otherwise (Edmans, 
2011). 
 
The literature has found 452 forecasting variables to explain and predict the 
cross-sectional stock returns (Hou et al., 2018). However, I cannot use all of 
these forecasting variables as controls in my Fama-MacBeth regressions, 
since there is the serious overfitting problem (Han et al., 2018). I have to 
choose limited representative variables from different category of variables. 
For example, the book/market ratio is a representative variable of the “value” 
variables, since Fama and French (1993) find that the book/market ratio can 
explain the value effect and absorb the predictive power of other “value” 
variables (e.g., earnings/price, dividend yield, and cash flow/price). Hou et al. 
(2018) divide 452 anomalies/forecasting variables into six categories (value, 
momentum, investment, profitability, intangibles, and trading frictions). 
Therefore, I select some representative forecasting variables from six 
categories as controls. These control variables are also widely used in Fama- 
MacBeth regressions in other inter-firm return predictability papers (e.g., 
Cohen and Lou, 2012; Lee et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). 
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After the first step, I obtain the time-series coefficients for each explanatory 
variable. The second step is to verify whether the average coefficient estimates 
are statistically different from zero. Bali et al. (2016) document steps to 
calculate standard errors by using the Newey-West (1987) method. In the 
second step, I firstly calculate the mean of time-series coefficients for each 
explanatory variable. And then I regress the time-series coefficients on a 
vector of ones to obtain the time-series residuals for each explanatory variable. 
Thirdly, I input the time-series residuals and a vector of ones to the Newey and 
West (1987) adjustment to compute the standard errors to deal with 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Finally, the t-statistics are calculated 
by the mean of time-series coefficients divided by the standard errors. Table 
4.4 reports the mean of time-series coefficients and the corresponding t-
statistics. 
 
The standard errors are computed using the Newey and West (1987) 
adjustment with 3 lags.37 The choice of the lag length from 1 to 12 does not 
influence the significance of in any of my tests. The monthly return 
predictability literature believes that residuals are heteroskedastic and/or 
 
37  As the time between error terms increases, the correlation between the error terms 
decreases (Greene, 1997). Therefore, I use the Newey and West (1987) adjustment with 3 
lags. 
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autocorrelated within one year (12 months). For example, Cohen and Lou 
(2012) use Newey and West (1987) adjustment with 12 lags to compute the 
standard errors. Li et al. (2016) use Newey and West (1987) adjustment with 
6 lags to compute the standard errors.  
 
Table 4.4: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table reports the results of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting 
regressions. The dependent variable is the excess return of the focal firm ($%&',g), the risk-
adjusted return of the focal firm ($%&',g
piqA), or the industry-adjusted return of the focal firm 
($%&',g'ri). The risk-adjusted return of the focal firm is adjusted with respect to the Fama and 
French (2018) six-factor model. The industry-adjusted return of the focal firm is the focal firm’s 
excess return over its value-weighted industry return (n^m_HQH',g). The explanatory variables 
include lagged one-monthly distance-weighted portfolio returns of employee satisfaction-
linked firm peers (%7',gj/), firm size (;^(7TsM)), book-to-market ratio (;^(8/1)), focal firm’s 
own lagged monthly return ($%&',gj/), medium-term price momentum (1QH), asset growth 
(@P), gross profitability (Pu), best 100 employee satisfaction companies (BC), stock turnover 
(&LO^Q_MO ), and focal firm’s value-weighted industry return ( n^m_HQH ). All explanatory 
variables are based on last non-missing available observation for each month t and are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Financial firms (with one-digit SIC code = 6) and stocks with 
price less than $5 at the end of previous year are excluded. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with three lags. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers 
firms from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
*100 Excess Excess Risk-adjusted Industry-adjusted 
Dep Variable $%&',g $%&',g $%&',g
piqA $%&',g'ri 
%7',gj/ 7.28*** 6.53*** 5.22*** 5.77*** 
 (4.63) (4.26) (3.52) (3.87) 
Ln(Size)  -1.25*** -0.52 -1.13*** 
  (-3.54) (-1.45) (-3.08) 
Ln(B/M)  0.67** 0.27 0.60** 
  (2.22) (0.88) (1.98) 
$%&',gj/  -3.86*** -3.09*** -3.46*** 
  (-3.15) (-2.58) (-2.81) 
Mom  0.32 0.15 0.28 
  (1.01) (0.52) (0.89) 
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AG  -2.10*** -0.83 -2.31*** 
  (-3.29) (-1.36) (-3.62) 
GP  1.83* 0.74 1.56 
  (1.74) (0.70) (1.49) 
BC  2.58*** 2.12*** 2.35*** 
  (3.13) (2.51) (2.78) 
Turnover  -0.32 -0.25 -0.29 
  (-1.47) (-1.18) (-1.34) 
n^m_HQH  3.67*** 2.93** 1.12 
  (2.75) (2.26) (0.82) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes No 
Obs. 103,680 103,680 103,680 103,680 
$6 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.03 
 
Column 1 of Table 4.4 reports the results without control variables. I find that 
the distance-weighted portfolio returns of employee satisfaction-linked firm 
peers can predict the future returns of focal firms. The results demonstrate that 
the coefficient of %7',gj/  is statistically significant at 1% level. Column 2 
reports the results with control variables. I find that the predictive power of 
employee satisfaction-linked firm peers cannot be subsumed by industry 
momentum and a series of firm characteristics. In column 3, I use risk-adjusted 
returns of focal firms, instead of excess returns, as the dependent variables. I 
compute risk-adjusted returns for focal firm T in month 3 as the difference 
between focal firm T’s excess return and its expected factor returns based on 
the Fama and French (2018) six-factor models in month 3: $%&',g
piqA
= $%&',g −
$(,g − v',/123',g − v',67HY',g − v',9:HJ',g − v',<$HR',g − v',>?HI',g − v',A1QH',g , 
where $%&',g
piqA denote the six-factor risk-adjusted returns of focal firm T in 
month 3, v',w is focal firm T’s factor loading with respect to the different risk 
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factors	x (x = 1,2, … ,6). To compute risk-adjusted returns, I use risk factors 
(123, 7HY, :HJ, $HR, ?HI, 1QH) from Ken French’s webpage. Following 
Fama and French (1992) and Cao et al. (2016) I compute the factor loadings 
for each focal firm by using a time-series regression over the entire sample 
period.38 I find that employee satisfaction-linked firm peers’ lagged returns can 
significantly forecast risk-adjusted returns of focal firms. In the final column, I 
use industry-adjusted returns ($%&',g − $(,g − n^m_HQH',g) as the dependent 
variable. By subtracting industry return from the focal firm return, I eliminate 
any predictability arising from monthly industry-wide auto-correlation in returns. 
Column 4 shows the magnitude and significant level coefficient for %7',gj/ 
remains virtually the same when I use the industry-adjusted returns ($%&',g −
$(,g − n^m_HQH',g) as the dependent variable. 
 
Consistent with univariate portfolio sorts in Table 4.3, the results of Table 4.4 
show that the portfolio return of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers can 
predict focal firm’s return.  
 
 
38 I obtain similar results when I use rolling estimates. 
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4.3.4 Controlling for Other Inter-firm Links 
In addition, I test whether the predictive power of employee satisfaction-linked 
firm peers cannot be subsumed by other inter-firm momentum. I test a series 
of inter-firm momentum variables. 7Lx_n^m',gj/  and ?LZ_n^m',gj/  are the 
supplier industry return and the customer industry return of focal firm T in the 
previous month (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010).	?LZ',gj/ is the customer return of 
focal firm T in the previous month (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). u?',gj/ is the 
pseudo-conglomerate portfolio return of focal firm T in the previous month 
(Cohen and Lou, 2012). 7@',gj/  is the strategic alliance partners’ portfolio 
return of focal firm T in the previous month (Cao et al., 2016).	&Mzℎ',gj/ is the 
technological partners’ portfolio return of focal firm T in the previous month 
(Lee et al., 2019). 	PMQ',gj/  is the average return of all other stocks 
headquartered in the same city of U.S. 20 largest cities in the previous month 
(Parsons et al., 2019). ?7',gj/ is the weighted average return of stocks that 
are connected through shared analyst coverage in the previous month (Ali and 
Hirshleifer, 2019). 7LY',gj/  is the ownership-weighted portfolio returns of 
subsidiaries of the focal firm T in the previous month. uIO',gj/ is the control-
weighted portfolio returns of parent firms of the focal firm T in the previous 
month. I also add control variables of Table 4.4 in all regressions. For brevity, 
these control variables are not reported. 
 
 194 
Table 4.5: Controlling for Other Inter-firm Links 
This table reports the results of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting regressions. This table reports the excess return of focal firm !, 
"#$%,'  is regressed on the lagged one-monthly distance-weighted portfolio returns of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers (#(%,')*) , inter-firm 
momentum (,-._012%,')* , (-3_012%,')* ,	,-.%,')* , 5,%,')* , (6%,')* , $78ℎ%,')* , :7;%,')* , ,(%,')* , (-<%,')* , or 5=>%,')*), and a vector of control variables, 
including industry momentum and firm characteristics in table 4.4. For brevity, coefficients of control variables in regressions are not reported. (-3_012%,')* 
and ,-._012%,')* are the supplier industry return and the customer industry return of focal firm ! in the previous month (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010).	,-.%,')* 
is the customer return of focal firm ! in the previous month (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). 5,%,')* is the pseudo-conglomerate portfolio return of focal firm 
! in the previous month (Cohen and Lou, 2012). (6%,')* is the strategic alliance partners’ portfolio return of focal firm ! in the previous month (Cao et al., 
2016).	$78ℎ%,')* is the technological partners’ portfolio return of focal firm ! in the previous month (Lee et al., 2019).	:7;%,')* is the average return of all 
other stocks headquartered in the same city of U.S. 20 largest cities in the previous month (Parsons et al., 2019). ,(%,')* is the weighted average return 
of stocks that are connected through shared analyst coverage in the previous month (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). (-<%,')* is the ownership-weighted 
portfolio returns of subsidiaries of the focal firm ! in the previous month. 5=>%,')* is the control-weighted portfolio returns of parent firms of the focal firm 
! in the previous month. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with three lags. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
*100 US US US US US US US US US US US US US 
Dep Variable "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' "#$%,' 
#(%,')* 6.53*** 5.68*** 5.61*** 5.49*** 5.93*** 6.28*** 5.55*** 5.34*** 6.01*** 5.09*** 5.65*** 5.24*** 4.46*** 
 (4.26) (3.81) (3.77) (3.68) (3.87) (4.04) (3.63) (3.49) (3.92) (3.32) (3.68) (3.43) (2.87) 
(-3_012%,')*  1.29*  1.03         -0.36 
  (1.78)  (1.45)         (-0.39) 
,-._012%,')*   1.38** 0.91         1.16* 
   (2.07) (1.43)         (1.85) 
,-.%,')*     2.33**        1.26 
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     (1.97)        (1.11) 
5,%,')*      2.82**       1.38 
      (2.03)       (1.01) 
(6%,')*       0.84      0.74 
       (1.15)      (1.03) 
$78ℎ%,')*        3.83**     1.90 
        (2.08)     (1.01) 
:7;%,')*         1.12*    0.90 
         (1.90)    (1.51) 
,(%,')*          4.36**   2.59 
          (2.35)   (1.40) 
(-<%,')*           2.28*  1.02 
           (1.81)  (0.90) 
5=>%,')*            1.38** 0.61 
            (2.05) (1.02) 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 103,680 98,169 98,169 98,169 8,147 24,362 14,469 35,579 96,494 70,097 31,114 20,746 5,832 




Column 1 of Table 4.5 shows the original result as Column 2 of Table 4.4. 
Columns 2-12 show that the predictor !"#,%&' cannot be subsumed by other 
inter-firm links, such as supplier industry and customer industry returns, 
customer returns, ‘pseudo-conglomerate’ portfolio returns, alliance partners’ 
returns, and technological partners’ returns, geographic peers’ returns, shared 
analyst coverage peers’ returns, subsidiaries’ returns, and parent firms’ returns, 
respectively. In column 13, I find magnitude and significant level coefficient for 
!"#,%&'  remains the similar after adding all these inter-firm variables. The 
coefficients of these inter-firm momentum variables become economically tiny 
and statistically insignificant.  
 
To sum up, these results indicate that I find a new inter-firm predictor which 
cannot be explained by industry momentum, a series of firm characteristics, 
and other known inter-firm predictors.  
 
4.3.5 Robustness 
This section supplies additional analyses and stability checks to guarantee 
robustness for the main empirical results. I perform univariate portfolio sorts in 
different samples to reveal the results of different stability and robustness 
checks. Table 4.6 reports the results of diverse robustness checks.  
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Table 4.6: Robustness 
This table presents robustness tests of the return predictability in labor competition network based on employee satisfaction. I report the Fama and French 
(2018) six-factor abnormal returns of value- and equal-weighted univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms in Panel A and B. Panel A performs abnormal 
returns for lowest and highest quintile portfolios and the 5-1 difference portfolio in different sub-periods, number of firm peers, and sub-samples. In Panel 
B, I perform univariate portfolio sorts in sub-ratings (Culture & Values, Work/Life Balance, Senior Management, Comp & Benefits, Career Opportunities). 
In panel C, I perform univariate portfolio sorts based on Burt and Hrdlicka (2019) adjustments. The risk factors are downloaded from the webpage of 
Kenneth French. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with three lags. **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
6-factor alphas Time splits # neighbor stocks Industry Location 
Value Weights 1st half 2nd half 10 30 Same Different Same Different 
1 (Low) -0.87** -0.70* -0.77* -0.81* -0.84* -0.73* -0.93** -0.64* 
5 (High) 0.62* 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.66* 0.45 
5-1 1.49*** 1.19*** 1.31*** 1.39*** 1.43*** 1.26*** 1.59*** 1.09** 
 (3.27) (2.74) (2.96) (3.10) (3.18) (2.86) (3.47) (2.57) 
Equal Weights 1st half 2nd half 10 30 Same Different Same Different 
1 (Low) -1.09** -0.87* -0.96** -1.02** -1.05** -0.92* -1.17** -0.80* 
5 (High) 0.87* 0.72 0.78* 0.82* 0.84* 0.75 0.93* 0.67 
5-1 1.96*** 1.59*** 1.74*** 1.84*** 1.89*** 1.67*** 2.10*** 1.47*** 
 (3.94) (3.27) (3.55) (3.73) (3.82) (3.42) (4.18) (3.06) 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
6-factor alphas  
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Value Weights Culture & Values Work/Life Balance Senior Management Comp & Benefits Career Opportunities 
1 (Low) -0.66 -0.69 -0.73* -0.89** -0.77* 
5 (High) 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.63* 0.54 
5-1 1.12*** 1.18*** 1.26*** 1.53*** 1.31*** 
 (2.62) (2.71) (2.86) (3.35) (2.96) 
Equal Weights Culture & Values Work/Life Balance Senior Management Comp & Benefits Career Opportunities 
1 (Low) -0.81* -0.85* -0.92* -1.12** -0.97** 
5 (High) 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.90* 0.79* 
5-1 1.48*** 1.56*** 1.67*** 2.02*** 1.76*** 
 (3.08) (3.22) (3.42) (4.06) (3.59) 
 
Panel C (1) (2) (3) 
Burt and Hrdlicka (2019) Excess returns 5-factor alphas 6-factor alphas 
Value Weights    
1 (Low) -0.19 -0.79* -0.73* 
5 (High) 0.88** 0.53 0.52 
5-1 1.08** 1.33*** 1.25*** 
 (2.54) (2.99) (2.84) 
Equal Weights    
1 (Low) -0.06 -0.97** -0.89** 
5 (High) 1.35*** 0.75 0.73 
5-1 1.42*** 1.72*** 1.62*** 
 (2.96) (3.52) (3.34) 
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In Panel A, I test the return predictability in different sub-samples and sub-
periods. First, In the first sub-period from January 2010 to June 2014, the 
value- and equal-weighted portfolio alphas are 1.49% and 1.96%, respectively. 
In the second sub-period from July 2014 to December 2018, the value- and 
equal-weighted portfolio alphas are 1.19% and 1.59%, respectively. The four 
alphas are statistically significant at 1% level. Second, I test the return 
predictability by using different number of neighbor stocks. I find that choice of 
number of neighbor stocks does not influence the return predictability, which 
eliminates the data mining concerns to firm peers. The alphas are similar with 
results in Table 4.3. In addition, I also divide firm peers based on industry and 
geographic location. Both same industry firm peers and different industry firm 
peers can generate statistically significant alphas. Same industry firm peers 
can generate larger abnormal returns than different industry firm peers. Also, 
both same location firm peers and different location firm peers can generate 
statistically significant alphas. Same location firm peers can generate larger 
abnormal returns than different location firm peers. These results show that 
information diffusion and cross-learning between employee satisfaction-linked 
firms are not constrained in the same industry and location but exceed the 
boundary of industry and location. 
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In Panel B, I present the abnormal returns (i.e., six-factor alphas) based on 
each of the five sub-ratings respectively: Culture & Values, Work/Life Balance, 
Senior Management, Compensations & Benefits, and Career Opportunities. 
As I expected, the alphas are statistically significant in all five sub-ratings, 
confirming the unanimous existence of information diffusion and cross-
learning on different factors among employee satisfaction-linked firms. In 
particular, the alpha based on Compensations & Benefits is the largest among 
all five cases, which suggests that the effect of the information diffusion and 
cross-learning (between employee satisfaction-linked firms) on 
Compensations & Benefits is the strongest among the five factors. This is 
consistent with the intuition that the compensation level (or other benefits) of a 
firm is objective and thus easier to verify and learned by firm peers than other 
factors (such as culture and work/life balance which are subjective). For 
example, if Facebook increases the salary level of its engineers, Google may 
want to follow up soon enough so that not to lose its existing engineers and 
maintain its firm competitiveness. 
 
Burt and Hrdlicka (2019) identify the correlation (correlated alphas) between 
economic linked firms. For example, this correlation makes sorting on 
customers’ returns or alphas an implicit sort on the alphas of their suppliers. 
Burt and Hrdlicka (2019) suggest one correction method by subtracting the 
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predicted returns of asset pricing model from the sorting return. Following their 
method, I use employee satisfaction-linked firms’ idiosyncratic return instead 
of their raw returns to construct predictors. I use the daily returns of each 
employee satisfaction-linked firm over the previous twelve months to calculate 
its alphas and factor loadings to the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model. 
Then I obtain each employee satisfaction-linked firm’s idiosyncratic return by 
using factor coefficient estimates and factor returns.  
 
Panel C reports the portfolio returns when I use each firm’s idiosyncratic 
returns rather than raw returns to construct employee satisfaction -linked 
predictor. The results are consistent with Table 4.3, when I remove the 
correlated alphas. The lagged idiosyncratic returns of employee satisfaction-
linked firms can forecast stock returns of focal firms. These results reveal that 
the information drawn out from the raw returns of the employee satisfaction-
linked firms is mostly orthogonal to the firms’ common exposure to asset 
pricing factor returns. 
 
4.3.6 International Tests 
In this section, I test the return predictability in international samples. I want to 
verify whether the return predictability between employee satisfaction-linked 
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firms is unified or mixed in flexible and rigid labor markets. The international 
samples include top 1000 employee satisfaction firms (excluding financial 
firms) that are both headquartered and primarily listed in Canada, France, 
Germany, and UK, respectively, to prevent my results being driven by a small 
number of multinational firms that are on the top employee satisfaction 
companies list of many countries. The dependent variable is the excess return 
of the focal firm, the risk-adjusted return of the focal firm, or the industry-
adjusted return of the focal firm. 
 
Table 4.7: International Tests 
This table reports the international samples of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
forecasting regressions. The international samples include top 1000 employee satisfaction 
firms (excluding financial firms) that are both headquartered and primarily listed in Canada, 
France, Germany, and UK, respectively, to prevent my results being driven by a small number 
of multinational firms that are on the top employee satisfaction companies list of many 
countries. The dependent variable is the excess return of the focal firm (!"#$,&), the risk-
adjusted return of the focal firm (!"#$,&
'()*), or the industry-adjusted return of the focal firm 
(!"#$,&$+(). The risk-adjusted return of the focal firm is adjusted with respect to the Fama and 
French (2018) six-factor model. The industry-adjusted return of the focal firm is the focal firm’s 
excess return over its value-weighted industry return (,-._010$,&). The explanatory variables 
include lagged one-monthly distance-weighted portfolio returns of employee satisfaction-
linked firm peers ("2$,&34), firm size (5-(2789)), book-to-market ratio (5-(;/=)), focal firm’s 
own lagged monthly return (!"#$,&34), medium-term price momentum (=10), asset growth 
(>?), gross profitability (?@), best 100 employee satisfaction companies (BC), stock turnover 
(#AB-1C9B ), and focal firm’s value-weighted industry return ( ,-._010 ). All explanatory 
variables are based on last non-missing available observation for each month t and are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Financial firms (with one-digit SIC code = 6) and stocks with 
price less than $5 at the end of previous year are excluded. I report only the coefficient on 
"2$,&34 for brevity. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West 
(1987) method with three lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The sample covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 
Country (1) (2) (3) 
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*100 Excess Risk-adjusted Industry-adjusted 
Dep Variable !"#$,& !"#$,&
'()* !"#$,&$+( 
Canada 3.58*** 2.94*** 3.29*** 
 (3.17) (2.60) (2.92) 
France -1.34 -1.07 -1.21 
 (-0.97) (-0.78) (-0.87) 
Germany -0.83 -0.64 -0.71 
 (-1.04) (-0.80) (-0.88) 
UK 2.75** 2.28** 2.48** 
 (2.38) (1.98) (2.14) 
 
The results are reported in Table 4.7. I find that return predictability between 
employee satisfaction-linked firms exists in flexible labor market, such as 
Canada and the UK. However, the return predictability disappears in rigid labor 
market, such as France and Germany. The results indicate that return 
predictability depends on a country’s labor market flexibility. The return 
predictability and information diffusion between employee-satisfaction-linked 
firms in the US are not anomalous in a global context. The return predictability 
exists only in countries with high labor market flexibility. These results are 
consistent with findings in Edmans et al. (2017). They find that investing in high 
employee satisfaction firms can generate abnormal returns only in countries 
with high labor market flexibility. 
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4.4 Underlying Mechanism 
In this section, I shed light on which underlying mechanisms can explain the 
employee satisfaction-linked firms’ return predictability. To explore the 
possible underlying mechanisms of the main results, I study the bivariate 
portfolio sorts to various firm characteristics associated with the extent of 
investors' limited attention, limits to arbitrage, and information complexity. 
 
Table 4.8: Mechanisms 
This table reports the interactions between employee satisfaction-linked firm peers’ past return 
and proxies for different mechanisms. Each month, stocks are sorted on each proxy into two 
groups, and then independently sorted on firm peers' past return into quintiles. I calculate the 
long/short Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas in each group and alpha differences 
between two groups. There are three variables to proxy limited attention, including turnover, 
residual institutional ownership, and analyst coverage. Turnover is the focal firm’s turnover 
measured as the average daily turnover in the prior year. Analyst Coverage is the number of 
analysts covering the focal firm at the end of the previous month. Res Inst Own is institutional 
ownership of the parent firm orthogonalized with regard to firm size at the end of December. 
There are three variables to proxy limits to arbitrage, including firm size, idiosyncratic volatility, 
and funding liquidity period. Size is the log value of market capitalization of focal firm at the 
end of the previous month. IdioVol is the standard error of the residuals from a regression of 
daily stocks returns in the previous month on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
Funding liquidity period is divided into low liquidity period and high liquidity period based on 
broker-dealer’s quarterly leverage that is defined by Adrian et al. (2014) and obtained from 
Federal Reverse. There are two variables to proxy information complexity, including analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and number of employees. Analysts’ forecast dispersion is analyst 
earnings one-year ahead forecast dispersion at the end of the previous month. Number of 
employees is the focal firm’s number of employees at the end of the previous month. T-
statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using Newey-West (1987) method with 
three lags. **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
sample covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018.  
 
Panel A: Investors’ limited attention  
US (1) (2) (3) 
Value Weights Turnover # Analysts Res Inst Own 
High 0.54 0.61 0.57 
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Low 2.16*** 2.09*** 2.13*** 
H-L -1.62*** -1.49*** -1.57*** 
 (-3.42) (-3.17) (-3.32) 
Equal Weights Turnover # Analysts Res Inst Own 
High 0.62 0.70 0.65 
Low 2.70*** 2.62*** 2.67*** 
H-L -2.08*** -1.92*** -2.01*** 
 (-4.24) (-3.95) (-4.13) 
 
Panel B: Limits to arbitrage   
US (1) (2) (3) 
Value Weights MktCap Idio Vol Funding liquidity 
High 0.59 1.90*** 0.77 
Low 2.11*** 0.80* 1.93*** 
H-L -1.51*** 1.10** -1.16*** 
 (-3.22) (2.49) (-2.59) 
Equal Weights MktCap Idio Vol Funding liquidity 
High 0.68 2.38*** 0.88 
Low 2.63*** 0.92* 2.41*** 
H-L -1.95*** 1.46*** -1.53*** 
 (-4.01) (3.13) (-3.25) 
 
Panel C: Information complexity  
US (1) (2) 
Value Weights Analysts’ forecast dispersion # employees 
Low 0.72 0.69 
High 1.90*** 2.01*** 
H-L 1.18*** 1.32*** 
 (2.61) (2.88) 
Equal Weights Analysts’ forecast dispersion # employees 
Low 0.82 0.79 
High 2.28*** 2.51*** 
H-L 1.46*** 1.72*** 
 (3.13) (3.60) 
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4.4.1 Investors’ Limited Attention 
If the predictive power of firm peers with similar employee satisfaction is 
related to investors’ inattention, I should expect a stronger effect for firms with 
less investor attention. I use the following three investor inattention measures 
in the literature: stock turnover, analyst coverage, and residual institutional 
ownership. I predict that firms with a lower stock turnover, analyst coverage, 
and residual institutional ownership will show a more sluggish stock price 
reaction to the information from firm peers with similar employee satisfaction. 
Turnover is the focal firm’s turnover measured as the average daily turnover 
in the previous year. The analyst coverage is defined as the number of 
analysts following the focal firm in the previous year from the IBES database. 
I use the residual institutional ownership, which is the institutional ownership 
of the parent firm orthogonalized with regard to firm size at the end of 
December of each year. 
 
Each month, stocks are sorted on each proxy into two groups, and then 
independently sorted on firm peers' past return into quintiles. I calculate the 
long/short Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas in each group and alpha 
differences between two groups.  
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Panel A in Table 4.8 show the alpha differences between high attention and 
low attention groups. I find that alpha differences are statistically significant at 
1% level. The results broadly support my ideas that the return effect is driven 
by investors’ limited attention. 
 
4.4.2 Limits to Arbitrage 
I also expect to see a stronger return effect for the firm stocks with more 
binding arbitrage costs, since investors are unable to freely trade and fully 
update these firms’ stock prices (Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Beneish et al., 2015). 
I use the following three proxies for the limits to arbitrage: MktCap, Idio Vol, 
and funding illiquidity. MktCap is the log value of market capitalization of the 
focal firm at the end of the previous month. Idio Vol is the idiosyncratic volatility 
– the standard error of the residuals from a regression of daily stocks returns 
in the previous month based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model. Finally, as defined in Adrian et al. (2014), funding liquidity period is 
divided into low liquidity and high liquidity periods based on the broker-dealer’s 
quarterly leverage and is obtained from the Federal Reverse. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.8 reports the results. I find that alpha differences between 
high limits to arbitrage and low limits to arbitrage groups are statistically 
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significant at 1% level. The results support to my hypothesis that return effect 
is stronger for the stocks with higher limits to arbitrage. 
 
4.4.3 Information Complexity 
The firms which have larger information complexity could generate larger 
return predictability effect, since investors who have limited abilities to analyze 
the complicated information are unable to fully update these firms’ stock prices 
(i.e., Cohen and Lou, 2012; Huang, 2015). There are two proxies to test 
information complexity, including analysts’ forecast dispersion and number of 
employees. Analysts’ forecast dispersion is analyst earnings one-year ahead 
forecast dispersion at the end of the previous month. Number of employees is 
the focal firm’s number of employees at the end of the previous month. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.8 reports the results. I find that alpha differences between 
high information complexity and low information complexity groups are 
statistically significant at 1% level. The results support to my hypothesis that 
return effect is stronger for the stocks with larger information complexity. 
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4.5 Risk or Mispricing 
From above sections I find that although the return predictability between 
employee satisfaction-linked firms cannot be explained by asset pricing factors, 
they are possibly driven by some unobserved risks. For example, if employee 
satisfaction-linked firms can proxy for changes in discounts rates of focal firms, 
which would change expected returns of focal firms. In this section, I shed light 
on whether risk or mispricing drives the return predictability. 
 
4.5.1 Earnings Announcements 
In this part, I examine if the return effect could be driven by unobserved risks. 
In the previous part, the observed return predictability between firms with 
similar employee satisfaction cannot be explained by the standard asset 
pricing factors. However, this predictability could still be driven by some 
unobserved risks. Indeed, I have previously shown that the six risk factors from 
the Fama French (2018) model, along with the industry momentum factor, 
cannot explain my results. However, other possible factors, such as the ones 
related to the focal firm’s discount rate, could also affect the firm’s expected 
return. Following Bernard and Thomas (1989), Chopra et al. (1992), Lee et al. 
(2019), and others, I examine how stock price reacts around the subsequent 
earning announcements. The intuition behind this approach is that, if the 
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anomaly is explained by changes in underlying risks, then the stock returns 
should smoothly adjust over subsequent periods. However, if the anomaly is 
related to mispricing, I should expect a stronger anomaly manifestation during 
the earnings announcement window, as the earnings’ release helps to correct 
investors’ prior expectation errors on firms’ future cash flows. 
 
Following Engelberg et al. (2018) and Lee et al. (2019), I conduct the test 
based a simple regression analysis. In this regression model, the dependent 
variable is the daily return of the focal firm’s stock instead of its monthly return, 
while independent variables are the similar employee satisfaction peer firm 
portfolio return, a dummy for an earnings announcement window (EDAY), as 
well as the interaction term consisting of these two variables. Control variables 
include the lagged values of the focal firm’s stock returns, stock returns 
squared, and its trading volume over the past 10 days. 
 
Table 4.9: Earnings Announcements 
This table reports regressions of announcement window daily returns (Daily Ret) on day-fixed 
effects, the ES variable, earnings day dummy variables, and lagged control variables. For 
brevity, control variables’ coefficients are not reported. ES is the distance-weighted portfolio 
return of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers in the previous month. An earnings 
announcement is defined as the one-day or three-day window centered on an earnings release, 
e.g., days D − 1, D , and D + 1. EDAY is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if that daily 
observation is during an announcement window, and zero otherwise. Following Engelberg et 
al. (2018), I collect earnings announcement dates from the Compustat quarterly database, 
testing the firm’s trading volume scaled by market trading volume for the day before, the day 
of, and the day after the reported earnings announcement date, and define the day with the 
highest volume as the earnings announcement day. Control variables are lagged values for 
each of the past ten days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. 
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Standard errors are clustered on time. T-statistics are shown in parentheses, coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The sample covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018.  
 
 One-day window Three-day window 
Dep Variable Daily Ret Daily Ret 
ES 0.004** 0.005*** 
 (2.54) (2.59) 
ES * EDAY 0.032*** 0.002*** 
 (4.83) (7.48) 
EDAY 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (6.97) (3.44) 
Lagged Controls Yes Yes 
Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,218,240 3,218,240 
!H 0.13 0.13 
 
Table 4.9 summarizes the estimation results. In column (1), the earnings 
announcement window is defined for one day only, while in column (2) – over 
three days. According to the mispricing explanation, I expect larger returns to 
the similar employee satisfaction firm strategy during the earnings 
announcement window. However, contrary to this expectation, for one-day 
earnings announcement window, the "2  coefficient is 0.004, but the 
"2 × "J>K interaction coefficient is 0.032. Said differently, the return spread 
based on the hedged similar employee satisfaction firm strategy is more than 
eight times larger during the earnings news release. For the three-day earning 
announcement window, the results show a similar pattern. Therefore, the 
results in Table 4.9 suggest that standard risk models are unlikely to explain 
the similar employee satisfaction firm portfolio return effect. 
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4.5.2 Forecasting Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
Lee and So (2015) show that anomaly return can still be attributed to risk, even 
if the source of risk has not been identifiable or measurable. Accordingly, in 
what follows, I test whether firms with similar employee satisfaction have a 
predictive power to standardized unexpected earnings (SUEs) of focal firms. 
Since SUEs can capture unanticipated changes in the focal firm’s earnings 
and are not return-based, the results of this test are not confounded by 
imperfect controls of risks. Furthermore, given that SUEs are also fundamental 
determinants of future cash flows of firms, the results of this test can further 
confirm whether the anomaly return is due to the changes of unexpected cash 
flows, instead of a risk compensation effect. 
 
To test the focal firms’ future earnings predictability, I use the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. Specifically, I examine whether similar employee satisfaction firm 
peers’ returns can predict the focal firm’s SUEs. The dependent variable is the 
unexpected earnings scaled by the standard deviation of unexpected earnings 
over eight past quarters, 2L".39 The independent variable is the lagged by 
one quarter return of similar employee satisfaction firm peers computed from 
 
39 Unexpected earnings measure is the year-over-year change in quarterly earnings before 
extraordinary items. 
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the preceding three months. I also add the focal firm’s own lagged 2L"s (up 
to four quarters) as control variables. The dependent variable is winsorized at 
1% and 99% in the cross-section, while all explanatory variables are scaled 
from 0 to 1 according to the assignment in deciles. For consistency, I restrict 
sample firms to those that have fiscal quarters ending in March, June, 
September, and December. 
 
Table 4.10: Forecasting Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
This table reports cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions of future standardized 
unexpected earnings (2L"s), defined as unexpected earnings (year-over-year change in 
quarterly earnings before extraordinary items) scaled by the standard deviation of unexpected 
earnings over the eight preceding quarters. The predictor ("2) is calculated based on past 
three-month returns of employee satisfaction-linked firm peers. The dependent variable is 
winsorized at 1% and 99% in the cross-section, and all the explanatory variables are assigned 
to deciles and scaled to range from 0 to 1. For consistency, the sample is restricted to firms 
with fiscal quarters ending in March, June, September, and December. I run Fama-MacBeth 
regressions with industry fixed effects. This table reports regressions of future 2L" from the 
next four fiscal quarters on the predictor ("2). I add 1-quarter to 4-quarter lags of the firm’s 
own 2L"s as control variables. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and calculated using 
Newey-West (1987) method with four lags. T-statistics are shown in parentheses, coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The sample covers firms from January 2010 to December 2018. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
*100 Quarter1 Quarter2 Quarter3 Quarter4 
Dep Variable 2L"$,& 2L"$,&M4 2L"$,&MH 2L"$,&MN 
"2$,&34 10.35*** 7.26*** 4.14** 0.93 
 (5.16) (3.62) (2.01) (0.54) 
Lagged 2L"s (4 quarters) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. (quarters) 36 36 36 36 
!H 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
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Table 4.10 shows the test results with unexpected earnings predictability over 
four subsequent future fiscal quarters; that is, the dependent variable, 2L", is 
estimated for quarters D  to D + 3 . As can be seen from the table, the 
coefficients on the lagged returns of similar employee satisfaction peer firms 
are positive, but significantly decrease from the first to the fourth fiscal quarter. 
The forecasting pattern decays over time. These results provide further 
support to my conclusion that return predictability between firms with similar 
employee satisfaction is consistent with a gradual information diffusion of cash 
flows, instead of changes in underlying risk. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I report evidence of return predictability of among U.S. firms 
with similar employee satisfaction by using a novel firm-ranking data based on 
employee satisfaction reviews from Glassdoor. I show that the lagged returns 
of firm peers with similar employee satisfaction can predict focal firm’s returns. 
This effect is distinct from industry and other known inter-firm momentum 
strategies and is not subsumed by the standard risk-factor models. I also 
illustrate that investors’ limited attention, the limits to arbitrage, and information 
complexity could explain the underreaction to information from firms with 
similar employee satisfaction. In addition, the results of my tests on similar 
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employee satisfaction firm return predictability in four other countries are 
largely consistent with those reported by Edmans et al. (2017). I also find that, 
while this predictability phenomenon is present in the flexible labor markets, 
such as those of Canada and the UK, it is not observed in the rigid labor 
markets of France and Germany. 
 
In order to examine whether the abnormal returns based on the information 
from firms with similar employee satisfaction are explained by the unobserved 
risk factors or investors’ mispricing, I use two different methods. Specifically, I 
test whether the lagged returns of firm peers with similar employee satisfaction 
(i) have a similar predictability effect on focal firms’ returns both on the earning 
announcements days and in other periods, and (ii) predict focal firms’ 
standardized unexpected earnings in the long-run over several quarters. The 
results of both tests indicate that my documented return predictability pattern 
cannot be explained by risk. 
 
The results of this study make two contributions to the literature. First, I add to 
the growing research on the impact of employees’ perception of well-being in 
their companies on their own firm performance, thus adding to such studies as 
Edmans (2011, 2012), Edmans et al. (2017) and Green et al. (2019). However, 
unlike previous studies, I examine the impact of other firms with similar 
 216 
employee satisfaction on a given firm’s performance, and show that this 
relation is distinct from known inter-firm predictability effects. Second, since 
my findings on the inter-firm return predictability within a group of companies 
with similar employee satisfaction provide new evidence on cross-industry 
human capital competition, my results also contribute to the body of work on 
inter-firm competition for employees (e.g., Yu and Cannella, 2007; Markman 
et al., 2009). 
 
The results of this chapter have essential implications to the study of return 
predictability from the implicit inter-firm networks. Current literature focuses on 
research of return predictability in explicit inter-firm networks (e.g., Cohen and 
Frazzini, 2008; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2019). However, this chapter advises further 
research and future directions to exploit new return predictability from implicit 














This thesis has provided new evidence and findings on inter-firm return 
predictability. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) propose that firms do not exist as 
independent entities, but are linked to each other through various relationships. 
Some links are clear and contractual, but some links are implicit and less 
transparent. In this thesis, I contribute to a new explicit inter-firm link, the 
ownership link, and a new implicit inter-firm link, the employee satisfaction link. 
I find return predictability along ownership links and return predictability across 
employee satisfaction links. My research has important implications for the 
return predictability and pricing factor literature. In the literature of return 
predictability, a large number of predictors constructed by the focal firm’s own 
information or own characteristics have been digested by popular factors 
(Fama and French, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018; Hou et al., 2015; Stambaugh and 
Yuan, 2016; Daniel et al., 2019). However, it is still difficult to explain my 
predictors constructed by firm partners’ information or firm peers’ information 
using popular factors. Therefore, my research is not only a thought-provoking 
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empirical fact with implications for investment strategy, but also has 
fundamental implications for the construction of new pricing factors.  
 
In addition, I also examine potential mechanisms to explain return predictability. 
In Chapter 3, I find that mechanisms of the limits to arbitrage, the investors’ 
limited attention, the opaque internal information of the conglomerate, and the 
information complexity, can explain return predictability along ownership links. 
In Chapter 4, I find that limits to arbitrage, investors’ limited attention, and 
information complexity can explain return predictability across employee 
satisfaction-linked firms. 
 
5.1.1 Summary of ownership links and return 
predictability 
In the first chapter, I find subsidiary-parent return predictability and parent-
subsidiary return predictability by using a sample of firms from twenty-three 
developed countries worldwide. In addition, I find a series of new sub-
predictors. I find that ownership-linked firms consisting of foreign firms, 
different industrial firms, minor firms, different name firms, or indirect firms 
generate a larger predictive power over the future monthly returns of focal firms. 
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5.1.2 Future research for ownership links and return 
predictability 
Two directions can be investigated in future research. First, I can examine 
return predictability along ownership links in developing countries. In the thesis, 
I study the return predictability in twenty-three developed countries. However, 
although the collection of ownership links and shareholding percentage data 
of developing countries is very time consuming, it will be interesting to see if 
return predictability exists in developing countries. This can be developed as 
a global investment strategy and help us better understand information 
diffusion in developing countries. Second, I can test bond return predictability 
along ownership links. Although stock return predictability research is 
mainstream in the literature, bond return predictability research is becoming 
increasingly important, since the volume of the US bond market is even larger 
than the volume of the stock market. Chen et al. (2016) study the bond return 
predictability in the supply chain. They find that the bond returns of customers 
can forecast the future bond returns of suppliers, which are similar to the 
findings of stock return predictability in supply chain (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; 
Menzly and Ozbas, 2010). They further find that information along the supply 
chain travels more gradually in the bond market than the stock market. 
Therefore, I can examine bond return predictability along ownership links and 
compare it with stock return predictability along ownership links. 
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5.1.3 Summary of mechanisms of the return 
predictability along ownership links 
In the second chapter, I examine the mechanisms that can explain and 
understand return predictabilities along ownership links. In the literature of 
inter-firm return predictability, a large number of papers use investors’ limited 
attention and limits to arbitrage to explain the return predictability. In this 
chapter, I use two new mechanisms, the opaque internal information of the 
conglomerate and the information complexity, to explain the return 
predictability. My research promotes a deeper understanding of inter-firm 
return predictability. 
 
5.1.4 Future research for mechanisms of the return 
predictability along ownership links 
In future research, I can conduct more robustness tests by testing these 
variables in different subsamples and subperiods. In Chapter 3, I test different 
variables of each mechanism in the global sample. For robustness, I can test 
these variables in regional samples and/or in two subperiods. It will be 
interesting to see whether these variables can explain return predictability in 
regional samples and different periods.  
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5.1.5 Summary of return predictability in the labor 
competition network based on employee satisfaction 
In this chapter, I find return predictability across employee satisfaction-linked 
firms by using the Glassdoor firm rankings based on time-varying employees’ 
satisfaction. I find that the returns of employee satisfaction-linked firms can 
forecast focal firm stock returns. A long-short strategy based on this firm peer 
predictor yields a monthly Fama and French (2018) six-factor abnormal return 
of 135 basis points with 1% significance level. This return effect is distinct from 
industry momentum and a battery of firm characteristics. I find that investors’ 
limited attention, limits to arbitrage, and information complexity may be 
economic mechanisms to explain the predictive information of employee 
satisfaction-linked firm peers. 
 
5.1.6 Future research for return predictability in the 
labor competition network based on employee 
satisfaction 
Although my current employee satisfaction-liked firm peers can forecast the 
focal firm’s stock returns, there could have been some errors in the 
identification of firm peers using the simple cross-section rolling methods. 
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Because there is no explicit link between each firm peer and the focal firm, 
some unconnected firm peers in the predictor portfolio could decrease the 
predictive effect. To obtain a pronounced firm peer predictor, I could use state-
of-art techniques, e.g., machine learning methods, to find accurate employee 
satisfaction-liked firm peers. I can use the Tibshirani’s (1996) least absolute 
shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) or Zou and Hastie’s (2005) elastic 
net (E-net) to select the individual firm peer to include in my predictor. Machine 
learning explicitly identifies the most relevant firm peers for predicting focal firm 
stock returns. Machine learning is increasingly popular in asset pricing 
research (e.g., Freyberger et al., 2017; Kozak et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2019; 
Rapach et al., 2019; Chinco et al., 2019). 
 
5.2 Implication 
The importance of the corporate network continues to rise in recent years. In 
the literature of asset pricing, the majority of predictors and factors are 
constructed by the firm’s own characteristics and information. However, this is 
just the beginning of the process of exploring and finding predictors and factors 
designed by firm peer’s information and characteristics. 
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In future research, I can continuously explore new inter-firm linkages and asset 
return predictability. Current research has found economic links, ownership 
links, technological links, and strategic alliance links, among others. In future 
research, I can explore alternative characteristic links, such as advertising links, 
environmental links, social links, and governance links. In addition, I could not 
only test stock return predictability along different linkages, but also test the 
return predictability of other assets, such as bonds, currencies, futures, options, 
and other derivatives. Finally, I could test the return predictability across 
different assets. For example, one firm’s stock return could predict the other 













Appendix – Definitions of main 
variables 
This table briefly defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis of this thesis.  
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